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FBIS-EEU-94-231 CONTENTS *1 December 1994*

NOTICE TO READERS: All material in this volume previously disseminated in electronic form.

INTER-EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Romanian President Views WEU Security, Bosnia *[Bucharest Radio]* 1
  Iliescu on Moldova, Balkans *[Bucharest Radio]* 3

ALBANIA

PDP Leader Discusses Participation in Government *[ZERI I POPULLIT 6 Nov]* 5
Prime Minister Promises Change in Procedure, Law *[RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE 24 Nov]* 6
Organized Crime Said 'Developing Dramatically' *[REPUBLIKA 20 Nov]* 8
Deputies Approve New Ministries, Aviation Bill *[Tirana Radio]* 9

BULGARIA

Rumen Yankov Elected Supreme Court Chairman *[Sofia Radio]* 10
Personnel Changes at Foreign Ministry Announced *[Sofia Radio]* 10
Nuclear Power Station Manager Explains 'Accident' *[TRUD 25 Nov]* 10
Party Official Discusses Foreign Policy Needs *[TRUD 25 Nov]* 10
Union Leader Discusses Union Financial Ventures *[PARI 25 Nov]* 12

CZECH REPUBLIC

NATO Membership Opposed by Russians *[PROGNOSIS 9 Nov]* 13
Zieleniec on EU Membership Prospects *[PROGNOSIS 9 Nov]* 13
Right-Wing Extremists Create Riot *[PROGNOSIS 9 Nov]* 14
Financial Practices of Far Right Party Questioned *[MLADY SVET 17 Nov]* 15
Persisting Chernobyl Contamination Detected *[PROGNOSIS 9 Nov]* 15
Speculation About New Cardinal Miloslav Vlk *[PROGNOSIS 9 Nov]* 16
Journalist Egon Lansky Ponders Allegiance *[PROGNOSIS 9 Nov]* 16

SLOVAKIA

Gen Joulwan Views PFP, Yugoslavia, NATO *[OBRANA 26 Nov]* 18
Acting Prime Minister Invited to EU Summit *[Bratislava Radio]* 19
Daily Publishes EU Demarche of 23 Nov *[SME 28 Nov]* 19
Meciar Discusses DU 'Fraud,' EU Demarche *[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA 28 Nov]* 19
Report on HZDS Republican Board Meeting *[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA 28 Nov]* 21
HZDS Regrets SDL's Attitude Toward Dialogue *[Bratislava Radio]* 21
KDH Chairman Airs Views on HZDS Objectives *[SMENA 25 Nov]* 21
Integration of Center, Right-of-Center Parties *[Bratislava Radio]* 22
Report on Republic's Continuing Disarmament *[PRAVDA 28 Nov]* 22
Moravcik Describes CEFTA as Necessary, Useful *[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA 28 Nov]* 23

HUNGARY

Horn Comments on NATO, CSCE, Minorities *[Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG 30 Nov]* 24
Romanian Ambassador Comments on Relations *[MAGYAR HIRLAP 30 Nov]* 25
Official Assesses Security Policy, Army Reform *[MAGYAR NEMZET 30 Nov]* 26
Government Decides To Reduce Ministry Personnel *[NEPSZABADSAG 30 Nov]* 27
Audit Office Head Views Budget Issues *[NEPSZABADSAG 29 Nov]* 27

POLAND

Pawlak on Defense Minister Appointment *[Warsaw TV]* 29
SLD, Walesa Reject Pawlak's Defense Candidate *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 30 Nov]* 32
Ceremony Cancellation May Affect Ties to Russia *[Warsaw Radio]* 33
KK Criticizes Cabinet's Pro-Russian Policy *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 30 Nov]* 34
Coalition Wants UP To Join; UP Not Interested *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 1 Dec]* 35
Pawlak To Control Official Travel of Leadership *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 30 Nov]* 35

ROMANIA

Customs Detains Serbian Vessel With False Papers *[ROMANIA LIBERA 28 Nov]* 37
U.S. Proposal on Bosnian Conference Noted *[Bucharest Radio]* 37
Kukan Views Bosnian Situation, Upcoming Visit *[Bucharest Radio]* 37
SRI Head Magureanu Makes Report to Parliament *[EVENIMENTUL ZILEI 25 Nov]* 38

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Butrus-Ghali: Talks With Izetbegovic 'Positive' *[AFP]* 40
  News Conference Held *[Sarajevo Radio]* 40
  Karadzic Boycotts Meeting *[AFP]* 40
  Butrus-Ghali Comments *[AFP]* 41
  Butrus-Ghali Briefs Media *[Sarajevo Radio]* 41
  Butrus-Ghali Leaves Sarajevo *[Sarajevo Radio]* 42
  Serbs Criticize Butrus-Ghali *[TANJUG]* 42
Rose Heads for Pale To Discuss Bihac, Missiles *[AFP]* 42
Captive Czech Observer Contacts UNPROFOR *[Prague Radio]* 43
Serbs Deny Plans To Shell Canadian Peacekeepers *[TANJUG]* 43
  Canadians Downgrade Alert *[Montreal Radio]* 43
UNPROFOR-Serb 'Incident' on Gorazde Front *[Sarajevo Radio]* 43
UNPROFOR Confirms 5th Corps Controls Bihac *[Sarajevo Radio]* 43
  5th Corps Counterattacks *[TANJUG]* 44
  Shelling Kills 7 in Bihac *[Sarajevo Radio]* 44
  'Grave' Humanitarian Situation *[Sarajevo Radio]* 45
Abdic Advances; Izetbegovic Units 'Decimated' *[TANJUG]* 45
  Abdic Interview *[TANJUG]* 45
Radio Sums Up Combat Situation 30 Nov *[Sarajevo Radio]* 46
  Serbs Concentrate Forces *[Sarajevo Radio]* 46
Croats Capture 'Important Strategic Positions' *[Zagreb Radio]* 46
Herzeg-Bosna Votes for 'Strengthening' of State *[TANJUG]* 47
Social Democrats, Liberals Criticize UN Inaction *[Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network 30 Nov]* 47

CROATIA

Army, Krajina Serbs Exchange Fire Around Knin *[AFP]* 48
B-H Serbs Cross Border, Seize UN Troops *[AFP]* 48
Government Ready To Resolve Military Situation *[Zagreb Radio]* 48
Susak Says Croatia To Enter War if Bihac Falls *[TANJUG]* 48
UNPROFOR Concerned With Military Activity *[TANJUG]* 49
Defense Minister Hails Accord With U.S. *[Zagreb TV]* 49
RSK Approves Economic Relations With Zagreb *[TANJUG]* 49
Croatian Serbs Support Zagreb-Knin Agreement *[TANJUNG]* 50
Albanian Prime Minister Makes Official Visit *[Zagreb Radio]* 50
General on Extent of Cooperation With NATO *[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA 29 Nov]* 50

THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Interior Ministry: Citizens To Regulate Status *[MIC]* 52
Production, Investment, Currency Problems *[SVET 15 Oct]* 52
Professor Views Opening of Albanian University *[NOVA MAKEDONIJA 30 Nov]* 54

SLOVENIA

Slovenia Becomes NAA Associate Member *[SLOVENEC 19 Nov]* 56
Defense Ministry Monitoring Situation in Bihac *[Ljubljana Radio]* 56

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

Rain Level Forces Cut in Hydroelectric Energy *[TANJUG]* 57
Report Describes 'Heroj' Class Submarine *[VOJSKA 17 Nov]* 57
Publications Examine Air Routes From Belgrade *[REPUBLIKA, etc.]* 57

Montenegro

Trial Run Begins of Third Private Radio Station *[TANJUG]* 58

Kosovo

Serb Police Continue Arrests, Mistreatment *[Tirana TV]* 58
Serbs Conduct Albanian Library 'Inquisition' *[Tirana TV]* 58

Romanian President Views WEU Security, Bosnia

AU2911205394 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1415 GMT 29 Nov 94

[Speech by Romanian President Ion Iliescu to the WEU Parliamentary Assembly in Paris—live; Iliescu speaks in French with superimposed Romanian translation]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mr. President, members of parliament, ladies and gentlemen,

To begin with, allow me to thank Parliamentary Assembly President Sir Dudley Smith and the other members of this forum for the invitation to address the Parliamentary Assembly of the Western European Union [WEU]. I am very touched that Romania has been offered the opportunity to express its point of view on European security at the current session, which marks the 40th anniversary of the Assembly's foundation. I would like to reiterate our high appreciation for the WEU Assembly's contribution to asserting the European spirit in the European national parliaments and in the public awareness and to strengthening ties with the states of Central Europe.

It may be said that, as far as Romania is concerned, November 1994 has been an extremely fruitful month for the development of relations with the WEU. In this respect, I recall with pleasure the meetings that I had at the start of this month with the WEU Assembly delegation and my participation in the inauguration of the first WEU Information and Documentation Bureau in a Central European country, in the proceedings of the international seminar entitled Central Europe in a European Security System, and in a visit to the Coordination and Support Center of the WEU mission in Romania. All this, including the participation of Romanian representatives in the WEU Council of Ministers meeting in Noordwiyk and the position taken on that occasion, stresses Romania's determination to prove itself a reliable partner of the WEU in efforts to develop a practical and genuine cooperation until the full integration into this organization.

Mr. President, for Romania, which is situated at the intersection of the great geostrategic axes of the continent, ensuring peace and security throughout Europe is a vital issue. Therefore, the central orientation of Romania's foreign policy is based on the strategic decision made as far back as the first day of the Romanian revolution—a decision which was supported then, as it is now, by all the country's political forces—namely to promote full integration into the political, economic, and security structures of a democratic Europe. That decision was a natural one, since the Romanian nation has always been—through its civilization, culture, history, and geographical position—an inseparable part of European culture and civilization.

For us, the 1989 revolution marked the start of the rebuilding and expansion, in new conditions, of our traditional ties with the other European nations. In this respect, Romania is promoting broad and rapidly growing cooperation with the WEU, the European Union [EU], and NATO. Indeed, it is a reason for satisfaction that, with the latest ratification, the EU association agreement is going to take effect in the near future, thus creating conditions for accelerating the necessary preparations—which we know will not be easy—for our admission as a member of this organization. In the same spirit, we welcomed from the start the Partnership for Peace [PFP] initiative and have signed the individual PFP program between Romania and NATO; we are already implementing the activities envisaged by that program.

For Romania, as well as for the other Central European countries, strengthening cooperation with the WEU—with its twofold dimension as promoter of security and defender of European integration on the one hand, and as the European pillar of NATO on the other—is vital for our security. The start of the WEU's official dialogue with the countries of Central Europe, which took concrete shape with the holding of the Petersberg meeting in 1992, and the institutionalization of these relations in the WEU Consulting Forum, is in accordance with our basic security goal and with Europe's need for integration.

Romania particularly welcomes the WEU's decision, within the framework of the Maastricht Treaty, to institutionalize relations with those countries that have the intention of joining the European Union. The effort of WEU member states to cope with totally new and highly complex situations in Europe, including the emergence of hotbeds of armed conflict, is laudable. Romania has not only joined these states in this effort, but has been and continues to be an active element in promoting peaceful and preventative solutions.

In this respect, the complex conflict situation that has developed in former Yugoslavia has set the WEU and other international bodies in charge of finding peaceful solutions to differences a real test. The evolution of events has shown that these bodies have not managed to adjust themselves rapidly enough from the conditions and problems specific to the Cold War period to the new dynamics of security problems that have emerged following the revolutions in Central and East Europe. In the new conditions, the projection and implementation of security operations on the model of force and retaliation have proved to be quite inadequate. The evolution of the Yugoslav conflict has clearly shown that the use of force can only complicate and aggravate problems and makes the restoration of peace increasingly difficult.

The latest events prove once more that the situation in former Yugoslavia bears the seeds of a generalized conflict, with possible consequences at a Balkan or European level. We are fully convinced that there can be no military solution to the conflict in former Yugoslavia. Our duty, the duty of the international community, is to facilitate communications and understanding among the parties to the conflict at the negotiating table, and to encourage all forces striving to this end and all measures aimed at finding ways and means for a peaceful solution to the conflict.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, we value the results of the recent WEU ministerial meeting in Noordwiyk, which marked an important step toward the conceptual and operational consolidation of the WEU as a security and defense element of the European edifice, in close correlation with the European Union and with the need to intensify cooperation with the associate partners in Central Europe.

On eve of the forthcoming implementation of the association accord and the start of the preparatory stage for Romania's admission to the EU, the intensification of cooperation with the WEU in the political, military, parliamentary, and scientific fields at all levels has acquired particular importance and is one of our foreign policy priorities. In this respect, we welcome the WEU decision on the participation of associate partner states in shaping a common European defense policy and in drafting a future White Paper on European security, which anticipates the creation of a common European space of security and defense. In this respect, we want stability and security to be achieved in the form of a common space. In this spirit, we intend to develop Romania's operational capacity, so that it can participate in humanitarian and peacekeeping missions.

Ladies and gentlemen, we are striving to solve our security problems efficiently within a coherent European system, by proceeding from the post-war experience, which shows that NATO was the main institution capable of effectively ensuring the necessary political and security guarantees for the democratic and prosperous development of its members. We consider Romania's option for full integration into this alliance as a most natural one, all the more so as the issue of NATO's possible expansion into the East has recently been taken up once more. The PFP is a contribution to strengthening security in Europe and throughout the world. We consider Romania's participation in the PFP as an intermediary stage toward our full integration into the alliance. Our firm option proceeds from the country's basic interest in benefiting from NATO's security guarantees for the maintenance and consolidation of Romania's security.

This is the angle from which we approach our relations with the WEU, an organization considered to be the European pillar of NATO and a structure capable of ensuring the necessary framework for elaborating and implementing a united EU policy in the sphere of security and defense. We particularly value the fact that the WEU's relationship with Central Europe has been nondiscriminatory from the start. By opening the gates of its own structures to the associate partners in Central Europe, the WEU has become an essential component of European security.

This normal policy of our country is not directed against anyone. It takes into consideration the structural political changes in Europe and the world over, which were sanctioned here, in Paris, in the very charter that bears the name of France's capital, which has the endorsement of the heads of state and government of the CSCE countries, and which solemnly proclaims that all participating states are friends and not adversaries, thus putting an end to the long period of confrontation. Similarly, we support the current efforts to define more precisely the CSCE's place and specific role in the new European architecture.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: At a practical level, Romania's security concerns are supplemented by a series of measures at two other levels. First, we are striving to cultivate good relations with our neighboring countries. Romania is promoting a policy of good neighborliness, broad cooperation, and full normalization of its relations with all neighbors and states in the region, by also concluding bilateral political treaties in accordance with the principles of international law. In this spirit, we welcomed the EU initiative on a stability pact and expressed our readiness to cooperate with the other interested states in achieving the goals of this proposal. The second level of security refers to the subregional aspect, which plays an important part in our economic development toward European integration. Therefore, Romania is deeply interested in the programs on cooperation in Central Europe, the Danube basin, and the Black Sea region.

These projects are not and may not be regarded as alternative solutions to European integration. On the contrary, they can represent important steps to achieve stability and ensure development, and a necessary precondition of European integration. In the same way, when the conflict in former Yugoslavia is settled, we hope to be able to lend a European sense to its bilateral cooperation with Romania.

Mr. President, turning to our domestic policy, our two principal preoccupations have been the development and the consolidation of the normative, legislative, and institutional framework of the law-governed state and the normal functioning of institutions specific to modern, democratic societies on the one hand, and, on the other, our transition to a market economy.

With respect to the transition to a market economy and economic restructuring, we can say that the most difficult moments following the revolution have been overcome. This year the decline of industrial production has been halted and we have even registered a slight increment in that field, and this represents the basis for the economic revival of the country. Agriculture has found its way out of the crisis situation. Thanks to our monetary and fiscal policy we have managed to cut inflation substantially and stabilize our national currency and the exchange rate. We have made important steps to recover the foreign trade balance and restore the state's hard currency reserves. This has amplified confidence in the perspectives and potential of the Romanian economy and has thus led to a visible increase in foreign investors' interest in Romania.

Currently Romanian society has reached a very important moment in the reform, namely that of large-scale privatization, encompassing 6,000 state-owned companies. Currently parliament is focusing attention on measures proposed by the government to accelerate that process. We hope that this will stimulate reform and economic restructuring by attracting not merely our internal financial resources and accumulations, but also foreign capital and loans, which eventually will positively influence the quality of life and living conditions of our people. To that end, in October in Strasbourg, Romania signed the European Social Charter. We did that out of our belief that the ultimate goal of all political and economic reforms is the improvement of the human condition of each member of society.

Mr. President, since the Central European countries exert civilian control over their armed forces, ensure parliamentary democracy, and are switching over to market economies, while relations among those countries are improving, our countries have become producers, not just consumers of security, which lends a greater degree of stability to the entire Central European region and, of course, enhanced security guarantees for the West European countries. I hope that you agree that essentially the new dimension of European security is represented by the nine associate Central European countries, which can play an important role in the new security structure that is being constructed. These countries are ready to accept a more complex perception of European security, and I also include here the economic aspect of security, which, as a matter of fact, also vouches for security.

An older and also a more recent historical chance, which our country never had, allowed the West European countries to devote their energy to their economic and technological development, as well as to the betterment of the population's standard of living. During the same time those countries have set up strong bodies, whose good functioning has been tested over several decades. As a result of this, they now feel that they are part of an environment that is more stable and secure than that of their Central European neighbors. Wishing to share that feeling, the Central European countries have oriented themselves toward the EU and concluded European accords, which, besides offering an economic framework, also represent stability and security guide marks both for Central and West Europe. Briefly, the involvement of the Central European countries in the economic and security bodies of the EU, even in the current formula, which is just an intermediate one, implies that they are already being taken into consideration and associated with the defining of the principal ideas of European foreign policy and in the establishment of the security framework and the priorities of European security in its widest possible sense. This is a necessary stage in view of our joining the EU, the result of conscious efforts made to adapt to the current circumstances, both by the Central and the West European countries, and an issue of joint interest.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, Romania, which asserts itself as an element of balance and continuity in the region to which it belongs, is prepared to invest its security and stability capital into its relations with West European structures. Similarly, I would like to reassure the Parliamentary Assembly that Romania is prepared to contribute, together with its WEU partners, to the future accomplishment of a genuine European security identity, and is determined to take action to turn the old continent into a basic factor of stability, security, and peace throughout the world.

Thank you.

Iliescu on Moldova, Balkans

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[FBIS Editorial Report] Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian at 1436 GMT on 29 November carries a live relay from the Western European Union Parliamentary Assembly session in Paris on Romanian President Ion Iliescu answering questions from deputies.

Iliescu is first asked whether he thinks that "a Balkan accord would be able to guarantee peace" in the region. Iliescu replies, "I do not think that I have any reservations about accepting such a proposal, a perspective accord within the Balkan forum to implement cooperation in the Balkans, but that is no solution to the Bosnian conflict."

Asked to comment on the presence of the 14th Army of the Russian Federation on the territory of neighboring Moldova and whether he is ready to accept the presence of CSCE peacekeeping forces in the Dniester region, Iliescu says that "the 14th Army is a foreign force on the territory of an independent state, the Republic of Moldova. Currently Moldova has no common borders with the Russian Federation, as Ukraine separates them. I consider that the presence of the 14th Army there encourages the conservative forces in the Dniester region involved in the military conflict a few years ago. We consider that the pullout of the 14th Army is a precondition to ensuring the full independence of the Republic of Moldova. This is the juridical aspect of all these negotiations and we consider that the Republic of Moldova ought to be a party in this entire process. Therefore we support the idea of Moldova negotiating with Russia to achieve the pullout of that army. That is a necessity and I believe that all foreign armies stationed on the territories of other states should be pulled out."

Asked to inform the assembly what is planned by Romania to break the deadlock in the Bosnian conflict and whether there are any plans to organize a Balkan conference, Iliescu replies that "currently a Balkan conference is not possible as no such conference can be held without the participation of former Yugoslavia. That would be a precondition to a political settlement of the Yugoslav conflict. In our opinion there can be no military solution to the Bosnian conflict. There are even some wrong perceptions regarding the Yugoslav and Bosnian conflicts. Some people talk about an ethnic conflict and ethnic cleansing. What ethnic cleansing? The people living there are brothers! The Serbs and Muslims there do not have different nationalities! There is no such thing as a Bosnian nationality. In Bosnia there are Serbs and Croats, Muslim Serbs and Orthodox Serbs, as well as Catholic Croats, but they have all lived together, they have a joint history. It is history that has separated the Croats and the Serbs on the one hand, putting the Croats under Austrian-Hungarian occupation, while the Turkish occupation separated those Serbs who kept their Orthodox faith in the village areas of Bosnia, and the Muslim Serbs living in the urban areas of Bosnia. But they are Serbs and they have mixed families." "The tragedy of that nation is a fratricidal war among the same Serbs. Perhaps it is not a religious war; it is rather a tragedy, and I do not believe that military intervention can solve the problem. We should assist all those forces interested in establishing peace and normal relations to restore normal life, to hold talks at the negotiating table and discuss conditions mutually accepted by all the parties. I cannot give you any solutions, but I believe that the proposal made by the Contact Group, although not ideal at all, still, all parties were ready to accept negotiations to that end. I believe that the international community did not react in the correct way for the benefit of realistic political forces in Yugoslavia."

Iliescu answers the next question by reasserting his views that, as stipulated by its Constitution, Romania is a republic and therefore former King Mihai cannot return to the country as a sovereign.

PDP Leader Discusses Participation in Government

95P20192A Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 6 Nov 94 p 4

[Interview with Abdurahman Haliti [Aliti], chairman of the Party for Democratic Prosperity in FYROM, by Fiqiri Sejdia; given in Tetovo on 3 November 1994: "Fine Words Have a Quick Effect But They Are Soon Forgotten"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Sejdia] You seemed to be quite moderate during the election campaign. How do you explain such a thing?

[Haliti] We Albanians were the key element in these [pre-election] meetings. Wherever we are, we are beginning to think politically, to form our political convictions and to disseminate them to the party that will properly articulate these political opinions and convictions. It has been our aim in these meetings for members, supporters, and the masses to decide whether or not to accept our options. There is no reason to impose upon individuals situations that they do not want. We are not promising much. We are presenting a real option for satisfying the demands of Albanians in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, FYROM]. We have indicated the paths to achieving this. We are not saying that this is the best path of political activity for Albanians in Macedonia, because there are other paths. However, we do not want the people to fall along the wayside, to accept imposed opinions and take action on the basis of empty statements that lead them up a dead-end street. Fine words have a quick effect but they are soon forgotten.

[Sejdia] You obtained 11 deputy seats in these elections. Didn't you forget the countryside in this campaign?

[Haliti] Not at all! Of course we announced that we would be holding meetings, and I am not sure that we informed all those who wanted to come. We did not engage in any propaganda. We did not exhibit any sort of euphoria at any of the meetings. We did not make any statements to the effect that we would do this or that, that we would create an ethnic Albania. Such expressions would arouse indisputable interest and enthusiasm among the Albanian population. This would have a very great euphoric effect. But what would be the consequences? As soon as the meeting ended, the persons who made such statements during the campaign asked themselves: Can such a thing be done?

After the meeting, those who heard such statements asked themselves: Can such a thing really be done? After the party split, we did not have time to work on the party infrastructure, especially in the branches and sub-branches. While the others concealed the problems, I stated publicly that we still have problems. Often, the sub-branches do not pay heed to the branches, nor the branches to the headquarters, but mechanisms will be found that will eliminate these phenomena very quickly.

[Sejdia] What will be your strategy for the future?

[Haliti] That is a question of current importance that we will be answering soon through actual work. The other group is overjoyed because they obtained several deputy seats. Until now, they have lined up as the ethnic opposition, but so far they have been our opposition. They are predicting that our party and our parliamentary group will participate in the government. Therefore, they will have the opportunity to attack us, enumerate our mistakes and thus increase their credibility with the people. However, there is also another road: Why aren't we happy with a little opposition? Let them go into the government if they want to. Let us understand, however, that we will never be the ethnic opposition. We are determined to be the opposition in the Macedonian parliament, and not the Albanian opposition, as some may expect and want us to be. Those who think we will be the ethnic oposition are wrong.

Up to now, all have gotten used to seeking the rights and freedoms of the Albanians in Macedonia through the Party for Democratic Prosperity [PDP in Macedonian, PPD in Albanian]. I do not understand that strange phenomenon called "ethnic opposition."

[Sejdia] What is your position on the laws on education and local government?

[Haliti] We have given our opinions on both laws verbally and in writing. We will refine these opinions even further and better formulate our demands. The law on local government does not satisfy the needs of a local administration because it does not provide for a sphere of activity for these organs. Indeed, this law is not in accordance with the charters of the Council of Europe for this purpose. It does not take into account the ethnic structure in Macedonia. We think that with greater wisdom, by means of this law, the Republic of Macedonia could solve a number of problems facing the Macedonian Assembly. According to the PDP, this could happen if greater opportunities for self-determination in the communes were provided.

For example, there is no wisdom in the fact that the ethnically mixed communes in which the Albanians are in the majority are under Macedonian administration.

[Sejdia] Your party is accused of being a pro-government party. How true is this?

[Haliti] I do not know what you, or rather, those who curse and accuse us, mean by the term "pro-government". If this conclusion comes only from the fact that the PDP is participating in the government, then this is absurd. Participation in the government is not a matter of individual or group greed. Even less is it a matter of obstinate persistence on the part of the party. It is a matter of necessity.

This decision was made after consultations that we had with other relevant Albanian parties in Macedonia. This is a fact. Only in this way can the positions of Albanians in Macedonia be advanced! Because we have participated in the government, we have achieved something, regardless of who might criticize us.

Secondly, we were compelled to do this because of the orders the Albanians in Macedonia gave us. Therefore, the political parties here should be a factor for stability because the stability of Macedonia contributes directly to the stability of the Albanian state. We have been and still are very much concerned about this.

Also, it has been publicly stated that the participation of Albanians in Macedonia in their government would facilitate the existence of the Republic of Kosova.

[Sejdia] Will you participate in the government now?

[Haliti] It is interesting to see what the government of Macedonia will be like without the Albanians. I myself believe that Macedonia cannot exercise any influence in international bodies without the Albanians. It will have neither credibility nor legitimacy as a democratic power if there are no Albanians.

The question arises: How should the Albanians participate in the government? As a collective force or as an individual force? If the PDP decides to be an opposition force, then the other political forces will be compelled to take part in the government. At the present time, we, as a party, are not prepared to sacrifice our political credibility and to run the risk that anyone, competent or incompetent, might evaluate us. Those who accuse us are hypocrites. Even though they know the circumstances, they continue to attack us, claiming that the PDP has hurt the Albanian cause by taking part in the government. These are fictitious dilemmas that must be rejected.

[Sejdia] Have you set up any coalition?

[Haliti] At the present time, we can say with certainty that all decisions will be made by the central leadership. If anyone advises us to participate in or not to participate in the government at this time, he will have to do it publicly.

[Sejdia] How should the Albanians in Macedonia operate: within the system or outside it?

[Haliti] There is no uncertainty about this issue. Our party will achieve its civil rights and its rights as a nationality within the system.

[Sejdia] Your faction believes that a nation such as the Albanian cannot progress under the wing of another nation. They take as an example the pedagogical faculty that the Macedonians did not establish and they say: We are opening one ourselves, in Tetovo.

[Haliti] Our activity within the party is sterile and does not produce results. I agree! Logically, then, the method of political activity must be changed, getting out of one system and creating another parallel system. Certainly, changes can be made—so this is one alternative. That is: The other party can form groups for attacks and subversion, groups for murders and break-ins, illegal units, all sorts of bands. Why not? This method can also be tried. But we must pay careful attention, make detailed analyses, and ask ourselves: Where does such a road lead? What would be its result? Who would win and who would lose?

[Sejdia] It has been a year since the PDP has had any official contacts with Tirana. Will these contacts be resumed? How?

[Haliti] The PDP has decided that it should have the closest possible relations with the Albanian state—for many reasons and for many purposes. We are not abandoning this decision either now or in the future. Misunderstandings between the PDP and the government organs of the Albanian state must be resolved as quickly as possible. We pledge that if any disagreements exist at the present time, we will resolve them immediately, without damaging the interests of the Albanian state and without damaging the interests of the Albanians. All those who think this way have no reason for not establishing normal communications. This will be done very soon. I do not think that Tirana will continue to insist on supporting one Albanian group to the detriment of another. Everyone must respect the free will of the people. We are here not because of our own desires but because of the will of the people. I do not know of a case anywhere in the world in which a government elected by its people has rejected this fact, regardless of whether any other state likes it or not.

Prime Minister Promises Change in Procedure, Law

AU3011134394 Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in Albanian 24 Nov 94 p 1

[Interview with Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi by Lorenc Ligori; place and date not given: "There Will Certainly Be Changes, and Changes for the Better"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Ligori] Mr. Prime Minister, in its analysis, the PD [Democratic Party] National Council came to the unanimous conclusion that part of the "no" vote against the draft constitution was a protest against the central and local governments, as well as against the pace of reform and the pain it is causing. Has the message from that part of the electorate gotten through to you?

[Meksi] As I have already emphasized in my discussion at the National Council, the reasons for the outcome of the referendum must be traced to the draft constitution campaign and to the draft constitution itself, which did not take into account the interests of certain sections of the Albanian population. The reasons are to be found in the way the country is governed, in the broad sense of the word; in the shortcomings of privatization; and in corruption and nepotism, which were openly and strongly criticized and called by their proper names. The referendum result showed that the PD, which failed to realize properly what its tasks were and did not make a success of its voting campaign, needs to be restructured. When we speak of governing the country, in the real sense of the word, we mean both central and local government. I think both these aspects come in for criticism, because the reform, which is part of the central government, has to a certain extent created difficulties for and dissatisfaction among certain sections of the population. I do not, however, believe that this discontent is directly linked to the constitution, because the constitution could never guarantee the solution of all their personal problems. Rather, I would say that corruption, flagrant shortcomings in the privatization process, and nepotism are the things that a free people rightly cannot tolerate. The people will not be tolerant if we do not fight for a just system of privatization, for transparency, and for auctions and bonds through which everyone can receive his share of the collective property—or if we do not eliminate nepotism and scrutinize everyone accused of it, starting with the prime minister himself. As far as corruption is concerned, I would like to stress that if we satisfy ourselves simply by saying the word "corruption" without revealing the facts about individual people, I can assure you that this will create a smokescreen behind which the really corrupt people will feel quite cozy. As for streamlining the government, I repeat that there are flaws and shortcomings that must be urgently corrected. Naturally the government has clearly received the referendum message in all its aspects, and these aspects were analyzed by the PD.

[Ligori] What will change in the reforms that are under way: their concept, their pace? Will the social consequences be eased?

[Meksi] The thing is that the government will change precisely those aspects of the reforms that have gone wrong. It will accelerate the rates of investment and will improve the process of privatization via the means I have just mentioned: auctions and bonds.

Certainly mistakes have been made, and fault must be apportioned. There are people who have become tired, who cannot come up with the results, or who are incompetent. There will certainly be changes, and changes for better. I do not think there is any need to change the concept or the pace of reforms that, according to the polls to date, have been considered as ranking among the best. However, the corrupt practices and mistakes of the past will be avoided.

[Ligori] Mr. Meksi, without in any way denying your government's achievements, which ministries and other government bodies have not functioned to full capacity, and who are the cabinet members to be replaced?

[Meksi] As I have always said, changes in the government cannot be made public before they are announced officially.

We must be more demanding in our everyday work, and in order to do this, we must naturally be assisted by specialized state organizations such as the judicial bodies, which are tasked with taking action and judging all cases where State Control finds shortcomings and mistakes by local and central government bodies.

The government is to submit a law under which high-ranking officials in the state and central administrations will be obligated to declare their property, and of course those who have made mistakes will not be allowed simply to move from one ministry to another, as has happened dozens of times in the past. The government will pass other laws too, against corruption and illegal profiteering, and will insist that the existing laws be implemented. The government in no way believes that it is better to have no state at all since this would allow everyone to earn more. I am convinced that without the existence of the state, profits would very soon dry up.

On the other hand, we will put pressure on the state to take action against those who violate the law, regardless of what position they hold.

I am also in favor of streamlining local state and government bodies whenever they clearly fail to function properly or when they act contrary to the laws of the state. In such cases I will of course act within the limits of the law.

[Ligori] Mr. Prime Minister, you have successfully survived countless motions and interpellations demanding your resignation, starting with the unprincipled request for early elections that the socialist leadership has been making since 23 March [1992]. In your cabinet's opinion, what was—and what is—the opposition's role, and what is its contribution to the proper running of the country?

[Meksi] I think that the opposition plays a very important role in democracy. It should assess what has been done, learn from the mistakes made by the people actually running the country, and prepare itself to eventually govern the country in the future. The opposition has an important role to play because it has the right to put forward amendments to draft laws and make specific remarks on specific laws that, even if rejected by the majority, still play an important part in creating new ways of thinking among the public. Unfortunately for the government, and to the misfortune of Albania itself, the present opposition has done nothing like this.

[Ligori] Mr. Prime Minister, 25 PD deputies have submitted a draft law on an amnesty. What does the prime minister think of that?

[Meksi] I think that the main message of the referendum vote was that Albanians are free and capable of living regardless of the government, because the economic situation has changed in favor of their well-being.

Free people must think more about those who are in prison, about the fairness of the punishment handed down to them. They must be more generous and tolerant. We know that there are people in prison who have been convicted without being allowed a lawyer, or who have been punished severely for crimes that are today viewed in a different light. The new penal code must of course take these things into consideration.

We therefore thought that an amnesty would help create a better climate of understanding among the people, a climate of national reconciliation in the best sense of the word. Naturally, individuals who are guilty of crimes against the people cannot benefit in the same way as the others. Criteria need to be set, but I think that an amnesty on the occasion of the national holiday of the 50th anniversary of liberation and Flag Day is something essential.

Organized Crime Said 'Developing Dramatically'

AU3011140194 Tirana REPUBLIKA in Albanian 20 Nov 94 p 1

[Unattributed commentary: "Mafia Power Looming in Albania"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] While heated debates rage among political groups fighting for power in Albania, a third force works underground quite undisturbed, and the day will come when it will take over the state. This force comes from from drug trafficking, arms smuggling, prostitution, and the monstrous crime of selling children for organ transplants. All this can be summed up under the conventional heading of "mafia." This force has put down roots in Albania and is developing dramatically. Foreigners are the ones telling us about it, while we ourselves know nothing—or pretend to know nothing. Some presidential spokesman tells foreign journalists that the situation is "under control," and that's that. The truth, however, is quite different.

According to several well-known foreign newspapers, Albania has become a transit center for drugs from the Black Sea region, Iran, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. After being refined in Turkey, the drugs come to Durres by land or sea, and from there go on to Italy, Switzerland and Germany. [passage omitted]

The second thing foreigners have long been telling us about, and which we can see for ourselves every day, is the massive smuggling of oil into Montenegro to feed the Serbian military machine in Bosnia. [passage omitted]

Beyond a doubt, the bosses of this trade, who earn millions of dollars, are operating with the "indulgence" of government, or government officials themselves are involved in it.

On 15 November there was a program on Italy's RAI Due television about illegal immigrants in Pulia. Entitled "Women in a Storm" the program showed evidence of the prostitution of Albanian girls in Italy. These girls, 14-20 years of age, were sent to Italy with the promise of jobs but after a few days found themselves on the streets working as prostitutes for the benefit of the pimp who got hold of them. [passage omitted]

Italian television also told us that about 80 children have been taken from Albania for organ transplants. [passage omitted]

Smuggling drugs, prostitution, kidnapping and selling children—all this is mafia activity. The mafia laid its foundations in Albania by first distributing pethidine among young people and then recruiting our expatriated sons. As it grows, it requires its own men in the police and judiciary institutions. It requires deputies in the legislature to reject anti-mafia laws and ministers in the government to obstruct the application of laws. [passage omitted] All this we have seen at the movies, but now we have it here in our midst. [passage omitted]

Our government is behaving very badly in not dealing with this major problem, and it becomes a party to the crime when it hides even the few things that it does know. It is rumored that the police and especially the SHIK [National Intelligence Service] have hauled in 20 kg of drugs. Everywhere else in the world, the government informs the public about such matters. Our government, however, is very secretive, viewing these things as "its own business", which the population is "not mature enough" to know about. Such ideas are completely intolerable. The Ministry [illegible] Order and SHIK, or whoever they may be, should let [illegible] people know everything that is going on, because it is the people who pay their salaries for the job they are expected to do. Furthermore, they will achieve success only if the public is made aware and provides assistance. The government knows that there is a murder in Albania every day, but nothing is reported because the government wants to present a picture of peace and brotherhood prevailing in Albania. The Ministry of Order must know that many businessmen have to pay protection money to criminals, and that the so-called "racket" will be organized here. Yet the ministry keeps silent—perhaps because police are involved in it, as they are in illegal emigration, which has already claimed victims.

The nation and the state are gravely threatened by organized crime. [passage omitted]

There must be a system of public defense against organized crime because such crime is aimed at controlling the state and subjugating the people. This is a patriotic duty. The internal invasion of the mafia is no less dangerous than foreign invasions, the only difference being that the former penetrates slowly and surreptitiously. Public reaction is a very powerful tool. The Republican Party, which has dedicated itself first and foremost to the nation and to property, must be more persistent and work with imagination, together with other political and social forces, to enhance public awareness through conferences, scientific and cultural activities, demonstrations, and clubs. Every possible means must be used to confront the evil. The state itself must show whether or not it is, in practice, capable of fulfilling its primary duty, that of protecting the daily lives and work of its citizens.

Deputies Approve New Ministries, Aviation Bill

AU0112084694 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1430 GMT 30 Nov 94

[Report by Pandeli Shehu]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The main discussion at today's session of the People's Assembly was devoted to President Berisha's proposal to break up several ministries and create new ones.

Specifically, the deputies proposed breaking up the Ministries of Construction; Tourism; Public Order; Labor, Emigration, and Social Assistance; Transportation; Industry and Trade; and the Committee of Former Political Persecutees.

Instead of these ministries, the deputies approved, by a majority vote, the creation of a Ministry of Construction and Tourism; Interior Ministry; Ministry of Industry, Transportation, and Trade; and Ministry of Labor. Emigration, Social Assistance, and Former Political Persecutees. [passage omitted]

At today's session, the deputies approved the work agenda for the period up to 29 December and endorsed the bill on civil aviation in the Republic of Albania.

The next session resumes at 1000 tomorrow morning.

Rumen Yankov Elected Supreme Court Chairman

AU0112085994 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 30 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The Supreme Judicial Council has elected Rumen Yankov chairman of the Supreme Court. Fourteen of the 20 members of the Supreme Judicial Council who took part in today's meeting voted for him.

Personnel Changes at Foreign Ministry Announced

AU0112085794 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 30 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] On 30 November Foreign Ministry spokesman Radko Vlaykov announced personnel changes at the Foreign Ministry: Todor Churov has been released from the position of deputy minister of foreign affairs and appointed ambassador extraordinary.

Vasil (?Baychev), until now head of the Foreign Ministry's European Integration Department, has been appointed deputy foreign minister

Stoyan Todorov, until now head of the Privatization Agency's Licensing and Control Department, has been appointed chief secretary of the Foreign Ministry.

Nuclear Power Station Manager Explains 'Accident'

AU3011201494 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 25 Nov 94 p 5

[Interview with Kozma Kuzmanov, manager of Kozloduy Nuclear Power Station, by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given: "Security Systems Operated Precisely, There Is No Radiation Risk"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [TRUD] Mr. Kuzmanov, has there been any change in the background radiation level following the accident with the circuit breaker?

[Kuzmanov] Absolutely not. The accident is not connected with the nuclear station's active zone. The background radiation level may increase only if a defect occurs in the first circuit, the radioactive circuit. The circuit breaker is located far away from this circuit.

[TRUD] How did the safety systems operate at the critical moment?

[Kuzmanov] This incident shows that our nuclear station's safety systems function normally. This means that the design solutions and our staff's readiness correspond to requirements, as far as safety systems are concerned. The accident was graded at zero level on the INES [expansion unknown] scale for assessing radiation incidents.

[TRUD] Is the incident in any way connected with the theft of cables in the region around Kozloduy?

[Kuzmanov] No. Recently someone stole a conductor from the 400-kilovolt electrical supply line to the combined power system, but it has been replaced.

[TRUD] What were the causes of the accident?

[Kuzmanov] At the moment we do not know why the circuit breaker failed. We have to clear up other features of the accident with our colleagues in the Central Control Room Department.

[TRUD] Why did the defect in a single circuit breaker have such consequences?

[Kuzmanov] We lost the standby power supply to the shore pump station, so that the supply of cooling water from the Danube was cut off. The accident led to the automatic shutdown of Reactor Units 1 and 2, but Units 4, 5, and 6 continued to operate. However, later on we were forced to shut them down as well, because we had a abnormal water supply situation to the station.

Party Official Discusses Foreign Policy Needs

AU3011202194 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 25 Nov 94 p 9

[Interview with Krasimir Premyanov, deputy chairman of the Executive Bureau of the BSP Supreme Council, by Valeriya Veleva; place and date not given: "We Need a Pragmatic Foreign Policy, But Not at the Expense of Morality"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Veleva] Mr. Premyanov, does the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] envisage any changes in direction in Bulgaria's foreign policy?

[Premyanov] First I would like to point out that no one can answer the question of what the direction of Bulgarian foreign policy is. Up to now, Bulgaria's foreign policy orientation has not been set at the required level by parliament, the government, or the presidency.

It is clear to the BSP that Bulgaria has to devise a foreign policy doctrine. Unfortunately, however, those ready to develop such a doctrine are not the state institutions but the representatives of the BSP, who are working on this question. We will present our draft document on Bulgaria's foreign policy doctrine by December. If it is adopted by the relevant state institutions and if a political consensus on it is reached, then Bulgaria will have a long-term foreign policy strategy.

[Veleva] What will be the supporting pillars of this foreign policy doctrine?

[Premyanov] In short: basing foreign policy on economics. Economics is a sphere that can serve as our starting point, through which one can formulate clear goals and interests for the nation while observing the accepted rules of international relations. Our country must strive to regain its market positions, and to win new ones. I would remind you that such a course was set at the start of the democratic changes in Bulgaria—which were carried out with the participation of the BSP, which in a certain sense played a decisive role, as it held a majority in the state structures and in the Grand National Assembly. I see no grounds to expect any substantial changes to what has already been begun. The BSP pledges to support a European orientation and a dynamic, clear direction of a calm, sensible, but sufficiently effective Balkan policy that rests upon both multilateral and bilateral cooperation in the Balkan peninsula.

[Veleva] Are we to expect that, if the BSP wins the elections, the path that our previous politicians have blazed across the ocean and to the west will turn toward the east and Moscow?

[Premyanov] It is unreasonable to consider that the creation of more favorable relations with new partners should be at the expense of what we have already achieved with our previous relations of cooperation.

We advocate preserving and developing our relations with Russia and the other CIS countries, and do not set these relations in opposition to our new relations with the United States. We acknowledge the great role that the United States is playing in world politics and expect this U.S. role to have a favorable effect on the processes in Bulgaria. Bulgaria has to be extremely pragmatic but not at the expense of morality and principles in its foreign policy.

[Veleva] Will the BSP continue the trends toward closer association with NATO?

[Premyanov] For Bulgaria, this is not a problem. It would be ridiculous for Bulgaria to believe that its acceptance in the north Atlantic bloc depends on us alone. This is a matter for NATO itself. If this is connected with the general processes of consolidating the system of security, and not just with individual acts to the benefit of one country or another, then Bulgaria will gain from this. However, you must agree that closer association of Bulgaria and the East European countries with NATO should not be at the cost of creating new centers for confrontation. If the joining of the East European countries is not carried out selectively, and if a way is found to establish an equal dialogue with all—including Russia and Ukraine—this would indeed guarantee the formation of a structure that can resolve the problem of creating a wide-ranging mechanism of cooperation. The entry of Bulgaria and the other East European countries into NATO could not happen at the expense of creating confrontation with other countries excluded from this bloc.

[Veleva] Does the BSP want a professional army or not?

[Premyanov] This is a fine thing to desire but we have to consider the real material resources, which are extremely meager. In reforming the Army, we have to take into account the fact that equipment and human resources must compensate for each other. The lower the level of the country's armaments, the more men the army should have, and vice versa. If we have to delineate an abstract model for the Bulgarian Army and determine the time scale for bringing the army into line with this model, we will see that we will need immense resources. The entire state and all our reserves are not enough to cover these requirements.

[Veleva] In connection with the celebrations of the anniversary of the Treaty of Neuilly, voices have been heard asserting that the treaty is now outdated and that Bulgaria should lay claim to the Western Outlands [areas of Serbia and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia inhabited by ethnic Bulgarians]. Is this possible?

[Premyanov] Under what international law can Bulgaria raise the issue of territories lying within the borders of foreign states? We advocate the peaceful settlement of disputes, a broad dialogue, cooperation on an equal-rights basis, and the absence of territorial claims. If Bulgaria wants to express its attitude toward these territories and their inhabitants, ways exist to take preferential positions regarding them. This means, however, that Bulgaria would have to permit similar claims regarding its own territory. By introducing the problem of territorial claims, one runs the risk of creating an explosive atmosphere in the Balkans.

[Veleva] Should Bulgaria show a special attitude toward Macedonia?

[Premyanov] If Bulgaria announces that it has a special attitude toward Macedonia, a large number of Macedonia's neighbors may do the same, and then Macedonia will become a bone of contention. Macedonia is a geographical region parts of which lie within various states, while part of this territory is an independent state.

[Veleva] Do the BSP's plans include any trends toward drawing closer to Serbia?

[Premyanov] This is necessary. The new political climate and the system of security for the Balkans also imply new attitudes toward Serbia, relations based not on the past but looking to the advantages. The fact that a large part of the Balkans is governed by leftist parties creates favorable conditions for cooperation. When the BSP wins the elections, there will be an opportunity to utilize common values and principles to develop relations of a kind that most fully correspond to our people's interests.

[Veleva] In Europe, where is the BSP directing its priorities regarding relations: toward Germany or toward France?

[Premyanov] Europe is broadly integrated, and every participant in this process should be regarded as an equally important partner for Bulgaria. Our relations with Germany have a better traditional basis and much more specific dimensions. Even today, our trade with Germany makes up about 40 percent of our exchange of goods with the European Union countries. France's share is much smaller, but this does not mean that we want this situation to stay as it is. Any change aimed at expanding cooperation on a European scale would bring benefits for Bulgaria and draw it much closer toward a united Europe.

Union Leader Discusses Union Financial Ventures

AU3011140094 Sofia PARI in Bulgarian 25 Nov 94 p 5

[Interview with Krustyu Petkov, leader of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria, by Tsvetan Petrov; place and date not given: "KNSB Enhances Its Financial Strength"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Petrov] Professor Petkov, lately the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria [KNSB] is exhibiting intensified business activity. The trade union participated in the establishment of the Doverie [Trust] Pension Insurance Company, the Eastern Brokers Center, and the Zakrila [Protection] Health Insurance Company. Now we also hear that you are going to establish a bank. Is this not rather strange behavior for a trade union?

[Petkov] Certain circles believe that this is not typical trade union activity. Moreover, they think the trade union is therefore violating the established principles and laws, and that it thereby becomes a semilegal organization. According to the laws of many countries, European standards, and the historical practice of the past 100 years, trade unions everywhere engage in economic, financial, and other activities, along their usual protection functions. In this context the KNSB has no qualms developing the structures it has already created, along with new ones. [passage omitted]

[Petrov] The KNSB has 51 percent of the Doverie Pension Insurance Company joint stock company. The remaining 49 percent belong to the Israeli Teladium Company, represented in Bulgaria by the TBI joint stock company. Could you tell us something about your partners?

[Petkov] The basic group within the company is called Kardan. It is the mother company. It is a huge holding that comprises 25 subsidiaries. In keeping with Israeli law, it regularly presents its shares and balances at the stock market.

[Petrov] And everything is taking place fully in the public eye?

[Petkov] Yes, there is total openness. During my recent visit to Israel I succeeded in closely acquainting myself with the company's activity, and I saw that high prices are quoted for stock market shares. Indeed, this was one of the visit's main goals. Teladium is a private company formed by the basic share holders of Kardan. As far as TBI is concerned, it belongs almost 100 percent to the Israelis. The management of the holding is left increasingly to the operational staff of managers, while owners attempt to penetrate new strategic spheres. One of these spheres is the pension and insurance fields in eastern Europe. [passage omitted]

[Petrov] The KNSB also participated in the establishment of the Eastern Brokers Center joint stock company, which will deal with marketing, management, consultations, and middleman services. Why did you join this initiative, and what is the cost?

[Petkov] The KNSB is not the basic shareholder. We participate with about 10 percent. We joined because of the opportunity to use the brokerage system, established by this center, for offering a broad range of services to our members and supporters. At the same time, we will be able to sell the products of other KNSB financial structures through the brokerage system. [passage omitted]

[Petrov] All this means that the KNSB is significantly enhancing not only its protective but also its financial strength. Who is afraid of this?

[Petkov] To judge by mass media articles and statements, three categories of people are involved. First, certain financial and press magnates, who accumulated sufficient power and self-confidence during the period of initial capital accumulation. They adhere to a strange philosophy: Everything belongs to us. Whoever wants something should come kiss our hand! We are at the opposite pole, and think that there is enough room in Bulgaria to develop dozens of similar structures. Party formations definitely also fear us. It is no accident that on the eve of the elections party publications on the left and right began to bite the trade unions. The politicians ask themselves what will happen after the elections. They clearly understand that they cannot break us by force and therefore they prefer to negotiate with us. The third category includes those who envy us and the stupid ones. We simply pay no attention to them at all.

NATO Membership Opposed by Russians

95CH0049E Prague PROGNOSIS in English 9 Nov 94 p 8

[Article by Byron Sebastian: "No Russian Veto on Czech NATO Membership"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Two Russian leaders say they want the Czech Republic to stay out of NATO, but U.S. officials say there will be "no Russian veto" on any Czech plans.

Pyotr Premyak, deputy chair of the military and security committee of the Russian Federation Council urged Central and Eastern European countries to consider the Western European Union as an alternative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Czech News Agency (CTK) reported.

Viktor Ustinov, chair of the geopolitical committee of the Russian Parliament, suggested that the greater the distance between the Czech Republic and NATO, the friendlier relations between Russian and Western countries would be.

But a Czech official calls the Russian statements "the old way of thinking" about NATO, which is "unfortunately...so common in Russia."

"We are trying to proceed as rapidly as possible (toward NATO membership)," said Pavel Vacek, security policy director at the Czech Foreign Ministry. Vacek said the Russians "have a right to express themselves," but NATO membership is a "strategic goal" of the Czech Republic and is also in the "best interests of the alliance."

Mary Thompson-Jones, press attache at the U.S. Embassy in Prague, reiterated U.S. President Bill Clinton's position that there would be "no Russian veto" of NATO membership for any country.

She went on to echo the recent praise William Owens, deputy chair of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had expressed for the Czech armed forces.

Thompson-Jones said the Czech military was "way ahead of the game" with its efforts in the Partnership for Peace, which she emphasized is a "transitional phase" designed to prepare countries for NATO membership. In particular, she cited Czech participation in peacekeeping efforts in Liberia, Croatia and the Kurdistan region, and in joint NATO exercises in Poland and the Netherlands.

But if the Czech Republic is going to join the alliance of Western nations, it must replace its Warsaw Pact equipment and procedures with those of NATO. The Czech air force maintains 10 standard Warsaw Pact-issue MiG-29s and a number of 40-year-old MiG-21s, which are obsolete.

The purchase of F-16 fighter planes would be a major indication that the Czech Republic is prepared to commit more than just rhetoric to the process of transition. But the extreme cost—F-16s cost $20 million US each—has left government officials uncertain. According to Defense Ministry spokesman Oldrich Holesek, "At this point, the purchase of F-16s is only a valid third option." The first two options, which would be significantly less expensive, are to upgrade the MiG-21 planes or to buy more MiG-29s from Russia.

Both Vacek and Thompson-Jones noted that preparing the Czech armed forces for NATO membership will take time. Although the U.S. Congress recently facilitated the process by passing the NATO Participation Act, neither the Czech Republic nor the Clinton administration has defined a timetable or set of criteria for NATO membership.

Zieleniec on EU Membership Prospects

95CH0049F Prague PROGNOSIS in English 9 Nov 94 p 2

[Article by Robert McLean: "East Sees Action From EU"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Five years of high-minded rhetoric about the integration of Central and Eastern Europe into the European Union [EU] finally changed into real discussions Oct. 31 as foreign ministers of the two blocs met in Luxembourg.

Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec said the talks on specific issues of integration heralded a new era in relations with the EU.

"We are no longer convincing each other that our goal is EU membership but are beginning to discuss concrete problems," Zieleniec told the Czech News Agency CTK.

No specifics emerged from the meeting, but the countries of Eastern and Central Europe pledged to bring their legislative systems into line with those of West European nations.

Zieleniec said half of Czech legal norms were already compatible with Western ones and made no complaints about the country's lack of progress toward EU membership in the five years since the fall of the Iron Curtain.

In contrast, Polish Foreign Minister Andrzey Olechowski requested a specific timetable so Poland could prioritize its legislative transformation.

The pace toward integration has quickened since an early October meeting at which the EU agreed to meet regularly with the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria. Assuming EU ministers agree on a membership strategy at an upcoming meeting in Brussels, premiers of those countries are expected to be asked to sign a pact outlining the strategy.

Stephen Heintz, executive vice president of Prague's Institute for East-West Studies, said that like other nations in the region, the Czech Republic has been waiting for specifics from the EU. He said Monday's meeting was a step in that direction.

"If you take the ambiguity out of the process, it will help everybody," Heintz said. "It will help reduce the level of false illusions and give people a much more concrete set of steps that they need to be working on."

However, Heintz noted that EU members still don't agree on a single approach to integration.

Zieleniec said the Czech Republic's main challenge for now was to continue to transform its economy. He warned that for things to run smoothly, the EU would also have to change.

Many observers agree that the EU's current institutions have become too cumbersome to deal with any more members and require a fundamental rethinking.

Right-Wing Extremists Create Riot

95CH0049D Prague PROGNOSIS in English 9 Nov 94 p 3

[Article by Tim Gilman: "Riots Bring Curtain Down on Holiday"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] When right-wing extremist Miroslav Sladek ascended the base of the Jan Hus statue in the center of Prague's Old Town Square Oct. 28, he was ready to incite violence.

To the crowd's chant, "Long live Sladek," Old Town Square became a battleground for skinheads and anarchists on the Czech Republic's National Day, the 76th anniversary of the 1918 birth of Czechoslovakia.

The skinheads had come looking for the blood of the anarchists, who in turn had promised to show up for a "peaceful" protest against the rally. But the skinheads, notorious for their brutality, underestimated the ferocity of the anarchist punks, who not only outnumbered the skinheads but brought homemade pipe bombs and clubs to face them down. Soon the square filled with explosions and flying cobblestones on both sides of the mounted police, who futilely tried to keep the groups separated.

None of the skinheads would voice any support for Sladek; apparently they had come to the rally simply looking for a fight with the anarchists. "We're not for Sladek. (The anarchists) should be in jail because they're on drugs," said one skinhead. Said another, "Sladek's not a rightist at all, he's a closet Communist."

The square was rented for a rally of the Assembly for the Republic-Czechoslovak Republican Party (SPR-RSC), led by Sladek, who is notorious for his anti-German and anti-Romany statements as well as his slanderous attacks on Parliament and Cabinet members.

While waiting for minor repairs on his PA system, Sladek told the crowd he was getting anxious. "Bring me an anarchist so I can kill him to relax," he said.

Soon after, the anarchists arrived sporting long hair, mohawks and pierced faces, and carrying "Stop Fascism" signs with drawings of raised fists.

The skinheads rushed through the crowd of Sladek supporters to meet them, but misjudged the might of the anarchists. The teenage skinheads ran like scared chickens from the bat-wielding anarchists and their foot-high mohawks. One youth, a Bohemia Hammer Skinhead nicknamed "Knot," was hit in the neck. His friend was hit in the foot by a piece of shrapnel from a pipe bomb, and another skinhead was cut by a rock that hit the front of his head.

Ignoring the violence in the corner of the square, Sladek continued. "We can call the government liars because they say one thing on TV and do another in the government building," he told the middle-to retirement-age followers still surrounding the statue.

Sladek went on to cite Labor and Social Affairs Minister Jindrich Vodicka's decision to change the retirement age, following it up with his standard call for the salaries of Parliament members to be cut to 8,000 Kc per month—"and anyone who doesn't like it can get out!" he told the cheering crowd.

When he finished his speech on Old Town Square, Sladek called for a march to the statue of St. Wenceslas atop Wenceslas Square. Last year the Republican Party rented the square, forcing participants in an official ceremony with President Vaclav Havel, Premier Vaclav Klaus and Prague Mayor Jan Koukal to lay memorial wreaths on Oct. 27, the eve of the holiday. After that mishap, Koukal rented the square for the next 20 years in order to allow citizens to peacefully celebrate the anniversary there.

Sladek, his supporters and the skinheads proceeded to the equestrian statue, and Sladek climbed up on it, despite warnings from the police, to address the crowd. In an attempt to pull Sladek off the statue, the police got into a conflict with several Republican supporters, including Parliament deputy Jan Vik. Vik fell from the statue and had to be hospitalized for head injuries. Sladek jumped to the roof of a car and continued his speech from there.

After the holiday, many political parties issued statements condemning the actions of the Republican Party for straying from the humanist traditions embraced by T.G. Masaryk, co-founder and first president of Czechoslovakia.

The Republican Party issued a statement decrying the "brutal intervention" and violation of human rights by the police. It stated that "more than 65,000 members and followers of the SPR-RSC (the Czech News Agency's estimate was 1,500) were steadily disturbed in a rough and brutal way by members of the drug-affected anarchist youth and by fanatic followers of Mr. Havel and Mr. Klaus."

Financial Practices of Far Right Party Questioned

AU0112123594

[FBIS Editorial Report] Prague MLADY SVET in Czech No 47 on 17 November on page 18, under the headline "Money Pipelines of Dr. Sladek," carries a 1,300-word article by Tomas Nemecek questioning the financial practices of Miroslav Sladek, leader of the Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia.

The author begins with his definition of a successful Czech politician as being one "who keeps two personal accounts in addition to the official party one, has a mistress, drives a luxury Alfa-Romeo, has been prosecuted many times and sentenced once, belongs to a party that does not pay its bills, and has the unconditional trust of 19 percent of the voters." Such a politician, the author explains, is Miroslav Sladek, 44-year-old chairman of the right-wing Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia.

By way of explanation, Nemecek says that the party dues have been always sent to a Komercni Banka account. When a secretariat employee learned that there were two other accounts, of which no one had known until then and regarding which no transfers could be traced because only the party chairman is authorized to access the account, Sladek reportedly advised her to "disappear for a while." She then moved to the United States. According to Nemecek, the head of the Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia secretariat, Laura Rajsiglova, also drives a luxury car, a white Cadillac. "Several people in the know independently claim that Sladek had an affair with her." Sladek's "colleagues who subsequently had to leave because they asked awkward questions recall that Sladek simply tore up many bills and reminders, saying that nothing could happen to him," Nemecek reports. The "political newspaper" REPUBLIKA, he says, must be losing money because it is sold below cost and has no subsidy, which, with a circulation of 20,000-30,000, means that it is certainly unviable. The party should receive 9 million korunas [Kc] next year on the basis of the votes it received, and its deputies must contribute Kc5,000 of their monthly salaries to "humanitarian causes." The actual charity expenditures are, however, according to Nemecek, minimal in comparison with those on a large house in the name of Sladek's right-hand man, Vik, or the purchase of the racehorse Republika.

Nemecek reports that several companies have close links to the party. One of them, Wisdom Co., was founded in 1991, and, while three of its "owners" were not aware of their participation, the remaining two are the aforementioned Rajsiglova and Vik. "Sladek's former lawyer, Dr. Kolar, has said that the party pays Wisdom 70 percent more than usual for printing its propaganda." The Reos (Republican Busines Company) and Livas, owned or associated with the party, are currently being prosecuted in connection with a rum-smuggling scandal, Nemecek notes. Next year, the Supreme Control Office is to audit the party books, but, according to Nemecek, "this will not bother the Sladekites much. They already have a new party, the Republicans, registered at the Interior Ministry."

Persisting Chernobyl Contamination Detected

95CH0049A Prague PROGNOSIS in English 9 Nov 94 p 3

[Article by Hana Lesenarova: "Chernobyl Cesium Found in Deer and Mushrooms"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Eight years after the Chernobyl disaster in Ukraine, deer meat and mushrooms from the Sumava Mountains possess inflated levels of the radioactive nuclide cesium-137, Czech health officials say.

In a sample of mushrooms from the Sumava Mountains tested Oct. 31, scientists detected "an exceptionally high level" of radiation—as much as 30,000 becquerels per kilogram—in dry mushrooms.

Miloslav Vobecky, a chemist at the Czech Academy of Sciences, said the amount of cesium in the Sumava mushrooms is "the same level as we measured in 1986 after the accident."

In addition to mushrooms, in mid-October the District Hygiene Station in Plzen reported that 14 deer from the Sumava region contained an average of about 500 becquerels of cesium per kilogram of meat.

Radioactive cesium-137 can have similar effects on the human body as other radioactive materials: It highly increases the probability of developing cancer, according to radiologist Vladislav Kelner at the State Health Institute.

The average range of cesium measured in dry mushrooms by health officials around the country is from 500 to 20,000 becquerels per kilogram. A becquerel is a unit of measurement expressing the total potential radiation in a substance.

Vobecky has been measuring cesium in Sumava mushrooms since the accident. He said mushrooms have an exceptional ability to absorb alkali metals, including cesium.

However, scientists said the cesium levels found by health officials do not pose immediate health threats. By today's government standards, the safe amount of radioactive cesium for one person to ingest in one year is 400,000 becquerels. Legislators are considering a new law that would lower accepted levels to 100,000 becquerels.

A person would have to eat two and a half deer or 500 kg of mushrooms a year (about 1.4 kg of mushrooms a day) to reach the maximum recommended allowance, Kelner said. However, a person would have to ingest only 130 kg of the Sumava mushrooms Vobecky tested in a year to reach the current government limit.

Pavel Beran of the District Hygiene Station in Plzen said his office has been monitoring cesium levels since the Chernobyl accident, and has never found anybody with dangerous levels of cesium.

The bumper crop of mushrooms this fall prompted the worry about cesium exposure. Miroslav Smotlacha, spokesman for the Czech Mycological Society, estimated that "the average Czech eats about two or three kilos of mushrooms a year, although there are some who may eat up to 10 kilos."

Speculation About New Cardinal Miloslav Vlk

95CH0049B Prague PROGNOSIS in English 9 Nov 94 p 7

Article by H.L.: "New Czech Cardinal Short-Listed for Pope?"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Czech Archbishop Miloslav Vlk was among 30 new cardinals appointed by Pope John Paul II Oct. 29, and according to two Italian newspapers, he could be on a short list of candidates to be the next pope.

After the official ceremony Nov. 26 at the Vatican, Vlk will join the ranks of 166 other cardinals. Cardinals serve as the pope's principal advisers and select new popes.

The pope is rumored to be seriously ill, and speculations about his departure from the church's highest post were fueled by the new appointments.

According to the Italian dailies LA REPUBLICA and IL MESSAGGERO, Vlk's name was mentioned among four possible candidates for pope in the last will and testament Pope John Paul II is allegedly preparing. According to those papers, Vlk ranks as one of the most important personalities in the Catholic Church and has already been chosen to play a vital role among the second wave of East European prelates.

Other factors that led to Vlk's selection as cardinal include his service as chair of the Council of European Bishop Conferences and his activity during the Communist regime. After Prague Spring in 1968 he had to hide his religious activities and was officially employed as a window washer. He continued practicing without state approval until after the 1989 revolution.

Miloslav Fiala, press spokesman for Prague's archbishop, said Vlk's appointment is an honor to the Czech Republic and the Czech Catholic Church. However, he completely dismissed speculation about Vlk's becoming the next pope. "This deserves no comment, it's all just imagination and fabrications," Fiala said. "They base their rumors on rumors of the possible worsening of the Holy Father's health, and any capable person can come up with 10 rumors like that. Besides, the one who is talked about being elected in advance usually isn't anyway."

Journalist Egon Lansky Ponders Allegiance

95CH0049C Prague PROGNOSIS in English 9 Nov 94 p 4

[Article by Prague journalist and political analyst Egon T. Lansky, former spokesman for the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry and ambassador to the Council of Europe: "The Politics of Citizenship"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Once again I have been reminded of my split personality. My background is Slovak Jewish, but all my life I have been Czechoslovak. The politicians, of course, did not make it easy for me by dividing the country in 1992. But having survived almost a quarter century in exile (and Nazi concentration camps before that), I am not easy to break down. That said, the last week has been almost overwhelming.

The first warning signal came from Stockholm. The Swedish authorities, who granted me citizenship during my exile years, reminded me I had a three-week period in which to vote on the question of whether Sweden ought to enter the European Union (voters in Sweden go to the polls Nov. 13). So complete was the information the Swedes provided that it swiftly became evident there was no way I could disqualify myself from voting—even if I had been a former Slovak premier, which I am not.

Obviously, though, this is an important vote, and I like the feeling of doing everything I can to make it possible for Sweden to join a larger Europe. Yet my casting a vote on the future of Sweden got me thinking—mostly about the Czech law on citizenship.

This law holds that I am not barred from multiple citizenship, so long as it is not Slovak. Which means, I take it, that I can be Czech while also being Swedish, but at no time can I be Slovak—which is what I am.

Clear enough, I hope.

This situation, naturally, has a number of consequences. I could not, for example, vote in the recent general elections in Slovakia, nor in a referendum held there two weeks ago. Unlike the general election, the referendum was quite worthless, so at least I have the satisfaction of not having had to vote on something worthless. Meanwhile, I had the pleasure of voting on the future of Sweden.

Things balance out, right?

Not so fast. Take the Czech national holiday, for instance. Oct. 28, the anniversary of the formation of the Czechoslovak state, is a national holiday in the Czech Republic but not in Slovakia. The political establishments in both countries have mixed feelings about celebrating this date, but for different reasons.

In Bratislava, where the politicians feel uncomfortable about the holiday, there were no official public celebrations at all, though that hardly prevented Czechs and Slovaks from getting together to demonstrate their bond.

I was invited to take part in commemorative events in both countries—yet that turned out to be a bit of a problem, for which nation should I pick? It occurred to me I could solve the question by deciding to take part in ceremonies in Uherske Hradiste, a town on the Czech-Slovak border.

There I stood next to a high representative of the U.S. Embassy in Prague, and the event appeared to be proceeding smoothly. But I was representing Slovakia—the country I cannot be a citizen of. The people, bless them, decided to let the error pass. I am from the neighboring Slovak town of Trencin, so for them I am Slovak enough—despite my Czech/Swedish citizenship.

If it seems complicated, well, it is. The Czech citizenship law, as well as the Slovak decision to abolish the national holiday, were passed by assemblies that existed under the Czechoslovak federation, which no longer exists. So now rules decreed by extinct bodies that were elected by citizens in a country that doesn't exist continue to dictate who I am and who I am not, and where I can celebrate and vote.

Thank God I can remain Swedish. At least in one way I am clearly defined.

Right or wrong, my country.

Gen Joulwan Views PFP, Yugoslavia, NATO

AU3011170794 Bratislava OBRANA in Slovak 26 Nov 94 pp 1, 3

["Exclusive interview" with General George A. Joulwan, supreme commander of Allied Forces in Europe, by "m + k"-signed correspondents in Bratislava; date not given: "Serving the Country...."]

[FBIS Translated Text] General George A. Joulwan, supreme commander of NATO allied forces in Europe, visited Slovakia in mid-November at the invitation of Slovak Defense Minister Pavol Kanis. After General John Shalikashvili, he is the second man in this post to have held talks with our highest state and military representatives. In accordance with the official agenda of his visit, Gen. Joulwan granted an exclusive interview to our weekly.

[OBRANA] NATO is facing the problem of the possible admission of the Visegrad Four countries. Do you consider Partnership for Peace [PFP] to be a good way of preventing a race among them for who will be the first to reach that goal?

[Joulwan] First, we have to understand correctly the reasons that led to the PFP program. The aim of the program is to establish equal and common standards and procedures so that NATO units and units of NATO's future partners are able to cooperate at the operational level—for example, within the framework of UN peacekeeping operations.

Each country has different reasons for joining the PFP. Some are interested in membership in the Alliance, but others are not. They want to cooperate with NATO to learn its procedures in the sphere of coordinating military activities in the implementation of humanitarian operations, and also for other purposes. It is evident that the countries of the Visegrad group have indicated very clearly where they want to go. Hence, I think that the PFP will help establish relations between NATO and individual countries and their armies. We have to continue with this. But, in the final analysis, the decision on NATO membership will be made not at the military level but at the political one.

This decision will be made between the sovereign countries of East and Central Europe and NATO. Some see the PFP program as the first step toward admission into NATO. I see it as a method of involving individual armies in cooperation and communicating among them.

As far as Slovakia's involvement is concerned, I must say that what I have seen so far within the framework of PFP has made a very good impression on me. You sent a unit to Poland and to the Netherlands to participate in exercises held within the framework of the PFP program. You also have your liaison officer in the PFP coordinating cell. Today's meetings have shown me the orientation of the endeavors of your military representatives.

[OBRANA] There is much talk about the attitude of Russia toward the possible admission of Central European countries into NATO. The nonadmission of Visegrad Four countries could lead to the creation of some kind of buffer zone in Central Europe. What is your opinion on this issue?

[Joulwan] I think that what you say is a bit premature. Russia signed the PFP program and is working on the preparation of its individual plan. I think that, first, we should allow this relationship to evolve. Only then will the time come for any conclusions. First, we should shake hands with Russia and cooperate with it as with any other partner. It is very important, particularly in relations with Russia, for an atmosphere of mutual trust to arise. But no country participating in the PFP has the right of veto in the sense of deciding whether some country will or will not enter Europe.

[OBRANA] The Alliance is playing an irreplaceable role in the settlement of the conflict in former Yugoslavia. Do you believe in an early cessation of that conflict?

[Joulwan] First, I would like to say that what is happening in former Yugoslavia is a tragedy. NATO is playing an important role in easing this conflict. NATO is involved in the protection of Bosnian airspace, in support of a UN Security Council resolution, which is actually a flight prevention operation. This is being done at the UN's request. Furthermore, we are participating in checking the embargo in the Adriatic. NATO is performing both these tasks of enforcing UN resolutions very well.

In the 40 years of our existence, this is actually the first time we have been involved in operations. Responsibility for the situation on the ground is borne by the UN Protection Force, whose activity we support. Of course, it is only at its request that we can carry out warning flights.

It is very hard for me to reply to the second part of your question. But I expect a political and diplomatic solution to the situation, rather than a military one. That is why I am looking hopefully at the United Nations and the work of the Contact Group.

While speaking about the situation in Yugoslavia, I would like to take the opportunity to convey thanks to the Slovak Republic and the more than 600 Slovak soldiers participating in the activity of peacekeeping forces in Yugoslavia. I know that this is a very important and difficult task and a great commitment.

[OBRANA] The system of blocs based on the existence of the Warsaw Pact and NATO has fallen apart. In view of the demise of the Warsaw Pact, are you an advocate of NATO's transformation in the sense of a gradual liquidation of its military structures?

[Joulwan] Looking to the future, I must say that NATO is just as important today as it was before, if not more important. But we must adapt to the present and the future. We must adapt our structure to our mission. And we are doing that. The PFP represents holding out one's hand to one's former adversaries. We are involved in peacekeeping operations. Right now, for example, we are preparing the General Staff, the chief command, for combined units. When we get the political order, we can make such combined joint general staffs available for specific tasks of the United Nations, the Western European Union, or other institutions that can make use of them. In the organization of the armed forces, we have moved away from static forces toward mobile ones.

We are the military component of a political structure that has democratic control over its military arm, and this will remain so also on our path ahead.

[OBRANA] Tomorrow, on the second day of your stay in Slovakia, you will be celebrating a significant milestone in your life....

[Joulwan] I am beginning to feel old. I think that Slovakia is a very good place to celebrate one's birthday. In some U.S. states, there is a 55-mile speed limit for cars, which is the limit I have now reached. Allow me to take this opportunity and wish the soldiers of the Slovak Army's ground and air forces all the best. I can tell you that, when I called on the president, on the way from the palace I stopped for a chat with a soldier of the Presidential Guard. When I asked him what he learned during his military service, he replied "serving my country and protecting the president."

Acting Prime Minister Invited to EU Summit

LD3011203694 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 30 Nov 94

[Article by Nora Parikova on EU summit]

[FBIS Translated Text] Branislav Zvara, our correspondent in Bonn, informed us a couple of minutes ago about the invitation extended to Slovakia to the summit of EU [European Union] representatives, which is to be held in the German town of Essen on 9 and 10 December. Because the news from TASR [Slovak news agency] does not give details as to whether the invitation applies to the prime minister, who has resigned, or to the prime minister-designate, Lubomir Lintner, director of the Press and Information Division of the Slovak Government Office, asked us a while ago to relay more accurate information. Lintner said, let me quote: "Today, Prime Minister Moravcik met German Ambassador Heike Zenker, who presented him with a written invitation to this summit for Jozef Moravcik."

Daily Publishes EU Demarche of 23 Nov

AU3011192094 Bratislava SME in Slovak 28 Nov 94 p 2

["The Demarche From the European Union That Was Handed by the Ambassadors of Germany and France to the Slovak President, the Prime Minister, and the Parliament Chairman" in Bratislava on 23 November]

[FBIS Translated Text] The European Union:

—is aware of the results of the Slovak parliamentary elections of 30 September and 1 October 1994 and welcomes their implementation in correspondence with the rules of democracy;

—acknowledges the position reached to date in Slovakia's transformation process;

—is counting on the continuation of the political effort to consolidate democracy, to create a stable market economy, to establish regional cooperation, especially with Hungary, and to further eliminate possible tension in connection with the Hungarian minority;

—declares its readiness to cooperate constructively with the new Slovak Government;

—and hopes that relations with Slovakia will intensify.

However, it must point out that the strengthening of relations between the European Union and Slovakia within the framework of the continuing process of rapprochement or, as the case may be, of affiliation brings not only advantages but also obligations for Slovakia, which will have to be fulfilled by the new Slovak Government.

The European Union:

—is alarmed by some of the political developments since the elections;

—expects and hopes that Slovakia, out of concern for its own interests, will continue assiduously on the road of democratic reforms.

Meciar Discusses DU 'Fraud,' EU Demarche

AU0112084094 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 28 Nov 94 pp 1-2

[Interview with HZDS Chairman Vladimir Meciar by Eva Zelenayova; place and date not given: "He Who Has Lost Trust at Home Is Looking for Support Abroad"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Zelenayova] Jozef Moravcik claims that, if the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] revised its position on recognizing the election results, this would set a precedent and effectively upset the democratic development of the Slovak Republic. How do you evaluate the precedent set by the vote of the Slovak Electoral Commission on the Democratic Union [DU] fulfillment of basic conditions for participating in the elections?

[Meciar] Jozef Moravcik's haughtiness makes you think that he is the embodiment of democracy, the constitution, and guarantees. Yet the fact is that he embodies none of these qualities. As for the situation that arose in conjunction with the petition sheets, it is worth noting that they do not protest the fact that petition sheets were forged and that incomplete and fake lists were foisted upon the Regional and Slovak Electoral Commissions. They refer only to the consequences of this step. First, DU should not have entered the parliamentary elections fraudulently. It was not alone in it; it was assisted in this fraud by those government coalition parties that, in the regional and Slovak electoral commissions, refused to have DU's petition sheets verified. This step means, furthermore, that the people who cast their ballots for DU were convinced that the party's participation in the elections was legitimate. It was not. This step also means that it appealed to a certain segment of the electorate that would otherwise have stayed away from the polls or voted for other parties. In this way, DU actually rigged the election results. Moreover, DU collected several million korunas for the elections and will apparently want to collect even more money for its votes. It has a claim to this money. DU has 13 votes in parliament, with the help of which it wants to pursue a civic and democratic policy, a policy of freedom. However, it was precisely freedom that DU violated because the people did not know the truth and could not decide freely. By violating the principle of free choice, DU actually set a precedent for the future that any instance of dishonesty and dirty practice in the elections by anyone and at any time will be tolerated. Therein lies the risk of this precedent. If there is anything the NRSR should consider today, it is the tackling of several problems. The first is prevention, meaning it must introduce legislative changes that will prevent a repetition of this situation. The second is reparation. It must fix the situation caused by DU. This could be achieved as a consequence of an NRSR decision, or DU could decide to leave parliament, which is unlikely to happen. Or it could be achieved as a consequence of some deputies acknowledging that it really is below their moral threshold to sit in parliament as a result of fraud. The third problem that must be tackled by the NRSR concerns sanctions. It should not be getting any money. Another question is whether this party should be allowed to run in the next elections, whether it should not be barred from participating for one electoral term because of electoral fraud. Moravcik has raised a hue and cry over whether the NRSR was authorized to check the signatures. According to the Constitution, it clearly had this authorization. The norms of a lesser legal force cannot distort a norm with higher legal force. Self-serving interpretations of the law and misleading the public have been characteristic of the Moravcikites' entire term in the government. Because the fraud already occurred, one would expect them to apologize to the citizens and identify those responsible in their own ranks, at the very least. Slovakia will be a more democratic country when it is freed of frauds and cheats.

[Zelenayova] Are you not afraid that the present parliamentary opposition might resort to extreme measures?

[Meciar] What extreme measures? What do they want to do? Are they thinking of using the Army or the police? That is nonsense. Do they want to thrust students into the streets again in their support? Every young person can get excited and make a mistake. After all, the essence of being young is searching for a new and higher principle of justice. But this is not what the opposition offers. Nor do it offer any alternative. Will it incite unrest among the people? What kind of unrest? When I consider the level of people's support, I am not worried. The demagoguery it has been spreading since the elections, with the help of the very same journalists who did it before the elections, is short-lived. Every lie is short-lived.

[Zelenayova] The U.S. Committee for the Defense of Journalists sent a protest to Slovak President Michal Kovac regarding the dismissal of some reporters from their posts. Among others, the protest mentions Svetozar Kosicky, who was recalled from the post of "director" of the Domestic Policy Department of Slovak Television's News Service. What do you think about this?

[Meciar] Everyone has the right to his opinion. But my question is what this committee was doing in March when REPUBLIKA was being liquidated, when the TA SR director general was fired for the fulfillment of orders from Deputy Prime Minister Roman Kovac, when the staff of SMENA NA NEDELU was being liquidated, and when members of the Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting were dismissed. Interestingly enough, no voice of protest was heard from the United States then. I am slowly getting the impression that this is not objective criticism of the status and rights of journalists but a party-motivated criticism, that certain circles in Slovakia are using their international links and seek support abroad when they have lost confidence and support at home. This state is guided by internal norms, however, and must be based on internal principles. We respect foreigners' views, but sometimes we have to say enough, esteemed gentlemen. This is our business. We do not claim the right to issue statements on the situation in other countries as long as a critical limit is not exceeded and do not want anyone from abroad to interfere in our internal affairs. Moreover, I think that this is nonsense because Mr. Kosicky never held that post.

[Zelenayova] Foreign countries, in general, became extraordinarily active last week, with the European Union [EU] sending a demarche. What is your opinion on this?

[Meciar] Many have commented on it but few have read it. As far as the contents are concerned, there is nothing to comment on. The demarche is positive. It recognizes the democratic results of elections in Slovakia, expresses the view that the course on which Slovakia has embarked will continue, and speaks about minority rights. That is all. Basically, all of the negative fuss about the EU's coming to the rescue of those who lost the elections or those who are now infamously leaving the government and begging us to let them go is nonsense. The contents of the demarche are not at all as they have been interpreted by the mass media. Nothing has happened.

Report on HZDS Republican Board Meeting

AU3011201294 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 28 Nov 94 pp 1-2

[Article by Eva Zelenayova: "The Prime Minister of the Coalition Government Will Be Vladimir Meciar"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kosice—At its meeting in Kosice on 26 November, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] Republican Board unanimously endorsed Vladimir Meciar for the post of prime minister of the future coalition government. It also decided to create a third deputy chairman post; it was filled by Augustin Marian Huska. The Republican Board assessed the talks held so far with the political parties on forming a government. It analyzed the results of the local elections and the course of the constituent and first meetings of the National Council of the Slovak Republic and devoted attention to topical internal party issues. The Republican Board members were informed that Prosecutor General Ludovit Hudek has suspended his membership in the HZDS. A possible date for the formation of a new government, between 15 and 20 December, was also mentioned at the meeting. It was also agreed to invite the Party of the Democratic Left to further talks on topical political issues.

At a press briefing held during the meeting, A.M. Huska told reporters that the HZDS Board had expressed its agreement with the conduct of the movement's chairman, V. Meciar, during the course of the coalition talks. The board also expressed its agreement with their procedure, which was maintained within the bounds of legality and constitutionality. Huska said that the Board also expressed the opinion that the government should be formed as soon as possible and that talks on forming a government are continuing on a broader basis than the current parliamentary coalition. Katarina Tothova said that consideration was being given to a formula for filling the departmental posts no matter which coalition is formed. She emphasized that the obligation stemming from the previous Board meeting—to form a stable majority government for four years—still applies.

Asked why the HZDS has said that it will present the new government only after next year's budget has been submitted to parliament, Huska said the following: "Out of consideration for our coalition partners, who want to know where things stand on the budget issue." According to him, the board did not adopt an official point of view on the demarche from the European Union. Asked whether the HZDS was willing to comply with the conditions that the Christian Democratic Movement had come up with at the coalition talks, he said: "These are demands to give up what we won in the elections."

HZDS Regrets SDL's Attitude Toward Dialogue

LD3011135194 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 30 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Only a few minutes ago, the Press Agency of the Slovak Republic [TASR] reported that the secretariat of the chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] sent a letter earlier today to the secretariat of the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] concerning the preparations for talks between the HZDS and the SDL. TASR has obtained the letter from the HZDS press and information department.

The letter says, and I quote: In its resolution of 26 November, the HZDS executive proposed that the two parties hold joint talks on the current political situation. The proposal to hold talks was delivered by the secretariat of the HZDS chairman to the secretariat of the SDL chairman on 28 November. The SDL chairman's reaction to this proposal shows without any doubt that the SDL chairman is refusing any talks with the HZDS. A fax sent by the SDL on 29 November does not show any change of stand by the SDL, but only asks for further information.

The response to the HZDS proposal is proof that the SDL is not capable of constructive dialogue and that it is consistently heading for cooperation with the Christian Democratic Movement and the Hungarian political parties. Any future proposal by the SDL for talks with the HZDS will be accepted only if it is meant seriously—that is, that it is backed by resolutions adopted by the SDL bodies.

We are sorry—I continue the quote—that, over several months, the SDL has not been able to hold a dialogue with the HZDS.

That was the agency report.

KDH Chairman Airs Views on HZDS Objectives

AU3011133894 Bratislava SMENA in Slovak 25 Nov 94 p 5

[Interview with KDH Chairman Jan Carnogursky by Dusan Valko; place and date not given: "Does the HZDS Lack a State Concept?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Valko] Mr. Chairman, allow me to return to the talks between the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] and the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]. Which issues did the victorious movement care most about, on which ones did it not want to make concessions, and which ones were acceptable to it?

[Carnogursky] We only got as far as the first group of issues, those that concern the National Council of the Slovak Republic session [on 3-4 November]. We did not reach an understanding on even one of them.

[Valko] In your opinion, what goal is the HZDS interested in?

[Carnogursky] I have the impression, in a narrower context, that they want to turn the parliamentary system into a presidential one. This means that President Kovac would be recalled. The president's powers would be greatly increased; he would probably be elected directly by the population. V. Meciar would let himself be elected president, and the government would be merely his executive authority. In a broader context, the point is that, during the establishment of the Slovak Republic, the HZDS had an image of this state merely as a kind of one-third continuation of the former CSFR in Slovakia in the sense that, for example, the budget would be one-third of the Czechoslovak one and the Army would be roughly one-third the size of the Czechoslovak Army. This means that everything would function as it did under the CSFR, except that the Slovak Republic would have sovereignty and a place in the United Nations. The HZDS had no fundamental intrinsic idea about Slovakia's state concept; it had only the one I mentioned. It is clear that it is impossible to continue with the methods that used to be applied in the CSFR. In many sectors, our budget is incapable of providing for their requirements the way the budget of the former CSFR used to. The political pressures on Slovakia are greater, because we are, simply, a small state. In the past, the Hungarian issue was never as tense or as serious as it is now. The Slovak Army is essentially unable to defend the entire length of the Republic's borders, and the country's international standing cannot be compared with the international standing of the former CSFR. These are all things that require a fundamental course of action toward devising a new state concept for Slovakia. The issue here is a broader one. The HZDS is incapable of devising a new state concept.

[Valko] Has the KDH already given some thought to this?

[Carnogursky] We realized that there would be a need for such a concept and that it would not be easy to formulate it. This is one of the reasons the KDH was restrained about the breakup of Czechoslovakia. There is no way back for our movement. We are capable of taking part in formulating a new concept; we insist on a bedrock of Christian values, from which this concept for Slovakia must proceed. Otherwise, it would be impossible to formulate. We insist on a foundation of Slovak national traditions, which also must play a role in formulating the state concept. We proceed from Europeanism more than any other party in our country. It also has to play a role in this concept.

[Valko] Are you willing to support a possible change to some of the articles in the Slovak Constitution?

[Carnogursky] We will not initiate any changes, but we will participate in and support them if they are initiated by others. That is to say, certain changes to the Constitution are really necessary. We think that any interference in the Constitution at the moment would merely be a pretext for removing the president. We want to make the changes in 1998, when M. Kovac's term in office comes to an end. Destabilizing the Slovak presidency would mean destabilizing the last stable constitutional body we have. Neither the government nor the parliament is stable.

Integration of Center, Right-of-Center Parties

LD3011145594 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 30 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The main topics discussed at the regular news conference held by the National Democratic Party were the EU [European Union] demarche, coupon privatization, and the current domestic political situation. Peter Turcik brings more details in an interview with NDS Chairman Ludovit Cernak.

[Turcik] You informed the journalists at today's news conference that a political agreement had emerged or, to be more precise, that there was a proposal of a political agreement on the integration of certain political parties. Which parties do you intend to integrate and on what basis?

[Cernak] We were given a clear answer by the local elections. Wherever we joined our forces, we remained strong [words indistinct]. After consultations with our partners, especially with the Party of Businessmen and Self-Employed People with which understanding has in fact been achieved and with the Democratic Union, we have prepared a draft agreement on the integration of center and right-of-center political parties. These entities are to be part of the integration agreement. However, the agreement is open. We would also like to approach other parties that have similar programs.

[Turcik] Can the voters take this as the first signal of a major change on the Slovak political scene?

[Cernak] Yes, I believe the time of small political parties is over. These parties, in fact, fight each other. They poach the other party's voters, and their programs do not offer alternative approaches. That was the reason the broad coalition was defeated in the 1994 elections. One should learn a lesson from these mistakes, and it should be a signal for gradual integration of similar political entities. [passage omitted]

Report on Republic's Continuing Disarmament

AU0112085694 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 28 Nov 94 p 2

[TA SR report: "Disarmament Is Continuing"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The Slovak Army should have 46,667 men a year from now, when the third and final stage of reducing its hardware in accordance with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces (KOS) is completed. It is apparent from the international tables that the Slovak Armed Forces will then be able to have 478 tanks, 683 armored combat vehicles, and 383 artillery systems at their disposal. The Air Force should have at its disposal 115 combat aircraft and 25 helicopters. If we compare these figures with the current numbers of personnel, hardware, and equipment, it is clear that, in the next and final year of disarmament, the Slovak Republic will be obliged to dispose of two combat aircraft, 166 tanks, 66 armored personnel carriers, and

251 artillery systems. There is no requirement that all of these weapons have to be destroyed. The state may sell off some of them or convert them to civilian use. The Army will donate at least some of them to museums.

Moravcik Describes CEFTA as Necessary, Useful

AU3011202394 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 28 Nov 94 p 3

[TA SR report: "A Necessary and Useful Grouping"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The biggest benefit from the 25 November summit in Poznan involving CEFTA (Central European Free Trade Agreement) member states is, according to Slovak Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik, the very fact that it took place. "It is important that the idea of using this form of cooperation to improve the conditions for integrating the countries of the Visegrad Group into the European Union has not foundered," he said in an interview for TA SR.

Moravcik's speech at the introductory CEFTA meeting was judged to be the most specific by the delegations present, and Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus also applauded it. The summit dispelled some concerns that CEFTA was heading for collapse and that this meeting would be the last one. The specific decision oriented toward reducing customs barriers and the greater liberalization of trade, as well as the agreement to expand CEFTA's activities to include other spheres of cooperation and new states, are proof that this grouping is necessary and useful, Moravcik said.

Although the issue of the Visegrad Four's rapprochement with the European Union was not the main topic of the summit, it did emerge several times from the background. At the same time, the Czech Republic, through Prime Minister Klaus, put forward the view that the Visegrad Four has ceased to exist and has been converted into CEFTA. The other three member states—Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland—still insist on the need to coordinate the integrative steps toward European structures. "Vaclav Klaus rejects political cooperation, and, therefore, he wants to hew the idea of the Visegrad Group down to just economic relations," commented Moravcik. According to him, Klaus wants to further expand the agreement to include new states. At the same time, he also alludes to cooperation with the countries of Latin America, which would mean that the original purpose of the Visegrad Group would be completely lost. Slovenia should be among the first to be accepted, probably followed by the Baltic countries and the Balkan states and, as the case may be, by other countries associated with the European Union. "No matter how we assess this group of states, the original Visegrad Four countries have their own specific features, and, whether we want it or not, they will cooperate with one another not only in the economic sphere but also in the political, military, and security ones," the prime minister emphasized.

Horn Comments on NATO, CSCE, Minorities

AU3011161494 Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 30 Nov 94 p 12

[Interview with Prime Minister Gyula Horn by Michael Frank and Bela Weyer in Budapest; date not given: "A Hungary Inside NATO Would Be No Threat To Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG] Mr. Prime Minister, your predecessor Jozsef Antall said that he felt he was the prime minister of 15 million Hungarians. Should Hungary's neighboring countries, which harbor Hungarian minorities, not consider that a threat? Do you feel the same way as Antall did?

[Horn] Some people regret that I have not said the same thing. But I cannot say it. If I did, I would be unable to safeguard the well-being of the Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia who are dependent on the policies of the governments of those countries. They are Romanian or Slovak citizens. The tension with our neighbors has relaxed considerably in recent times, even with Serbia. I consider that a sign of major progress.

[SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG] Why is your government more successful than the previous one?

[Horn] This government has achieved a turnabout in foreign policy values. The supporters of the previous government always said that bilateral relations with the neighboring countries depend solely on these countries' treatment of the Hungarian minorities. But we said these relations with these countries must be improved first, so that they can take the rights of the Hungarian minorities seriously.

[SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG] You have presented Slovakia with a draft treaty on mutual relations. What does Hungary offer therein?

[Horn] In it, we extol the inviolability of borders, and we state that we have no territorial claims. In return, we expect the rights of the minorities not to be questioned.

[SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG] Vladimir Meciar will soon govern Slovakia again. Was he not the one who accused Hungary of not being generous enough? When will the treaty be signed?

[Horn] Whether or not Vladimir Meciar forms a government in Slovakia is a Slovak domestic matter. I spoke to him at length in Bratislava. He assured me that he is seeking a sensible relationship with Hungary and that he will respect the concerns of the minorities. Well, politicians tend to say lots of things. But the most important thing is that this is not just a Hungarian wish, but a European one. If the new Slovak Government wants to be respectable, a matter of vital importance for it, then it must meet this challenge. On the other hand, I cannot accept our previous practice of passing advance judgment on the governments of the neighboring countries. An absurd example of this is that Hungarian firms close to the Slovak border maintained good economic links with Slovakia, but many people in Budapest, rather than encourage these links, considered them to be a mistake. That is stupid!

[SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG] How is it that even the chronically tense relations with Romania have improved?

[Horn] When a Hungarian Government says positive things about Romania or Slovakia, this is bound to have a positive effect. But there is still tension. The parliaments of both countries still contain nationalist parties that are trying to stir up provocation. One example is the wild nationalist Gheorghe Funar in Romania. There are no nationalists in the Hungarian National Assembly. Csurka and his tram failed to win. Even though at least four right-wing-extremist parties took part in the elections, the Hungarian people were wise enough not to admit them to parliament. Therefore, unlike the democratic forces in Slovakia and Romania, we do not have to wage a hard struggle against our own nationalists, because they have not entered the structures of power. Therefore, we find it easier to pursue normal politics.

[SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG] Does the minority issue not depend on a European-wide process?

[Horn] The Council of Europe has taken the issue seriously. I can only express the greatest recognition of this Council's role. If the Council really does create a system to protect minorities—I have in mind the drafting of obligations and sanctions for violating them—then this will be something of enormous importance. After all, in this region the question of minorities is inseparably linked to war and peace. Where minority rights are violated, territorial claims soon follow. Yugoslavia is an example of that. Both things go hand in hand. That creates the danger that the confrontation might turn into an armed conflict. Anyone who does not perceive when that might happen has no knowledge at all of Central and East Europe.

[SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG] Is this not a topic for the CSCE, which is meeting in Budapest shortly?

[Horn] Hungary is going to assume chairmanship over the CSCE for one year. We want the CSCE to lay down a code of conduct binding on all countries. It is more expensive to contain and resolve a crisis than to prevent it. The CSCE can play a major part in the prevention of conflicts. But its work has to be organized much better.

[SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG] Is the CSCE livelier than it seems?

[Horn] I would not underestimate the CSCE. On the other hand, the organization is very difficult to manage. After all, it has 54 member-countries, some of which have only existed for a short while and have internal conflicts or conflicts with their neighbors. But we have to keep working on this, especially in the case of Russia and the CIS. For instance, we have to convince Moscow that

Hungarian NATO membership would not be a threat to Russian security. Many Russian politicians are still convinced that NATO is aggressive in principle just because it is a military organization. And yet NATO is a defense community. It has never committed any aggression. I think people simply do not know NATO well.

[SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG] You are facing a mountain of domestic problems. Five years after the changes, people have dispensed with their emotions. Did they expect too much, or have disastrous mistakes been made?

[Horn] Five years ago, no one knew that the changes would be so difficult. A lot has happened in Hungary in the sphere of market economy, including a lot of dirty business. That is life. But the social partnership, without which progress cannot be achieved, was simply forgotten by the previous government. The country is becoming richer, but the state is poorer. That is a serious matter because the system of state distribution and financing has remained unchanged and is hindering economic reform.

[SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG] You have not given your voters much cause for hope. But you did promise them you would clarify all the wrongdoings connected with privatization. When is the great clarification operation beginning?

[Horn] Yes, we did promise to bring things to order. Already on our first day in office, we resolved to curb corruption in every sphere, inside institutions, during privatization, and so on. This is a much slower progress than we expected, mainly because all these irregularities do not actually involve any breach of the law. But, they are highly immoral.

[SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG] Do your socialist party colleagues accept the harsh conditions governing stabilization?

[Horn] We have the largest left-wing parliamentary faction in Europe. Of course, there are differences of opinion, even inside the government. There have even been threats of strike action. But even a left-wing government has to take this in its stride.

[SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG] Disputes inside the government? Do you find the liberals inconvenient?

[Horn] I have only had four months of experience in a coalition government. Yes, they are tough partners. A dispute is emerging because one cannot unleash a liberal economic policy on an economy in transition. I am in favor of the stabilization program. But we must show something at the same time. Otherwise, I cannot ask people to make sacrifices.

Romanian Ambassador Comments on Relations

AU3011192794 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 30 Nov 94 p 3

[Interview with Romanian Ambassador to Hungary Ioan Donca by Otto Neumann, place and date not given: "The Hungarian Press Has Made Funar Into a Negative Hero"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Neumann] The CSCE summit to be held next week in Budapest will be a first, among other things, in the development of Romanian-Hungarian relations: Since his election four and a half years ago, this is the first time Romanian President Ion Iliescu will have visited Hungary. Do you know if he will meet with Hungarian officials outside the plenary sessions?

[Donca] According to my information, Iliescu will meet Hungarian President Arpad Goncz and Prime Minister Gyula Horn. As far as I know, these meetings will be more than brief meetings held in corridors. Naturally, we cannot expect miracles from this type of contact; however, the highest level talks of responsible politicians are certainly useful for relations between the two peoples.

[Neumann] Romania's most important national day is on 1 December, but the event celebrated—the unification of Transylvania with Romania in 1918—creates negative feelings in Hungary. Have Hungarian politicians made you, as ambassador to Budapest, feel the strange dichotomy of the celebrations?

[Donca] This day was designated by the democratically elected parliament of the Romanian people as the country's most important national day and, in my position of ambassador, I have not received any indications from the participants in Hungarian political life that our commemorations offend feelings in Hungary. As a matter of fact, I was also invited to the 15 March commemorations in Budapest when the 12 points [demands of revolution] of 1848 were read out—namely that Transylvania should be united with Hungary. A high-ranking Hungarian politician reminded me that this was a historical document and that I should not be upset about it. I can honestly say that I was not at all offended because history cannot be changed.

[Neumann] Gheorghe Funar's [Cluj mayor] anti-Hungarian statements create indignation in Hungary because he, at the same time, is the chairman of the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR], a political party in government. Have his latest remarks created a diplomatic scandal?

[Donca] In my view, the Cluj mayor has been made into a negative hero by the Hungarian media. If we look at the media in Romania, he appears in them less than a fifth as often as in Hungary. Funar's various statements must not be seen as the official Romanian stance....

[Neumann] Nevertheless, Funar is the head of a government party....

[Donca] However, the Hungarian media usually forget to mention that Funar's party distances itself from his statements. I would like to note that, prior to Romanian Foreign Minister Melescanu's visit to Budapest, the PUNR issued an official statement supporting the political steps facilitating rapprochement between the two peoples. As for the latest "event," the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of Romania's liberation was held in Carei [Nagykaroly] on 25 October. At that time, Iliescu, rather than Funar, made the official statement. I used the same arguments in the Budapest Foreign Ministry when asked to explain Funar's statement. Naturally, I did not have to go to the Foreign Ministry because of Funar.

Official Assesses Security Policy, Army Reform

AU3011193094 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 30 Nov 94 pp 1, 6

[Interview with Bela Gyuricza, deputy of the Federation of Young Democrats and member of the Defense Committee, by Vereckei at the National Assembly building in Budapest on 29 November: "If You Want Peace, Prepare for Peace"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Three important questions must be clarified before starting the army reform: What sources of danger come from our environment, how we can react to these challenges, and what is Hungary's ability to cope? If these three subjects are not examined scientifically and an army reform begins without clarifying these issues, this reform is bound to fail—Bela Gyuricza, parliamentary deputy for the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ] and member of the Defense Committee, told our correspondent. We asked the former commander of the Hungarian Army's land forces about Hungary's security policy and the reform of the armed forces.*

[Vereckei] Do you think that such an examination failed to materialize?

[Gyuricza] I feel a certain haste, and, as is well known, this does not allow a thorough examination. One can hear an increasing number of statements made by leading government officials speaking about processes that have already begun, while some of these steps should be approved by parliament. It seems that economic considerations are pushing the ministry on this road, and I am afraid that this haste could lead to mistakes. In the case of the army, a poor decision can only be corrected in years or decades.

[Vereckei] As a former general, you obviously have a clear concept about the future army.

[Gyuricza] First of all, we should create an efficient force on the existing basis, one based on the best technical means, a force comprising quick-reaction troops, modern aircraft, and modern land combat equipment. This could be the core of a future modern army, a smaller army than the current one. We must also increase the number of professional soldiers to about 50-60 percent of the overall army personnel. By the year 2005 or 2010, we could create an army that can be fully integrated in the Western structure and is capable of participating in crisis management, as well as in conflict-prevention and humanitarian actions together with other NATO members.

[Vereckei] You are talking about 2005 or 2010, while we might be able to join NATO in a few years.

[Gyuricza] The changing NATO will not accept new members on the basis of the system of conditions prevailing during the Cold War. I have held talks with some 80-90 delegations in the past four years, and these talks convinced me that the main condition of joining is what we can fulfill now and what we take upon ourselves, and not whether we are technically and organizationally compatible. For example, do we record the percentage of GDP we spend on the army and the funds we spend on the reform of the armed forces?

[Vereckei] A security policy conference was held recently in Budapest with the participation of military experts and politicians. Several speakers called Hungary's security policy and defense principles obsolete. Do you agree with this?

[Vereckei] Both basic principles were adopted by parliament in the spring of 1993 as the final stage of the six-party coordination process that had begun three years before. However, many changes took place in those three years, changes that the legislators could not fully take into consideration: The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact began in 1990, and so did the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the separation of Czechoslovakia, and the Yugoslav crisis. NATO formulated the essence of its new strategic concept in November 1991, in which it only decided that it should extend a hand to its former enemy. As for the goal itself, NATO only declared it in January 1994. Similarly, the Peace Partnership Program could be one way of enlarging NATO was first mentioned in January 1994. The basic principle of our security policy concept—that we do not regard anyone as an enemy—is in harmony with the above. A new way of thinking is emerging, one that regards the armed forces differently. We no longer say that you should prepare for war if you want peace; instead, we say you should prepare for peace if you want peace. This approach wants to change not only the political aspect of the doctrines, but also the military technology aspect that refers to the army organization and readiness. Naturally, all this presupposes a new security policy basis.

[Vereckei] How general is this view among politicians?

[Gyuricza] I think that political views have changed considerably since the spring of 1994, and not only in Hungary but also in the neighboring countries. I would like to mention, however, that the modification of the new basic principles can only be the first phase of the changes, one that must be followed by a review of the defense law. The law stipulates 11 tasks of the armed forces, while NATO countries only stipulate four or five tasks.

[Vereckei] In conclusion, a topical question: Will Hungary be more threatened from the south if the United States abolishes the arms embargo against Bosnia?

[Gyuricza] Not as a direct consequence. However, if the process of settling the crisis slows down as a result or a new conflict emerges, we will also have to take this possibility into consideration.

Government Decides To Reduce Ministry Personnel

AU3011201194 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 30 Nov 94 p 1

["Correspondent's report": "Staff Reduction at Ministries"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to our information, at its meeting held on 27 November, the government decided on reducing the number of people employed in the ministries and bodies financed from the central budget by a total of 3,072. This reduction of personnel connected with saving measures represents a one-time budget expense of 1.8 billion forints, but it will result in a large-scale saving in the long term.

The proposals of the various ministries were evaluated by the Finance Ministry, and the government based its decisions on these proposals. The reduction in personnel will be carried out everywhere at a rate stipulated by labor rules.

Among the more than 100,000 public service employees, the government decision might affect the 40,000 employees working at central public administration bodies. Thus, the staff of the Prime Minister's Office, the ministries, and the subordinated organizations, as well as the staff of national organizations will decrease by about 10 percent.

This reduction already started after the change in the government, but it did not reach 5 percent in the middle of November. According to the government concept, the expected reduction of about 5 percent will end at the beginning of 1995. However, in some cases, the reduction in personnel will not have personal consequences because the bodies financed from the central budget will abolish the empty positions.

Audit Office Head Views Budget Issues

AU3011162394 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 29 Nov 94 pp 1, 18

[Interview with Istvan Hagelmayer, chairman of the State Auditor General's Office, by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given: "Hagelmayer: Too Much Taxation and Too Much Redistribution"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [NEPSZABADSAG] The State Auditor General's Office [ASZ] has ended its voluntary elections silence, and you have again begun to examine the parties.

[Hagelmayer] We have again found that the management of both the parliamentary and non-parliamentary parties is undisciplined.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Have you turned to the courts in such cases?

[Hagelmayer] Yes, on a number of occasions. In the case of the Civic Liberal and Democratic Party, we have turned to the prosecutor's office because we have found irregularities. However, this is an extreme case. It is more common to find confused records, ambiguous "entrepreneurial" activities, and strange financial maneuvers....

[NEPSZABADSAG] Could you give examples?

[Hagelmayer] I would not like to do this now because we could easily be accused of trying to favor or harm someone's position in the local government elections. We would like for the law on public accounting also to apply to the parties. The balance sheets prepared in accordance with the current rules hide the actual economic activities: We cannot be convinced that they are correct. This is one of the reasons we are preparing a comprehensive report on our findings which will be sent, among others, to the justice minister. [passage omitted]

[NEPSZABADSAG] When the parliamentary committee positions were allocated, you objected to the fact that Socialist Sandor Nagy, chairman of the National Federation of Hungarian Trade Unions, was appointed chairman of the Parliamentary Audit Committee....

[Hagelmayer] This position is normally filled by an opposition politician. Nagy takes his job very seriously, we have a good working relationship. However, I am afraid that he will not have enough time for us due to his many other tasks.

[NEPSZABADSAG] As for the 1995 budget, in your parliamentary speech, you indicated that you can see some progress in the planning of the budget. Does this mean the reform of state administration already?

[Hagelmayer] This is only a precursor, for example, in the area of treasury financing. This budget is much more detailed than the previous ones were. However, it still does not give enough information for the deputies to be able to form an informed opinion on the economic policy. The ASZ summed up the formal, legal, and professional deficiencies it had found in 24 points, and the finance minister promised that he would correct these within two weeks through amendment proposals.

[NEPSZABADSAG] You also said that you do not find the 1995 budget well-founded. Why?

[Hagelmayer] Similarly to the previous years, a kind of over-estimation can be seen, for example, in the case of privatization revenue. At the same time, it can be seen that the deficit of the current payment balance will be bigger than what has been submitted. If I only look at these two items, it can already now be predicted that the possibility of the next supplementary budget is included in this budget. [passage omitted]

[NEPSZABADSAG] In the past, you found quite a few irregularities in the operation of special state funds. The current budget proposal plans to terminate or merge many of these. Is this supported as far as public accountancy?

[Hagelmayer] This projects the possibility of a more efficient management of public funds which is very desirable. However, I suggested to the finance minister that he first have the management of these funds examined by an independent auditing organization. Most of these funds were set up by the previous government and the ASZ's criticisms were seen as political statements.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Is there any time left for this?

[Hagelmayer] Yes, there is in the case of funds that were frowned upon.

[NEPSZABADSAG] You also said that the reform of state administration can be no longer delayed. Talking about this, are you thinking of technical, economic, or political reasons?

[Hagelmayer] While the economy operates primarily on the basis of market principles, the budget is still very much a state budget. This is shown in the methods of financing and in the structure of the whole budget. The 1995 budget is still too centralized and still distributes too much—also in poor proportions compared to the GDP. This expenditure structure cannot be financed in the long term because the Hungarian economy is unable to produce enough for this. This is the reason the deficit grows each year.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Its suppression would require welfare system reform. Can the ASZ contribute to this process, for example, with the experiences gained from the examination of the social security funds?

[Hagelmayer] In connection with the final accounts, we examine the welfare budget and, naturally, separately examine the social security funds. Our findings are varied. The establishment of the local administration boards was a good measure but this in itself is a very small step in the reforms. The tasks are the same, the money is decreasing—which can be seen with the level of services—and, at the same time, the apparatus is growing; it would be possible to be more sparing. The management of the pension insurance fund is just being organized, therefore, our criticism is mainly directed at the health insurance fund. Many economic management irregularities exist and the records are incorrect.

[NEPSZABADSAG] However, the Social Insurance claims it is unable to improve management until it receives the promised funds, the budget repays its debts, and it can cash in the huge amounts of money owed to it. These are rather serious arguments, are they not?

[Hagelmayer] This might seem like a renegade view but I do not find that Social Insurance—in its current condition—is able to properly manage the significant assets that were promised to it. As for the money owed to it, the major state debts will probably have to be settled through debt consolidation. If a tabula rasa is not done then the Social Insurance will also require a supplementary budget. On the other hand, its "planned" deficit increases the deficit of state administration. Therefore, the reforms will have to be started from two directions: From a professional approach from the "bottom up" and through the strictness of the budget from the "top down."

The Alarm Bell Will Not Stop

[NEPSZABADSAG] The local governments receive a large proportion of the public funds. Opinions vary even within the ASZ on how and to what extent to control these. What is the way forward?

[Hagelmayer] I agree with all those people who believe that, with the ASZ's current heavy burdens and it staffing situation, it is impossible to inspect all local governments of more than 2,000 people every four years. However, we cannot always reveal basic deficiencies through spot checks. This can only be changed if the Interior Ministry makes the local governments implement stricter internal control. Unfortunately, most of these do not have any internal inspectors or they only have untrained inspectors.

[NEPSZABADSAG] It is impossible to have an inspector for every public forint.

[Hagelmayer] This is true and, rather than necessarily increasing the number of inspectors, I expect a breakthrough as a result of rethinking the inspection system and the government making better use of the experiences. According to our plans, a loose association of state inspection bodies would be set up in early December; we have not yet decided whether in a form of an association or a chamber. We will examine where the gaps are in the system of state control, and what kind of cooperation we can have between the ASZ, the Office of Tax and Fiscal Auditing (APEH), the National Headquarters of the Customs and Revenue Police (VPOP), the governmental controlling organizations, and the various inspectorates.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Is all this being done in conjunction with the fight against the black economy?

[Hagelmayer] Yes, I believe this to be a very urgent task. The suppression of the black economy, and spectacular improvement in the management of public money might be the two most sensitive social issues. In my view, the government can win the public's support if it pays attention to these areas.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Even if putting the public funds in order means nothing more than restrictions and taxes in the current period?

[Hagelmayer] In connection with the 1995 budget, the ASZ has already said that the reform of state administration will unavoidably mean stricter management in the budget sphere—and in fact everywhere public assets are used. This process creates social tensions. These tensions can be relieved if people see what kind of positive changes can result from the current restrictions. We supervise the use of public funds in the name of parliament, namely society. For this reason, we support the government's efforts in this direction. However, this legitimation role can only function if it is objective, unbiased, and professional. Therefore, the ASZ alarm bell will not be silenced in the future, either. According to available means, we will always indicate if we find that this government does not practice what it preaches.

Pawlak on Defense Minister Appointment

LD0112001994 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1900 GMT 30 Nov 94

[Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak interview by correspondent Leszek Wasiuta—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Wasiuta] Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. In yesterday's television news, the prime minister reported that his candidate for the head of the Ministry of National Defense was Ryszard Kaczorowski. This aroused strong feelings in you, ladies and gentlemen, and, since this morning, we have been getting from you a great number of telephone calls, including praise for the decision, but also outright criticism. Prime Minister, tonight's television news reported that the Kaczorowski issue is no more. Is that so?

[Pawlak] Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. I would first and foremost like to say something more about this proposal. This is one of the few opportunities when we can bring about a combination and wide cooperation of the communities at home and abroad for building Poland's future. I think that here, President Kaczorowski will have had a very important and significant place in that kind of joint undertaking. This requires that politicians and political groups in Poland give up their aspirations and ambitions in order to make room for an expansion of this wide cooperation.

[Wasiuta] That is the genesis.

[Pawlak] I would like to emphasize that President Kaczorowski is a man of great integrity, who has a tremendous sense of the Polish state imperative, keeps away from political adventurism, and is a moral authority above party divisions. And I think that his personal characteristics would make it so that his very presence in the government would contribute to the fact that, in his presence, some of the very simple games simply could not be gotten away with.

Furthermore, I think this would constitute a very natural closing of the circle that began with [Deputy] Prime Minister Mikolajczyk, and now we would bring about a situation in which we would combine all of the communities that care about Poland's future for wide, practical cooperation, not declarations or words of respect but a real opportunity for wide cooperation. And it seems to me that this proposal, irrespective of the positions of President Walesa and the parliamentary group of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], which to some extent were a surprise to me, makes it so that today we can take a somewhat different view—equally at the problems linked directly to defense and our integration into Western structures, and at wide cooperation with the communities of Poles abroad.

[Wasiuta] That is the genesis of your idea, Prime Minister. And what about the situation today? Is this no longer an issue?

[Pawlak] After the statements, after the view, after familiarizing myself with the view of President Walesa, which was expressed in public by his spokesman, and after familiarizing myself with the statement of the SLD parliamentary group, in this situation I cannot see the possibility of continuing to support this candidacy, and I would like here to thank President Kaczorowski very much for his approach to this issue, which was full of reflection and responsibility. I think that, irrespective of this fact, I can say very unequivocally that my impression from the great many meetings I have had with President Kaczorowski is that he will continue to be sincerely and extensively involved in cooperation and work on the development and future of Poland. I think we shall still be able to come together in many practical places, together solving many problems.

[Wasiuta] Prime Minister, comments by politicians, comments by the press were resolutely in opposition. The person who was to unite or was to be above divisions in fact united those against. What do you think was the cause of this? As you said yourself, President Kaczorowski has such a fine biography and could play that kind of role.

[Pawlak] Well, ladies and gentlemen, this has to be viewed not only on some sort of immediate, short-term political time scale but also from a certain distance. Let us return to this issue at a later date, and then we can see whether the opinions that were expressed today under the influence of strong feelings remain valid.

[Wasiuta] Prime Minister, irrespective of how this case evolves, we have to say clearly that, through this decision of yours, you raised the issue of Polish emigres, political emigres, both emigres who left this country a long time ago and those who left very recently. Today, after your assurances, after the willingness to involve the emigres in the work on our country, no one will be able to say that the people living in London or Munich or New York are merely symbols of struggle for a different Poland. So let us somewhat change the subject, but not all the way. During your latest visits around the world, of which you have had quite a few—of course, these are economic visits, but you always visit Poles abroad, you meet them—could you say what results from this for the Poles abroad, for you and for our country?

[Pawlak] There are many people who in a practical way get involved in our current issues and problems in various fields, equally in the field of science and in cooperation with the administration and very widely in economic cooperation, in doing business. And I think this is the time and the challenge that face all Poles around the world, the challenge that amounts to whether we are able to make use of this moment in history, when our big brothers are busy with their own problems and, meanwhile, we can build a strong basis for our statehood and economy. This is a task for Poles irrespective of where they live, and I think a very important thing is the fact that the world has opened up.

Today you can very easily travel to London, for instance, and get back the same day. You can very easily contact the American continent. Today the equipment, the technology make it possible, for instance, to conduct academic research while living thousands of kilometers apart. This opens up enormous opportunities for everyone—those who want to return home and those who want to continue living abroad but, at the same time, do something for Poland.

[Wasiuta] Prime Minister, this year you attended the most important event of the Polish community abroad—that is, the Congress of American Poles. Could you share your thoughts about what you got from there and what the most important thing for you there was?

[Pawlak] I think...

[Wasiuta, interrupting] Apart from the standing ovation you and the president got from the members of the Congress [laughs].

[Pawlak] ...an important reflection was the impressions of the people who founded the Congress of American Poles, and I think that at the time they made that bold decision, at the time it was already known that Poland was already behind the Iron Curtain, not many of them probably thought they would live to see the day when the 50th anniversary would be attended by the president of the Republic and the prime minister, and that Poland would be able to fashion its political and economic future freely and independently.

And, at the same time, it was evident how much work and how much effort had to go into maintaining the efficient operation of that organization during the 50 years, into maintaining the various communities involved in the issues of our country and of Poles abroad. We view the congress as a single organization, but it is in fact made up of various organizations that operate inside various communities, from social organizations to economic ones, to those that deal with specific things—for instance, the Union of Polish Women in America, which, after all, is also a very influential community. And I think this is a fine example even for us that, in difficult conditions, in conditions when it seemed that there was very little hope, this methodical and hard work led to the mobilization and to raising the whole community to a higher status.

[Wasiuta] And it was there, in America, that you were reminded about the case of Kazakhstan. You visited Kazakhstan, too. You met our fellow compatriots there, who have been living outside their homeland for more than 70 years, not through any fault of their owns. And there, both in America and in Kazakhstan, the same thing was talked about: making it possible for the Poles to return from Kazakhstan to Poland. Is that possible? Can a country that is fairly poor afford to fulfill the mission because, after all, this is a mission in respect of our fellow countrymen.

[Pawlak] It so happened that, in Kazakhstan, I was accompanied by the deputy chairman of the Congress of American Poles, Mr. Musielak, who is at the same time its treasurer, and we could learn the conditions there on the spot. The situation there is complex. On the one hand, there are people who are interested in coming back—this especially applies to the older generation, which now sees this hope very clearly—and there is also, among the younger generation, the belief that it is possible to combine the knowledge of Kazakhstan reality and good contacts in Poland in order to support cooperation between Poland and Kazakhstan for doing good business, for raising their standing there in Kazakhstan.

And I think this is how these problems have to be viewed, especially because, if you look at it objectively, assistance and support given to these people there on the spot would be much more effective than an attempt to assimilate them quickly into the community here, in Poland. But we have to consider various options, and there can, of course, be various situations. We know that one cannot always count on calm and safe development, and we are trying to prepare solutions for various eventualities, above all, in a way that would create the conditions for providing a wide range of support to the Poles there, in Kazakhstan. And this is a very extensive task for government institutions, but also for nongovernment ones, for many communities at home and abroad. And I think that in this respect this will also be a field in which to manifest involvement.

[Wasiuta] So today we cannot talk about large-scale repatriation to any meaningful extent or at all but, rather, about technical, scientific assistance...

[Pawlak, interrupting] Excuse me, you are rather beginning to distort this a little too much...

[Wasiuta, interrupting] I am sorry.

[Pawlak] ...because this repatriation is taking place. There are offers—for instance, the Senate speaker, who cooperates directly with the Polish community, has inspired the parishes, the local self-governments to put forward initiatives for opportunities for employment, for bringing families over from Kazakhstan. So this process is under way. We as the government are also committing certain resources in order to provide support through a foundation that is helping Poles in the east, and it was there, during this visit, that we were able to learn on the spot how the foundation operates, how it supports these Poles. So things are not so that you can talk about these issues only in terms of black and white.

[Wasiuta] We are talking so much about this because it is a kind of thorn in the side of our society, this Polish community in Kazakhstan, and we feel somewhat morally guilty toward it.

But now let us take our conversation back to London because that was also a place you visited. You met the Union of Poles there, the Polish Association. And those

Poles there are rather peculiar. That is where President Kaczorowski comes from. What about the Poles in London?

[Pawlak] I understand that what you said about Kazakhstan were your own personal....

[Wasiuta, interrupting] ...my own, my personal feelings.

[Pawlak] That's fine....

[Wasiuta, interrupting] And of people I know.

[Pawlak] Well, I probably—well, that's all right. When it comes to our emigres' situation in London, I think that because the government in exile and the authorities in exile functioned in London, that is the community that is the most capacious in the political aspect and aware of the political problems and conditions. I had an opportunity there, at the Polish Sociocultural Center, to have a meeting with representatives of the British Poles, and I think at present we are dealing there with very interesting initiatives.

Apart from the political aspect, we also had an opportunity to meet a younger generation group called "Interes" [business], which is interested in promoting economic cooperation. They are also people who come here to Poland and work in Polish companies, in Polish enterprises, making use of their knowledge of and familiarity with the realities of the West. And I think these are interesting examples that show that there is an evolution toward highly practical contacts with the homeland and cooperation that supports our contacts with the countries of West Europe. I think that is a community that could contribute a great amount of valuable experience and enthusiasm.

[Wasiuta] That was an interesting thing you said, Prime Minister, about these young, second-generation Poles returning to Poland, as if seeking a home to return to in their fathers' land.

[Pawlak] You know, over there is a stabilized world. Here we have a world we are putting together, and I think that even that represents an enormous attraction to all of us. And it seems to me that this is also a tremendous challenge for the young generation because perhaps it is easier for young people to find their feet in this highly complex reality, inasmuch as we do not have blueprints and stereotypes, and routine is not always helpful in the present-day reality. And I think that for people who in the West see that the climbing of the economic or political ladder is very arduous, these conditions here in Poland represent conditions where you can manifest much activity and fashion this world in a very direct manner.

[Wasiuta] Prime Minister, we have a little more time. Let us talk about the economy. Statistics say clearly that the development of the Polish economy is dynamic. We are manufacturing increasingly better and more goods. Our foreign trade balance is close to being balanced. It is not yet, but it is close. Our viewers ask: Because things are like that, perhaps Poland can already afford reprivatization. There are several acts, several versions of the reprivatization act and—nothing. People left behind their property, all their possessions...

[Pawlak, interrupting] These problems are to be debated by parliament. We have a whole number of very complex situations here. There is reprivatization interpreted in the simple sense of return of property. There are also the problems of property on the other side of the River Bug and of all those who were displaced from the territories of eastern Poland. There are also the problems of reparations for the war period, for the postwar period. In general, as the government, we have found it very difficult to find a solution that would be satisfying and acceptable to the various communities. And, generally speaking, we could say that we are interested in finally finishing these issues from the legal point of view, but, at the same time, we are interested in not righting old wrongs by creating new ones, and, in these solutions, not being detrimental to new, future generations.

When we look at our history, the history of Poland, we can see even in the 20th century several times when it would have been difficult to right the wrongs, and it is difficult to decide up to which point these wrongs should be righted and how this should be done so that all those who were wronged by the system, by the war, by the unjust period when we were written off into the Soviet Union's sphere of influence. This is a very difficult undertaking, and I think the parliament is going to have a very difficult debate about these problems.

[Wasiuta] But the government has also put forward an initiative, as far as I know. Because it is like this, Prime Minister, of course it is hard, it is difficult, it is painful at times. But because we have achieved historical justice, we also think—at least that is how our viewers think and the majority of the inhabitants of this country—that there should also be financial compensation for the period when, as I said, people had possessions acquired through many generations taken away from them.

[Pawlak] But you should complete this idea by saying that this justice has be done very widely, in respect of all those who suffered and lost things. Well, if we add all this up, we also have to think how this can be done, but for everyone, if we want to make this kind of compensation.

[Wasiuta] And that would be fair, Prime Minister. Let us remain for a moment longer with economic issues. Lately, the whole of Poland has been absorbed by privatization, mass privatization. At present, there is a popular opinion in Poland that your government has slowed down privatization, or some even say halted it. The figures convey a different story entirely. The state budget revenues from privatization are greater than last year. So what is it really like, Prime Minister?

[Pawlak] Really, it is like you said. I understand that in politics you have to use various moves, but, besides such opinions and feelings, there are facts. And these facts are visible in the form of the figures, in the form of the budget revenues from privatization. And these revenues are greater than last year.

As far as the mass privatization program is concerned, we should say clearly that this is one of many privatization programs that covers less than one-tenth of the enterprises, so its extent is large but not so significant that we could speak here about the entirety of the privatization problems, and it is being methodically implemented. We have to act here consistently and firmly so that later we do not have to think about the consequences of the earlier decisions or regret that they had been made too hastily.

In general, the privatization processes are best demonstrated by the facts, and it seems to me that that is what counts. On the other hand, our government is not going to be as publicly eager as the previous governments. We are not going to overtake our predecessors in the eagerness to present privatization to the public, but we might overtake them somewhat as far as the practical effects are concerned.

[Wasiuta] And the last question, also about the economy. We have spoken about statistics. These show that our economy is developing, that the development is very dynamic, but the people, people who live here, somehow do not see this development of the economy, the dynamic growth being converted into their wallets, into their standard of living, into their life-style. How would you explain this divergence, Prime Minister?

[Pawlak] I think this is a very fair observation because now we are noting economic development, a growth in production reaching 12-15 percent, that is very dynamic....

[Wasiuta, interrupting] It is only the East Asian tigers....

[Pawlak, interrupting] ...a growth of about 5 percent in the gross domestic product. I think the consequences here are visible even in respect of a very specific number of people because, at the end of 1994, I believe we are going to have fewer unemployed than we had at the beginning of the year. So you can even convert this into the people who feel employment security and improvement in their situation.

But why is this not felt so widely? I think this is fairly simple. It is because this growth is mostly taking place through a significant improvement in exports that makes it so that it is not so perceivable in the domestic market. In 1995 we plan to redirect these money streams in such way as to support, for instance, the teachers, the health service, the field of science, the budget-financed field in general terms.

We uphold the solutions that produce real growth in old-age and disability pensions. So, in 1995, we will create conditions for the improvement to be clearly perceived by the public. The year 1994 was the first year in which we did not seek budget balance through cutbacks—for instance, in old-age and disability pensions. And this, I think, does not create much of a sense of a clearly improving financial situation, but it certainly creates a sense of stabilization for the people who have relatively low incomes, and any attempts or threats that some budget cuts could be sought here would certainly affect all these communities very badly.

In 1995 we precisely want to move the emphasis in the budget policy so that the benefits of the economic development are more clearly felt at home.

[Wasiuta] We could go on forever about next year's budget. Thank you, Prime Minister, for finding the time for our viewers. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen, for your attention. You are always most welcome here, Prime Minister. Good night, ladies and gentlemen.

[Pawlak] Thank you very much.

SLD, Walesa Reject Pawlak's Defense Candidate

WS3011150094 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 30 Nov 94 pp 1-2

[Article by "E.K.," "E.Cz.," "K. Gr.," and "E.T.": "Prime Minister's Idea"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Ryszard Kaczorowski, the last president of Poland in exile, is the prime minister's candidate for national defense minister. Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak submitted that proposal yesterday to the deputies of the governing coalition. Ryszard Kaczorowski refused to be a candidate for this post because of his advanced age (he is 75 years old). The Presidium of the Club of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] decided that this candidacy was inappropriate. The prime minister believes that the issue of Kaczorowski's assuming the post of head of the National Defense Ministry [MON] is still open.

The candidacy of Ryszard Kaczorowski for the post of defense minister is not a candidacy of the coalition, nor is it a candidacy of the SLD. While it expresses due respect for Ryszard Kaczorowski, the SLD deems this candidacy inappropriate, reads the statement released yesterday by the Presidium of the SLD Parliamentary Club. The members of the Presidium of the SLD Club do not understand the motives by which the prime minister was guided in presenting the candidacy of President Kaczorowski. In their statement, they say bluntly that "the passage of time, the submitted candidacy, and the manner in which Prime Minister Pawlak discusses the issue of filling the post of MON head confirm that the decisions concerning MON were hasty and unjustified."

After yesterday's session of the coalition's leadership, Prime Minister Pawlak recalled that, during his meeting with the president on 27 November, Lech Walesa rejected the SLD candidate for MON head and maintained his own proposal—the candidacy of Zbigniew Okonski. In this situation, the prime minister decided to submit the candidacy of a person who enjoys general respect and who is not linked in any way to the present political configurations. According to Pawlak, President Kaczorowski would, as the head of MON, make it possible to link emigre circles to Poles in the country. "Perhaps this is one of the last opportunities to contribute to joint construction of Poland's future," Pawlak said. It is worth recalling that, during his recent visit to London, Pawlak met with representatives of the English Polonia at the Polish Cultural Affairs Center. Among the participants was Ryszard Kaczorowski.

Right after he returned from Great Britain, Pawlak dismissed Piotr Kolodziejczyk from the post of MON head.

Kaczorowski Refuses, Prime Minister Maintains Candidacy

"My advanced age does not allow me to take on any duties of this nature," Kaczorowski told us yesterday. Asked whether the prime minister had been in touch with him, he said: "I was informed that he was taking me into consideration." He added that he was informed about it yesterday morning.

The Government's Press Office announced that "the prime minister believes the issue of Ryszard Kaczorowski's assuming the post of defense minister is still open." "It is natural," the prime minister believes, "that, because he did not know the opinion of the entire coalition and because he received only a preliminary suggestion, and because he considered his age, Mr. Kaczorowski decided to refuse."

"The prime minister is entitled to believe that the issue of my candidacy is still open, but I will persist with my stand. If I were 20 years younger, I would have said yes," Ryszard Kaczorowski said yesterday afternoon.

The SLD Is Waiting For the PSL To Take a Stand

Aleksander Kwasniewski found out the name of the candidate on the morning of 29 November. The prime minister's proposal came to him as a "great surprise." At first, the SLD leaders did not really believe that it was serious.

"I asked Deputy Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych whether this was the candidacy of the entire Polish Peasant Party [PSL]. He replied that it was not—not yet. This means that it will still be discussed there as well," Kwasniewski said. "If I wanted to follow the style of this proposal, I might say that I know the name of the president of Poland, who is perfectly prepared to perform the duties of the defense minister because, after all, he did it for many years. However, I do not know whether he would agree to my proposal."

After discussing the candidacy in the Presidium of the SLD Club, the SLD stated that it expects the PSL leadership to specify, clearly and speedily, its stand on this issue, which "has not been generally understood." The SLD is hoping that the peasants will do it by 1 December. A joint session of the presidiums of both of the parliamentary clubs of the coalition parties is scheduled to take place on this day. Until that time, the left will try not to fuel the fire. For this purpose, the SLD Club decided to abstain in today's vote on the acceptance of the prime minister's information on the circumstances of dismissing former Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk. If they were not afraid of causing another conflict, the SLD deputies would vote to reject the information.

Limits of Comicality

According to Jerzy Szmajdzinski, in a situation in which the president does not want to agree to the SLD's proposal, the PSL does not want to accept Mr. Okonski, and the SLD does not agree to Mr. Kaczorowski, there are two solutions left: either the great three—that is, Lech Walesa, Waldemar Pawlak, and Aleksander Kwasniewski—meet and jointly agree on one name that would be acceptable for all, or it is quickly decided who is to become the ministry's director. Then the entire affair will no longer attract the attention of the mass media, and the real work can begin. Commenting on the unofficial "proposals" to entrust MON with General Kuropieska and General Maczek, he said: "We have entered the stage of comicality. Now, if the situation has become comical, it all must be stopped and either serious talks should be held or a serious decision should be made." Szmajdzinski does not rule out the possibility that Jerzy Milewski may be discussed as a candidate for the director, head of the ministry.

Belweder Still Supports Okonski

President Lech Walesa's spokesman, Leszek Spalinski, told us yesterday that Lech Walesa maintains the candidacy of Zbigniew Okonski for MON head. Officially, the prime minister has not proposed any candidate yet. He mentioned Ryszard Kaczorowski at the meeting with the president on 27 November. However, he presented him as his own candidate, who has not been agreed upon with the entire coalition yet. Spalinski is surprised that the prime minister, who not long ago did not want the issue of filling the post of defense minister discussed in the mass media, did not inform the president and publicly announced the name of his candidate. Asked about the president's evaluation of Ryszard Kaczorowski's candidacy, Spalinski replied: "No one can put into question the services Mr. Kaczorowski has rendered. Apart from that, however, there is also pragmatism. Therefore, particularly such a ministry should be run by an energetic person who is very familiar with the country's affairs." [passage omitted]

Ceremony Cancellation May Affect Ties to Russia

LD3011132294 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1105 GMT 30 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The ceremony of the official opening of the Goldap-Gusev border crossing point will not take place because of disagreements between the leadership of the Kaliningrad Oblast and the commanders of the Russian border troops. The opening of the Goldap-Gusev crossing point, which was to link the Kaliningrad Oblast of the Russian Federation to Suwalki Province [in northeastern Poland], was envisaged by the Polish-Russian agreement on cross-border cooperation signed two years ago during President Lech Walesa's visit to Moscow. Failure to meet the deadline for the opening of the crossing point, which was set at such a high level, may have negative repercussions on Polish-Russian relations, the TASS agency has written.

The border-crossing point was to be opened by Senate Speaker Adam Struzik and Vladimir Shumeyko, chairman of the upper chamber of the Russian parliament. After the ceremony, they were to take part in a meeting of parliament members from Poland, Russia, and Lithuania. We have learned from unofficial sources that the cancellation of the meeting of members of parliament and the postponement of the opening of the border-crossing point resulted from a decision by Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Apparently he does not want Russian representatives to take part in events organized in Poland.

KK Criticizes Cabinet's Pro-Russian Policy

WS3011150694 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 30 Nov 94 p 3

[Article by (wz): "Conservative Coalition Warns: Polish Government Pro-Russian"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The activities of the government and the president are conducive to making Poland economically dependent on Russia," say leaders of the Conservative Coalition [KK]. They warn: "As a consequence, we may become politically dependent on Moscow, and we may drift away from NATO and the European Union [EU]."

The conservatives presented their arguments yesterday at a press conference. According to them, the government is being forced to conduct such a pro-Russian policy by "capital groups" linked to the Democratic Left Alliance and the Polish Peasant Party, as well as by military officials representing the interests of the arms industry.

Okonski a Favorite

"He is dependent on trade with the East. Therefore, he is afraid of integration with NATO," said KK Deputy Chairman Pawel Zalewski. This is exactly why the military people are trying to impede the implementation of the "Brown Amendment" (the purpose of which is to give the Polish Army access to Western equipment). This is also why they are supporting the candidacy of Zbigniew Okonski, a specialist in the area of the Polish-Russian arms trade, for defense minister.

The entrepreneurial "interest groups," in turn, are afraid of the sanctions Russia may impose on Poland in retaliation for drawing closer to NATO. As a result of this step, our companies that are doing business in the East might incur considerable losses. Therefore, their bosses are forcing the government to pursue a pro-Russian policy instead of a pro-Western one. "These people are closely linked to the present authorities (Minister Podkanski, for instance). This is why they are so "efficient," Zalewski claims.

Blatant Examples

The conservatives presented yesterday "blatant examples" of the government's pro-Russian policy. They spoke about the prime minister's readiness to consult Moscow about Poland's integration into NATO. They also mentioned the policy of the Foreign Economic Cooperation Ministry, which is favoring trade with the East and...entrepreneurs related to the coalition.

"They are assisted by establishments that are financed by taxpayers' money (the Agency for Regional Development or the Cooperation of Export Credits Insurance). Thus, companies' business failures in the East are paid for by taxpayers," Zalewski said.

According to him, the government wants so much to maintain economic contacts with Russia that it is ready to make considerable concessions—also on the issue of our integration into NATO and the EU.

Government Should Promise

Therefore, the conservatives demand that the authorities do the following:

—declare unequivocally that they are in favor of integration into NATO and that they will not consult Russia about it;

—oblige the Ministry of National Defense to implement the "Brown Amendment," which will make it possible for Poland to become independent of arms deliveries from Russia;

—abandon the policy of strengthening economic ties to the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States;

—renegotiate the agreement concerning the Yamal gas pipeline; more that 50 percent of the shares in this investment should be controlled by Poland.

The conservatives also consider it necessary to "find an alternative source of gas supplies for Poland." "If three-fourths of our economy is dependent on Russian gas, Moscow gains a very good instrument for political pressure," said Zalewski, who recalled the Russian-Ukrainian experience.

Both Zalewski and KK Chairman Kazimierz Ujazdowski said several times that they "have nothing against economic cooperation with Russia." However, they do not want Russia to try to stop Poland from joining NATO.

Olechowski Should Leave Bank

Zalewski submitted one more demand concerning Pawlak's ministers: They should abandon their posts on the supervisory boards of companies whose economic interests may not coincide with Polish foreign policy: "I am thinking primarily about Foreign Affairs Minister Andrzej Olechowski," he added. "He sits on the Supervisory Board of Bank Handlowy, whose main customers are the largest Polish companies that conduct foreign trade, including with the East."

Coalition Wants UP To Join; UP Not Interested

WS0112110294 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 1 Dec 94 p 3

[Article by "(an)": "Broadening the Coalition"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Polish Peasant Party [PSL] and the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] are hinting at the possibility of including the Union of Labor [UP] in the coalition. UP definitely rules out, at least for the time being, the possibility of establishing an alliance with the coalition.

In yesterday's "Puls Dnia" [current affairs program on Polish television], the prime minister let it be known that he is ready to begin talks with UP on its entering the coalition.

During a meeting of the SLD parliamentary club on Wednesday, Aleksander Kwasniewski wondered: "Perhaps we will have to broaden this coalition. Otherwise, we will be unable to pass any resolutions through the parliament."

Deputy Mieczyslaw Krajewski and Senator Jan Mulak of the Polish Socialist Party, a political group within the SLD, share similar views. On Monday, they appealed to the coalition to make an effort to include UP in the Government of the Republic of Poland.

The government's economic concepts are falling apart: Lech Walesa has vetoed the tax law and is preparing to veto others. The coalition lacks nine votes to the minimum two-thirds required to overrule the presidential veto.

Meanwhile, no one seems eager to join the coalition.

Ryszard Bugaj, head of UP, denied rumors circulating in the Sejm that the PSL and the SLD were holding confidential talks with his party on broadening the coalition. "I do not see any reason to enter the government, especially after what Pawlak did to Minister Kolodziejczyk. We were shocked by that," Piotr Marciniak (UP) told GAZETA.

According to him, there does, of course, exist a danger that, being at the tip of the balance, UP would support coalition policy, over which it would have no influence. Marciniak claims, however, that, upon entering the coalition, UP would not have much say regarding government policy, either. The best example of that is the fate of the SLD. UP believes it will have more influence on the government and its policies if it stays in opposition and supports the coalition only occasionally to overrule presidential vetoes. The PSL-SLD coalition will then truly have to take UP opinions into consideration.

UP politicians state that, if the president vetoes the law on wages for public-sector workers, UP will probably support him.

Pawlak To Control Official Travel of Leadership

WS0112085594 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 30 Nov 94 p 2

[Article by "Ma. S.": "Foreign Travel: Pawlak Will Control"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The prime minister has to be informed in advance about every foreign and domestic trip taken by high-ranking state officials. Such an instruction will be issued shortly by the president of the Council of Ministers. Yesterday, the ministers did not agree that the Cabinet as a whole pass such a resolution. Foreign Affairs Minister Andrzej Olechowski and Deputy Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz fiercely protested the move. Also, the government has allocated 30 trillion zlotys toward covering the costs of the rescue operation and hospitalization of victims of the fire in the Gdansk Shipyard Hall [during a rock concert on 24 November].*

Prime Minister Pawlak, when asked when would he issue instructions on "coordinating business trips by ministers, heads of central administration offices, and heads of viovodships," told us: "Immediately, and it will be even worse than a draft law," said the prime minister, smiling.

A draft resolution on the issue was prepared by the Council of Ministers. A month ago it was discussed during a government session but because of, for instance, protests by Foreign Minister Olechowski, it was sent off "to be revised." The Foreign Affairs Ministry states off the record that the proposal curtails its authority. "We have always considered all amendments made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, except for one, and now Minister Olechowski comes forth with new ones and claims that the whole project is unconstitutional," complained Michal Strak, head of the Office of the Council of Ministers [URM], after the session. The amendment that was not taken into consideration, according to Minister Strak, concerned him. High state officials were to inform the prime minister about their travels via the head of URM. "I am not stubborn, the ministers do not have to inform me, they can report to the secretary of state who is in charge of proceedings at the Council of Ministers (Kazimierz Korona)," added Michal Strak. "You previously wrote that the head of URM is blocking Minister Olechowski's reforms. Now you can write that Minister Olechowski is blocking mine."

We have already written about the provisions of the draft that was rejected yesterday. As a reminder, if a minister or head of a voivodship wants to go abroad, he has to obtain the prime minister's approval (through the head of URM) and present a written report upon his return. The ministers of foreign affairs and foreign economic cooperation are also included. If a minister or head of a central administrative office plans to travel around the country, he must notify Minister Strak.

An official must provide information on the date and time of departure, the duration of the visit, and its program, and appoint an acting deputy for the time he is away. The head of URM evaluates the visit "from the point of view of functioning of the state administration organs, with particular consideration of government operations." The suggestion then has to be approved by the prime minister.

Foreign Affairs Minister Andrzej Olechowski most fiercely protested the passing of the resolution. Prime Minister Cimoszewicz also criticized the very complex system of "travel approvals," which resembled an obstacle course.

"The trips have to be coordinated in some way. The president has spoken of it," reminded Leszek Miller, defending the very concept of the resolution.

Waldemar Pawlak decided to issue an instruction on the issue. The approval of ministers is not necessary, but an instruction is a lower-ranking document than a resolution passed by the Council of Ministers.

Customs Detains Serbian Vessel With False Papers

AU3011134294 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 28 Nov 94 p 1

[LArticle by V. Bunget: "Embargo—False Documents Via Belgrade: TUMAN"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 30 August the Romanian authorities stopped the 2,400 horsepower tugboat TUMAN, sailing under the Russian flag, which was trying to pass through the Iron Gates sluice downstream. Its destination was Novorossiysk harbor (in the Russian Federation). The crew consisted of three Russian and seven Serbian citizens, with two captains: the Russian Aleksandr Nikolayevich and the Serb Radivoje Cikovic. The tugboat's documents gave the port of Drobeta Turnu Severin [in Romania] as the departure point. According to the documents, the vessel was built by the company SEVERNAV S.A. in Turnu Severin and the crew came on board there, too. The customs officers' suspicions regarding the authenticity of the documents was confirmed by the Border Police Customs and the SEVERNAV shipyard. The vessel was consequently detained at Ostrovu Mare. Subsequent investigation revealed that the vessel had not been built at the Turnu Severin shipyard, that Customs had no registered export documents for the tugboat TUMAN, that no currency transaction was made on that day, and no overhaul of a vessel under the Russian flag. Faced with this evidence, the two captains confessed that the documents were forged at the marketing bureau of the Belgrade shipyards.

We would like to point out that another tugboat, the TITAN, with the same destination and with false documents, was detained at the Iron Gates II a few months before this latest incident. The TITAN was later released upon intervention by the Russian Embassy in Bucharest. The file with legal charges against the TUMAN captains for violating Governmental Decision 161/93 and Resolution 820 of the UN Security Council was forwarded to the Drobeta Turnu Severin Court.

On Saturday 19 November at 0645 hours, the tugboat TUMAN, which was tied to the pontoon of the Ostrovu Mare Harbor Master's Office, disappeared, only to be stopped later at Calafat by the representatives of the Western European Union. The two captains said that the last tugboat of this three-unit series—built by Yugoslavia for Russia in exchange for fuel deliveries illegally reaching the Serbian port of Prahovo—is due to leave the Belgrade shipyards for the same destination soon.

U.S. Proposal on Bosnian Conference Noted

AU3011130994 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 30 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Today, during the weekly news conference of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, spokesman Simona Miculescu referred to the meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, which is to be held on Friday, 2 December, in Brussels. [passage omitted]

In connection with the special session of the committee of CSCE senior officials, which took place in Budapest on 28 November and which was convened at the request of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina with a view to cooperation and consultations on the situation in the Bihac area, Miculescu pointed out that the head of the Romanian delegation, Ambassador Nicolae Iordache, asserted that it is the duty of the CSCE to not just examine such situations but also try to make a contribution to efforts to find a political solution to the Bosnian crisis. The Romanians pointed out that events in the Bihac area and the escalation of tension should serve to warn European countries of the genuine possibility that the conflict might expand throughout that region, with unforeseeable consequences for the whole of Europe. Our country's representative stressed that Romania has consequently taken action to find a political solution, employing peaceful means, to the Bosnian crisis and, more generally, to the Yugoslav crisis—with the participation of all parties involved.

The Romanian Foreign Affairs Ministry took note of, with great interest, the recent proposal made by the U.S. State Department with respect to the organization of an international conference with the participation of all parties to the conflict, and expresses the hope that the conference will give new impetus to the political settlement of the crisis.

Kukan Views Bosnian Situation, Upcoming Visit

AU0112092094 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 2000 GMT 30 Nov 94

[Statement by Slovene President Milan Kucan following his meeting with President Ion Iliescu in Paris on 30 November—recorded; in Slovene with superimposed Romanian translation]

[FBIS Translated Text] The situation in Bosnia is very complicated, and the deviation from Lord Carrington's plan has in fact caused many difficulties. Currently, the French plan that we are supporting encompasses the principles that prevailed before the changes that have taken place. More precisely, it concerns the mutual recognition of Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia within the existing borders, as well as the protection of national minorities.

As far as bilateral relations are concerned, they are good. However, I do not believe that proper use has been made of all the available possibilities, but I expect that at the end of next year, during the visit that I am going to make to Bucharest at the invitation of President Ion Iliescu, I will come ready to hold talks about intensification of economic and other types of relations.

SRI Head Magureanu Makes Report to Parliament

AU3011203194 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 25 Nov 94

["Excerpts" from speech by SRI Director Virgil Magureanu during a joint session of the Romanian parliament in Bucharest on 24 November—first paragraph is introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] The speech made in parliament by Virgil Magureanu, director of the SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service], came as a surprise, pleasant for some and unpleasant for others. The things disclosed by Magureanu before Parliament spectacularly completed the information, already sufficiently abundant as it was, contained in the Report on SRI Activity. Considering that it is important to present the most important fragments of Magureanu's speech to our readers, we also wish to express our hope that the openness displayed by the director will be lasting.

Romania Has Been Targeted by Weapons- and Drug-Trafficking Networks

Mr. Speaker, ladies and gentlemen, the report sent by the SRI to Parliament includes all the essential information and elements, as well as certain concrete cases and situations selected on the basis of their relevance to the state of our national security over the past 12 months—which is described, defined, analyzed, and assessed on the basis of the information obtained by means of specific methods.

We are located in a region in which the transfer of sources of insecurity and instability is extremely intense, as has become a current and unavoidable phenomenon throughout the countries that formerly belonged to the socialist bloc.

A first set of risk factors stems from our geopolitical situation. One cannot claim we are the target of any major, acute, or immediate threats—and this goes for the definition of the current state of our national security in general. Nevertheless, we have not found sufficient reason to relax, either. Since the current geopolitical developments are extremely fluid, complicated, and delicate, I will refrain from discussing them now.

Secondly, there has been a transfer of sources of insecurity and instability facilitated by the opening that took place in Central European societies: organized crime; the smuggling of arms, drugs, and strategic materials; terrorism; illegal immigration; and others. (...) We continue to pursue them, trying to heal their consequences—ignoring, however, that besides being a transit country, Romania is increasingly becoming the very target of such networks. I would like to emphasize here that the threshold beyond which the sources of risk that we are currently importing can no longer be efficiently mastered is not very far away; I would also like to stress that under such circumstances the mere testing of our reaction speed is not always the best solution. (...)

The Economic Situation—The Most Exposed Area of National Security Gentlemen members of Parliament, were you to ask me to single out the area currently concentrating the most numerous and important sources of risk for our national security, I would be compelled to call your attention, as I have done before, to our economic situation. (...)

The SRI has identified certain projects aimed at restructuring and modernizing certain Romanian branches and strategic resources—especially nuclear power production, our mineral resources, the defense industry, and communications—which could make the Romanian state face an unacceptable situation of dependence or limitation of its prerogatives. Such is the project aimed at rebuilding Romania's oil industry, a project conceived by specialized foreign companies in a way that is disadvantageous and inopportune in terms of the financing of the project, the preconditions set for supplying new technology, the limiting of our research and design work in that domain in the sense that it has to be reduced, as well as the increased volume of our hydrocarbon imports. (...)

We warned in due time that business transactions concluded incompetently or corruptly, the object of which was our merchant marine fleet, are harming our national interests. We have documented that case and insisted upon it several times, but now we have to do it once again, because—and I am trying to formulate very briefly what we have already told the competent juridical bodies—Romania has lost so much control over its means of maritime transportation that one currently needs maximum benevolence to even regard it as a fleet or talk of its strategic importance. At the same time the maritime and river transportation infrastructure—ports, navigable channels, and piloting activity—as well as our ship-building docks, are currently in a condition that ought to cause worry and, in the near future, even serious concern. (...)

Left- and Right-Wing Extremist Movements Are Reorganizing

Romanians are also recognized as a nation with a very low adherence to totalitarian regimes. The claim that Romania's current passage to a democratic regime is irreversible is hardly disputed any more. Who would doubt it today? Nevertheless, I take the liberty of arguing that we are putting the complex, lengthy, and fragile erection of a law-governed state on the list of things already accomplished because we prefer to believe we have already achieved it for good. But, in fact, just how fragile is itt? I do not know how many of you have considered it worth noting that the Iron Guard movement is unifying, being provided with financial support and organizational counsel from the diaspora; that Iron Guard propaganda is on the continuous offensive, and that its principal target is young people—who, owing to the crisis of values by which they are is affected at least as much as the adult generations, are proving to be alarmingly receptive. Again, I do not know how many of you would be impressed if I told you that in October alone, and just at the Eminescu book shop in Bucharest, they put on sale four volumes belonging to the "classics" of that movement; that a youth group in the city of Sibiu is preparing to set up a cross bearing the Iron Guard emblem on top of the Moldoveanu peak of the Fagaras Mountains; that a teacher at the Gheorghe Lazar High School in the capital city, one of the leaders of the movement, is making great efforts to recruit new disciples; and so on.

And how many of you have spent a great deal of time pondering on the passage of our report that deals with left-wing extremism? The mere fact that so far none of the communist groupings has managed to obtain legal status might be considered a comforting thought. Well, I can now add that encouraged by the results of the recent local elections, the members of such a grouping in Targu Jiu decided to convene a national conference entitled "The 15th Congress of the PCR" [Romanian Communist Party], which is to be followed by local conferences in almost every one of the nation's counties. This signals a change in their tactics. They will not request a legal status any more but instead declare themselves the followers of the PCR by simply adopting the latter's statute, which can be done by merely sending a note to the courts. If they manage what they set out to do—namely, to have half of the members of the former CC [Central Committee] and some of the members of the CPEx [Political Executive Committee] attend the national conference—I venture to claim that we will not be faced with tiny anonymous and illegal groupings but rather a genuine party having a certain degree of authority, and perhaps even the necessary legal documents. (...)

Certain Ethnic Groups Are Obsessively Concerned with Autonomy Claims

I see myself compelled to here submit to your attention a complex and delicate subject: the issue of autonomy and separatist claims, which are being promoted consistently and brutally, I would say, by certain extremist groupings in our country's territory. I have to remind you that the issue is that of achieving an autonomous status that has nothing to do with the autonomy of local administration as stipulated by Romania's legislation and as defined by the norms and recommendations of European and international bodies. On the contrary, we are witnessing the obsessive preoccupation of a certain grouping—either through by their abusive interpretation of, or defiance of, legal norms and domestic and international usage—with the intention of imposing administrative and territorial self-determination and self-governing of their community, which actually means that an entire zone would be removed from the authority of the Romanian state and separated as an independent entity. This is the problem, and I do not think that there is anything here that can be doubted. Let me add, in parentheses, that similar aspects and claims—on a much smaller scale, of course, and without being formulated as clearly and subtly—that are being circulated by the media of certain ethnic minorities in our country other than those mentioned in the report—the latter belonging to Hungarian extremists. And here it is necessary for me to make a distinction that we should all take into consideration. The issue of the Hungarian ethnic minority of Romania is one thing, whereas that of Hungarian extremists is an entirely different thing, since the latter are a total minority as compared with that ethnic group—and the Hungarian minority, like the internal situation in Romania, I must say, has often been the target rather than the initiator of the actions to which I refer. (...)

Former DSS [Department of State Security], Militia, and MApN [Ministry of National Defense] Personnel Are Active in 166 Private Detective Agencies

I would like to reassure you that we enjoy the same—if not even more—attention from foreign secret services. However, in this respect I believe we are mastering the situation quite well. It is our friends whom we fear more than our foes. The issue that is worrying us most is the vulnerability of the targets at the center of the attention of the foreign intelligence services, and their agents' chances of finding support in operational areas. In this connection, there are two aspects that I would like to call to your attention. The first refers to the private detective agencies, whose number has reached 166, according to our latest information. They are operating with former personnel of the DSS, the former police, and the MApN of the former totalitarian regime—people who are specialized in investigation, surveillance, operational equipment, and so on. Such companies have a remarkable intelligence potential, and the fact that some of them even possess ultramodern specific equipment considerably multiplies both that potential and the risks deriving from it, namely that this potential could be used for the most varied purposes, including goals associated with certain foreign threats. And I must tell you that the situation has not remained at the level of a mere hypothetical risk. We have evidence proving that in a number of cases this has already happened, and in some cases their targets were objectives that are quite difficult to penetrate. The more important issue that I would like to point out here is the fact that in Romania, at present, professional intelligence work is being carried out under cover of such private firms, taking advantage of the fact that there are absolutely no laws to regulate this—although they also frequently violate the laws protecting the rights and liberties of the citizenry, and also harm our national security. (...)

A situation that could become alarming within a short time is that of the data banks and information networks, a situation which in our country is a kind of "no man's land." On top of this, it holds especially true for our public institutions. Anyone who so wishes has access to information stored there, and, via technical operating personnel, these banks and networks are under the control of precisely the wrong people.

Butrus-Ghali: Talks With Izetbegovic 'Positive'

AU3011135594 Paris AFP in English 1311 GMT 30 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Nov 30 (AFP)—UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali ended talks in Sarajevo Wednesday with the Bosnian authorities on the crisis in the Bihac enclave in northwestern Bosnia and the future of the UN mission in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

In a short statement after the two-hour session, the UN chief said he had had a "very long and positive discussion" with President Alija Izetbegovic "with the purpose of reaching a ceasefire and to continue the peace process in spite of all the difficulties." He refused to give details on the talks, expected to focus on achieving a ceasefire in the UN-mandated safe area in Bihac and to examine the prospects for a nationwide truce.

Outside the presidency building where Butrus-Ghali was speaking, around 100 demonstrators jeered and shouted insults such as "Butrus is a chetnik."

Izetbegovic told reporters that the UN chief had not brought any new plan for a political solution to the Bosnian conflict, nor had they talked about a possible confederation between the Bosnian Serbs and Serbia in line with a suggestion by Russia and France.

He said the United Nations had no right to neutrality between a normal government based on democracy and one that recognised only one nation, one religion and one party and demanded that all others should be eliminated.

Butrus-Ghali was due to travel later to Sarajevo airport for talks with Serb leader Radovan Karadzic.

News Conference Held

AU3011152994 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 30 Nov 94

[Report by Senada Cumurovic on the news conference by UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali and Bosnia-Herzegovina President Alija Izetbegovic in Sarajevo on 30 November—recorded; Butrus-Ghali speaks in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation]

[FBIS Translated Text] We are 100-percent in favor of the Contact Group's plan. This was stated by Butrus-Ghali, making a brief statement for journalists after one and a half hours of talks with the Bosnia-Herzegovina leadership.

[Begin Butrus-Ghali recording] I will only say that I held very long and useful talks with the president. I stressed the importance of establishing a cease-fire and continuing the peace process, despite all the difficulties. The president will express another point of view that does not differ very much from mine. [end recording]

I am afraid that our views differ to some extent, President Izetbegovic said, presenting several details concerning the talks with the UN secretary general today.

[Begin Izetbegovic recording] I briefed the secretary general on the fact that the (?maps) are on the table, together with the Contact Group plan, which is still valid. So are our offers regarding the cease-fire in Bihac and the cease-fire in Bosnia-Herzegovina for the duration of three months, as are all the Security Council resolutions.

We proposed to the secretary general that he demand from the other side to accept these documents. In addition, I drew the secretary general's attention to the fact that his authority is great and that he should use that authority, to say very clearly that here in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as he knows (?from all the facts), there is a conflict between democracy, the democratic legal authorities, (?which strive) for democracy, and a dark (?fascism).

The people there only recognize one nation, their own nation; one religion, their own religion; and one party, their own party. Everything else is supposed to be exterminated. I said that in such a situation, the secretary general could not be and has no right to be neutral. He should clearly say to the French, English, and all other forces that are hindering him in his actions from time to time that the legal authorities and this country should be protected. I told him that. I asked him to do it. [end recording]

Was the confederation between the Bosnian Serbs and Serbia proposed to you? This was a question posed to President Alija Izetbegovic, who said that this was not discussed.

Not wanting to go into the details of his talks at the Presidency today, Butrus-Ghali nevertheless said that the first thing should be a cease-fire throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. Replying categorically to the question whether he had proposed a new plan, different from that of the Contact Group, Butrus-Ghali said:

[Begin Butrus-Ghali recording] No, never. No, no, no, no.... [end recording]

The citizens that gathered in front of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency building greeted the secretary general with boos and protests. This afternoon he will hold talks, as he said, with the other side.

Karadzic Boycotts Meeting

AU3011162894 Paris AFP in English 1601 GMT 30 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, Nov 30 (AFP)—Bosnian Serbs boycotted talks Wednesday [30 November] with UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali following a dispute over the venue and were angrily criticized by the UN chief.

"I was deeply disappointed and surprised," Butrus-Ghali told reporters after meeting members of the mainly Moslem Bosnian Government. "Unless there is cooperation from both sides in the conflict it will be increasingly difficult to convince the Security Council to keep UN poeacekeepers here."

The meeting was called off because the Serbs refused to go to Sarajevo airport, a neutral zone, while Butrus-Ghali said he would not go to the Bosnian Serbs' "capital" at Pale, UN sources said.

Butrus-Ghali, who had arrived in Sarajevo during the morning, tried to contact Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic by telephone but Karadzic would not talk to him. The UN secretary general then tried to speak to Nicola Koljevic, one of the deputy presidents of the Serb "parliament," who also refused to take his call.

Eventually Butrus-Ghali reached Jovan Zametica, one of Karadzic's advisers, who suggested he go to Pale, a proposal Butrus-Ghali turned down. [passage omitted]

Butrus-Ghali Comments

AU3011180794 Paris AFP in English 1742 GMT 30 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Nov 30 (AFP)—The following are extracts from a statement by UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali at Sarajevo airport after the refusal of the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic to meet with him there.

"I came to Sarajevo at the express request of (Bosnian) President Izetbegovic and Dr Karadzic.... My purpose in coming here was not to enter into detailed negotiation but to convey to both sides a simple message. That message is that if they want to retain the assistance and support of the United Nations in bringing this terrible war to an end they must do two things. First they must show a readiness to negotiate and work in good faith to find common ground. Secondly they must cooperate with UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Forces) and UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees).

"UNPROFOR is here to help them reach agreements and implement those agreements. It is not here to become a party to the conflict. It can only carry out its mandates if the two parties cooperate with it.... We face a new situation in which the members of the United Nations are increasingly critical in their assessment of peace-keeping operations.

"I spent nearly two hours this morning with President Izetbegovic.... We discussed specific action that could be taken now to reach agreement on measures that could be taken now to bring the military situation under control and create conditions... for a political settlement.

"I had invited Dr Karadzic to meet me at the airport.... I have to express my disappointment and surprise that he declined my invitation.... Nor have I had the opportunity to press him to lift the unacceptable restrictions he is currently placing on the movement of United Nations personnel and convoys, including the resupply of the Bangladeshi Battalion in Bihac. Another matter of concern is the Bosnian Serbs' deployment of anti-aircraft systems....

"....in declining to meet the secretary general of the United Nations Dr Karadzic has done his people a great disservice."

Butrus-Ghali Briefs Media

AU3011194894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 30 Nov 94

[Report by Nedzad Leko on news conference by UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali at Sarajevo airport on 30 November]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the beginning of the 30-minute news conference at Sarajevo airport prior to his departure, Butrus-Ghali read the following statement:

[Begin Butrus-Ghali recording in English fading into Serbo-Croatian translation] I came to Sarajevo at the express request of President Izetbegovic and Dr. Karadzic. Both of them drew my attention to the recent deterioration of the military situation, especially in the Bihac region. This has been of great concern to the Security Council recently.

The purpose of my visit here was not to get involved in detailed negotiations, but to give both sides a simple message, namely that if they want to continue receiving UN help and support in ending this horrible war, they must do two things. First, they must demonstrate readiness to negotiate and cooperate in order to find a common basis. Second, they must cooperate with UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] and UNHCR.

UNPROFOR is here to help them find an agreement and implement that agreement. UNPROFOR is not here to become a side to the conflict. It can accomplish its mandate if these two sides cooperate with it. My message is that if they do not do that, it will be impossible for me to convince the Security Council to keep UNPROFOR here.

We are facing a new situation in which UN members are becoming increasingly critical in their assessment of the operation of maintaining peace.

This morning, I spent almost two hours in a sincere exchange of views with President Izetbegovic. I gave him my message. He told me his views on the efficiency of the UN operations in this country. We discussed specific actions that could be taken now to find an agreement on the measures that would put the military situation under control, and create conditions in which negotiations on a political solution could successfully be finalized.

I invited Dr. Karadzic to meet me at the airport this afternoon to hold similar talks with him. I must express my regret and surprise that he had rejected the invitation. It was therefore not possible for me personally to convey to him my message. Nor was I in a position to pressure him to lift the unacceptable restrictions on the movement of the UN personnel and convoys, including resupplies for the Bangladeshi battalion at Bihac.

The other worrying thing is the deployment of antiaircraft systems by the Bosnian Serbs, which is obstructing the humanitarian airlift. Mr. Akashi will discuss these issues with Dr. Karadzic as soon as possible. I believe that by refusing to meet with the UN secretary general, Dr. Karadzic has done a disservice to his people.

The leaders of this country are facing critical decisions. I appeal to all of them to face up to their responsibilities and make it possible for the international community to help them via its organizations bring peace to their people. [end recording]

Replying to journalists' questions, the UN secretary general said that he would try to avoid the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Explaining why he had not gone to hold talks with Karadzic in Pale, Butrus-Ghali said that the United Nations and he personally recognize only Bosnia-Herzegovina as a sovereign and internationally recognized state, and not artificial entities in Pale.

Butrus-Ghali Leaves Sarajevo

AU3011163094 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 30 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] After his visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina today, UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali left Sarajevo at about 1600. At a brief news conference at Sarajevo airport, Butrus-Ghali said that Radovan Karadzic had refused to talk to him at Sarajevo airport, demanding that Butrus-Ghali come to Pale.

Answering journalists' questions why he had not done that, Butrus-Ghali said that the United Nations and he only recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina as a sovereign and internationally recognized state, and not some artificial entities in Pale.

Serbs Criticize Butrus-Ghali

LD3011183194 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1729 GMT 30 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 30 Nov (TANJUG)—The refusal of UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali to have a meeting with the Srpska republic [RS] leadership in Pale or Grbavica shows that "the United Nations does not want to face up to the reality of the existence of the RS," Jovan Zametica, an adviser to the RS president, said today.

In a statement broadcast by Serb radio in Pale, Zametica stressed that it is a matter of the vital principle of the equal treatment of the sides in the conflict and that "the RS must have equal treatment."

"The secretary general insisted that the scheduled meeting with President Karadzic be held at Sarajevo airport. Our side proposed that the meeting be in Pale. Later we offered to switch the meeting to Grbavica. This was a sign of the goodwill and readiness for compromise on the part of the Serb side, in view of the fact that Pale is the seat of our presidency," Zametica said.

"However, the secretary general rejected this Serb concession. It is quite clear from this that the United Nations does not want to face up to the reality of the existence of the RS," the adviser to the RS president assessed.

"If the secretary general can meet Mr. Izetbegovic in the so-called presidency of Muslim Sarajevo, he should have been considerate enough to come to Serb Sarajevo to have talks with President Karadzic."

Adviser Zametica stresses that what is at issue is "the vital principle of the equal treatment of the sides in the conflict—based on international military law. Different countries can have different attitudes toward us, but the least we can expect is that the United Nations should treat us equally."

"The Serb side notes with regret that the meeting with the secretary general was not held. However, our firm position continues to be that the RS must have equal treatment, and that is all we are asking for," Zametica's statement says.

Rose Heads for Pale To Discuss Bihac, Missiles

AU0112091494 Paris AFP in English 0858 GMT 1 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Dec 1 (AFP)—The commander of UN forces in Bosnia General Michael Rose was headed for the Serb stronghold of Pale, east of Sarajevo, Thursday following the refusal of Serb leader Radovan Karadzic to attend last-ditch peace talks with UN chief Butrus Butrus-Ghali.

He was to hold talks there on the situation in the northwestern Bihac pocket, where Serb forces are poised to overrun a UN-mandated safe area, and seek a response to a UN proposal issued last Sunday for a ceasefire in the region and a demilitarisation of the safe area.

The Bosnian Government has accepted the proposal but the Serbs have given no response so far.

On Wednesday they rebuffed the UN secretary-general by refusing to meet him except on Serb-controlled territory.

The UN commander was likely to press the Serb leadership on the presence of anti-aircraft missile batteries around Sarajevo, considered a threat to humanitarian flights to the city and specifically mentioned by Butrus-Ghali in a statement issued at the end of his visit.

Rose was also to discuss the issue of UN humanitarian convoys blockaded around the country, the detention of UN peacekeepers at weapons collection points in the Sarajevo demilitarised zone, the supply of utilities in the Bosnian capital, and other issues, spokesman Major Herve Gourmelon said.

Small arms and automatic weapons fire was reported overnight Wednesday around the Bihac safe area, the spokesman said. Some mortar shells fell in and around the town where around 70,000 townspeople and refugees from outlying areas are trapped.

Captive Czech Observer Contacts UNPROFOR

LD3011195094 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1700 GMT 30 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Major Dusan Dubovy, a Czech UN military observer, who is being held captive at the airport of the Bosnian town of Banja Luka, was allowed to leave for a hotel to replenish food supplies and basic personal things. Maj. Dubovy is being held by Bosnian Serbs as a human shield against a possible NATO attack on the airport. However, he is allowed to communicate with the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] command. In a conversation yesterday with his commander, Dubovy said that he was under constant psychological pressure but he was not depressed. The UNPROFOR command is holding intensive talks on the release of the whole group of military observers at Banja Luka airport, and on the solution to the situation.

Serbs Deny Plans To Shell Canadian Peacekeepers

LD3011131994 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1300 GMT 30 Nov 94

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Nov. 30 (TANJUG)-—The Bosnian Serb Army has categorically denied that it plans to shell the Canadian peacekeepers in the town of Visoko, 25 km northwest of Sarajevo.

The Bosnian Serb News Agency SRNA quoted a Bosnian Serb army communique as saying the allegation of a U.N. spokesman in Sarajevo was "completely unfounded." SRNA quoted the communique as saying the members of the Canadian battalion of the U.N. Protection Force were "absolutely safe."

The communique said the Bosnian Serb army had "always had correct cooperation with the U.N. peacekeeping forces."

SRNA quoted the communique as saying "the U.N. peacekeeping forces have always been the safest on the territory of the Bosnian Serb republic." The communique said, "there is no reason why this should not continue to be the case."

Canadians Downgrade Alert

LD3011152194 Montreal Radio Canada International in English 1430 GMT 30 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Four hundred and twenty Canadian peacekeeping soldiers in central Bosnia have downgraded their alert after shoring up defenses at their camp in Visoko. Canadian officials say they have good intelligence about the level of Serb activity, in spite of threats by the Bosnian Serb army that it would attack again.

The Serbs fired 6 of 10 rockets at the camp on Sunday 27 November, damaging one building. On Monday more than 100 nonessential military personnel moved out of the camp to nearby Kiseljak. Fifty-five other Canadian peacekeepers are still being detained at various locations near Visoko.

In Ottawa, General John de Chastelain, chief of Canada's defense staff, says contingency plans are being revised in case peacekeepers have to leave Bosnia.

UNPROFOR-Serb 'Incident' on Gorazde Front

AU3011200894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 30 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] As in the past few days, the chetniks attacked the defense lines and civilian targets in Gorazde with antiaircraft weapons and mortars. There was again an incident between the chetniks and members of the UN peace forces on the Gorazde front. Last night, the aggressor attacked civilian targets in several locations. After being directly threatened, members of the peace forces returned fire. We do not have details on the consequences. It is assumed that there were no casualties.

UNPROFOR Confirms 5th Corps Controls Bihac

AU3011174394 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 30 Nov 94

[Report by Nada al-Isa]

[FBIS Translated Text] All military forces from the so-called SAO [Serbian autonomous region] Krajina are taking part in the fighting on the Bihac front. We are talking about thousands of soldiers and significant amounts of heavy weapons, tanks, antiaircraft guns, antiaircraft machine guns, multiple rocket launchers, [word indistinct], and other heavy weapons. New brigades are crossing from the so-called SAO Krajina in the Cazin Krajina. They are also bringing new heavy weapons. This is being confirmed by the captured soldiers of the aggressor paramilitary. Let us only mention two of the captured aggressor soldiers, Djordje Marjanovic and Branko Pintor, both from Knin. They were captured in the Bugari region yesterday and are members of the 3d Brigade of the so-called Lika Corps. They also confirmed something else. In addition to the [word indistinct] paramilitary from Knin, on the Bihac front are also brigades from Vukovar, Borovo, Pakrac, Benkovac, Korenica, and other occupied areas in Croatia.

And yet UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] allegedly still has no evidence that the aggression is coming from the so-called SAO Krajina. Therefore, the residents of Bihac appealed to UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali again today to come to Bihac from Sarajevo, to see how the UNPROFOR mandate is not being implemented, how UNPROFOR reporting from the ground is almost identical to the aggressor's reports. There are only occasional, realistic reports and claims.

This was the case with the Zagreb UNPROFOR report yesterday and today, which timidly confirmed that the fighters of the 5th Corps control both Kladusa and accesses to Bihac, despite very fierce fighting. UNPROFOR says that they, too, have received reports that the 5th Corps defensive lines at Bihac are unchanged. Are these realistic reports a consequence of Butrus-Ghali's visit to Sarajevo?

UNPROFOR has finally said that there is no evidence of the Serb media claims about the alleged capture of a large number of 5th Corps soldiers. As we have already reported, the reports that the shown captured soldiers, allegedly members of the 5th Corps, are in fact the remnants of Fikret Abdic's paramilitary are reliable. For this reason the members of the 5th Corps are not even analyzing the aggressor's propaganda [word indistinct]. They have more important things to do, to defend Bihac, and thus Bosnia-Herzegovina.

5th Corps Counterattacks

LD3011195494 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1935 GMT 30 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Petrovac, Nov. 30 (TANJUG)-—Bosnian Muslims' Fifth Corps on Wednesday mounted the heaviest attacks on Bosnian Serbs south of the town of Bihac, northwestern Bosnia, Bosnian Serb army sources said.

The sources said the Sarajevo Muslim government Fifth Corps attacked Bosnian Serb defenses at Privilica, Debeljaca and Zegari, south of Bihac. The sources said Muslim troops had fired several mortar shells also on the town of Krupa, 15 km east of Bihac.

Radio Velkaton said troops of moderate Muslim politician Fikret Abdic were also advancing on Bihac. The town was still controlled by the Sarajevo government forces.

The radio, controlled by Abdic's supporters, said now that Abdic's troops had routed a well-fortified position of Sarajevo Muslim forces in the town of Velika Kladusa, 40 km north of Bihac, there was nothing to prevent them from regaining the entire town.

The radio said over the past 24 hours alone, 700 members of the Fifth Corps had surrendered or joined Abdic's troops.

The Fifth Corps in late August overran the autonomous province of west Bosnia, proclaimed in September 1993 by Abdic and his supporters who opposed the belligerent policy of Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic.

Inter-Muslim fighting resumed in western Bosnia about three weeks ago, about the same time when the Bosnian Serb troops mounted a counteroffensive against the Fifth Corps.

During the counteroffensive, Bosnian Serb troops regained all territories lost in the Fifth Corps offensive mounted from the U.N.-designated 'safe area' of Bihac.

Shelling Kills 7 in Bihac

AU3011200994 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 30 Nov 94

[Report by Muhamed Mulic]

[FBIS Translated Text] The joint aggressors are not stopping the fierce offensive on the Bihac protected area and the Bihac region as a whole. Intensive battles have been fought with the enemy units on all lines of separation since early this morning, especially at Debeljaca, in the Zegari area, Vedro Polje, Klokot, Izacic, and Bugar, and on the Grmusa-Srbljani plateau and the Grabez plain. Up to the time of this report, and it is now around 1800, more than 2,000 destructive shells have landed on the defenders' lines, the suburbs of, and Bihac itself. The aggressor tried on several occasions to breach the defense line and reach the center of town. The fighters of the 5th Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina have successfully repelled all enemy attacks. The lines of defense remain unchanged.

Unfortunately, the bestial chetnik shelling and antiaircraft fire on Bihac streets and districts today left seven civilians dead and 20 wounded. The situation in the Bihac hospital is extremely difficult. There is no more space for new casualties because the hospital is currently treating about 2,200 patients. In addition, there are no medicines, bandages, or food. Only a few hundred meters away from the hospital fierce battles are being waged against the aggressor units.

There is no point talking about the humanitarian catastrophe any more. There is no food and the world is not doing anything to help the 200,000 residents in this part of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The suffering of these peoples is being watched silently by the international community, which, judging by everything, is one of the participants in the perfidious destruction of the Bosniak and Croat peoples in this part of the republic.

'Grave' Humanitarian Situation

AU3011174294 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 30 Nov 94

[Report by Muhamed Mulic]

[FBIS Translated Text] The battle for the defense of Bihac has continued today on all lines of the front, which are subjected to strong aggressor attacks from howitzers, mortars, tanks, and antiaircraft weapons. Their aim is to reach the center of town. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army fighters are resolutely repelling all chetnik assaults on this town that has been reverberating with strong detonations since this morning. Newly wounded civilians are arriving at the hospital all the time.

Fierce fighting today took place again at Debeljaca, in the area of Zegari, Vedro Polje, Klokot, and Bugari, and on the other side, on the Grabez plain and the Grmusa-Srbljani plateau. Thousands of shells landed on the outskirts of the town that is successfully resisting the aggressor's attacks.

The humanitarian situation is become increasingly grave. Food ran out some time ago, since not a single food convoy has passed through the so-called Serbian Krajina for the Bihac region since May. However, nothing is being done by the international community to save more than 200,000 residents from starvation in this part of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The already difficult situation is becoming even worse as a large number of refugees is wandering around the municipalities in western Krajina looking for shelter and food.

Children and the elderly are in the most difficult position. There are more than 26,000 children under five years of age and 10,000 pensioners in Bihac alone. A catastrophe is looming over thousands of residents in the Bihac region, while the world is still silently watching the expiration of civilians and the protected zone of Bihac.

Abdic Advances; Izetbegovic Units 'Decimated'

LD3011164494 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1549 GMT 30 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Petrovac, Zvornik, Bileca, Doboj, Brcko, 29 Nov (TANJUG)—Units of the 5th Corps of the Muslim army are not ceasing their attacks on Serb positions on the Bihac-Krupa front, especially at the southern approaches to Bihac, TANJUG correspondents report, citing sources in the army of the Srpska republic. [passage omitted]

Radio Velkaton reports that Fikret Abdic's army is continuing its advance toward Bihac. The same source says soldiers of the People's Defense of the autonomous province of western Bosnia knocked out a stronghold of the 5th Corps in Velika Kladusa, "so the road to the liberation of Velika Kladusa is completely open."

In this place, the radio claims, many units loyal to Alija Izetbegovic, who have been trying to hold their positions at any price and prevent the advance of Abdic's forces, have been decimated. People's Defense members control virtually the whole of the road near Velika Kladusa which leads to Pecigrad, 20 km away.

According to Radio Velkaton, in the last 24 hours alone about 700 members of the 5th Corps have either surrendered or joined the ranks of the People's Defense. [passage omitted]

Abdic Interview

LD3011164294 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1523 GMT 30 Nov 94

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Prague, Nov. 30 (TANJUG)—Moderate Bosnian Muslim politician Fikret Abdic has said he is sorry he ceded the office of president of Bosnia-Herzegovina presidency to Alija Izetbegovic four years ago. Abdic said in an interview published in the Czech daily MLADA FRONTA-DNES on Wednesday, "if I had assumed the post of president, there would have been no war. I underestimated the danger and gave priority to Izetbegovic."

Abdic, who leads the supporters of west Bosnia's autonomy, said that three months later he had to admit that he no longer had influence in all of Bosnia and was unable to change anything significantly.

He said that was why he had returned to western Bosnia to help there. "We could provide jobs, we had enough food and maintained peace with our neighbors," said Abdic who proclaimed the Autonomous Province of West Bosnia in September 1993 on the basis of a local referendum.

Abdic said that Muslim authorities in Sarajevo had criticized him for signing peace accords first with the Bosnian Serbs and then the Bosnian Croats.

The Bosnian Croats and Muslims were initially allies in the civil war against the Bosnian Serbs. However, they eventually engaged in fierce mutual clashes, fighting for territories in central and southern Bosnia-Herzegovina. The fighting lasted a year and ended after the agreement on the Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was signed in Washington in March this year under strong pressure from the United States.

The Czech daily quoted Abdic as saying he was strongly in favor of peace.

Abdic told the daily, "I worked to improve relations between some peoples at a time when nobody had given that a thought. I may prove successful in it. No solution in Bosnia is possible without peace between Serbs and Croats and I could be the only one able to accomplish that."

Abdic said he had left Velika Kladusa, the center of west Bosnia, in the face of the offensive launched by the

Sarajevo-based Muslim government in the summer of this year because "we did not want a civil war. We would have, otherwise, organized our defenses differently. But at what cost."

About 70,000 Muslim civilians and troops had crossed from west Bosnia to the neighboring republic of Serb Krajina as a result of the offensive launched by Izetbegovic. Serbs in Croatia set up their own state, the republic of Serb Krajina, in 1991, after Croatia launched a war of secession from the former Yugoslavia and removed Serb national rights from the Croatian Constitution.

Abdic criticized foreign factors and the United Nations for recognizing the Izetbegovic army's aggression on the supporters of west Bosnia's autonomy. Abdic said, "we are going back, but not as Izetbegovic's slaves. Everybody has had an opportunity to see what our intentions are and what those of the (Muslim) government in Sarajevo."

Fierce fighting is now under way between Izetbegovic's and Abdic's troops in the area of the town of Bihac in northwestern Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Abdic had earlier said that west Bosnia Muslims had wanted to return home peacefully but were prevented from doing so by Izetbegovic's troops.

Radio Sums Up Combat Situation 30 Nov

AU3011164694 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 30 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] In the last fierce counterattack by the joint units of the 4th Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Bjelimic [word indistinct] region, several important heights and facilities have been liberated. Brigadier General Ramiz Drekovic, commander of the 4th Corps, has sent greetings to the members of the (?4th Corps) for courage in breaking the last chetnik offensive in the Ljuta River valley and the Bjelimic area. [passage omitted]

There was no peace in the theater of operations of the 4th Operations Group of the 2d Corps of our army. The chetniks shelled the villages in the free Zvornik territory with long-range artillery. The Miljanovci-Jajici road also came under fire, Muhamed Smajic reported from the Press Center at Kalesija.

After a brief lull, the chetniks also stepped up artillery shelling on the Orasje-Samac front. [passage omitted]

Tanks, hill guns, and mortars have occasionally been active on the Vozuca front, which is in the 3d Corps' theater of operations. [passage omitted]

On the Gracanica front, the chetniks attacked the industrial area with mortars, and Stjepan Polje with Browings and Bofors. The lines of the 111th Gracanica Brigade also came under attack. The situation on the Doboj and Lukavac fronts was similar. The aggressor attacked the settlements of Turija and Hadzici with artillery. The columns of the enemy vehicles were spotted on the Vozuca-[word indistinct] road.

There was no peace on the Gorazde front either, Fahrudin Becic reported. [passage omitted]

Serbs Concentrate Forces

AU0112111894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 1 Dec 94

[Izudin Durakovic report from Gracanica]

[FBIS Translated Text] The enemy continued his activities and in greater [word indistinct] in the theater of operations of the [word indistinct] Operations Group of the 2d Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the Doboj front, the enemy fired at the defense lines and [word indistinct] of the free territory. An enemy howitzer fired from the Doboj region. The enemy fired with (?82)-mm and 120-mm mortars from the Ciganiste, (Lipac), (Rosavica), and [name indistinct] regions on populated areas of Subasici, [name indistinct], and Lukavica Rijeka. Chetnik snipers were also active, particularly in the region of [word indistinct] Glavica and (Mujano Mezar). During the night the enemy intensified his movements and concentrated manpower and military hardware in the region of Tesanj and (?Teslic).

Our fighters not only calmly observed the aggressor's activities but energetically responded and had [word indistinct] results. They managed to destroy a 57-mm Zis antitank gun in the region of (?Devetak), a Bofors 20-mm antiaircraft gun at Ciganiste, a battery of mortars, and two enemy trenches where another Zis antiaircraft gun was damaged. Also, in the area of Gavrica (?elevation), one truck has been destroyed and another one has been made unable to move. The defenders of Lukavac managed to render useless an enemy T-34 tank that fired in the general area of the town center on two occasions yesterday. In this section of the front the enemy also took advantage of the night and (?morning) hours to concentrate his forces, clearly indicating his intentions.

Croats Capture 'Important Strategic Positions'

LD3011165194 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 30 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The fighting died down on the Kupres battlefield over the past few days, but last night and this morning the Bosnian Serbs stepped up attacks which spread from the Kupres battlefield to the Livno-Glamoc and Livno-Grahovo battlefields, all the way to the state border between the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Units of the Croat Defense Council repelled all attacks and launched a counteroffensive, capturing important strategic positions. This is stressed in a statement issued by the Herceg-Bosna defense ministry, which adds that fierce fighting is still in progress.

Herzeg-Bosna Votes for 'Strengthening' of State

AU2911132894 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1022 GMT 29 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 29 November (TANJUG)—The house of representatives of the assembly of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosnia passed a decision to continue strengthening the legal system and institutions of this republic, the Croatian Radio of Herceg-Bosna reported this morning.

According to the same source, at the session held in Mostar yesterday, deputies concluded that the strengthening of the Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosna is inevitable in light of "current events and further processes" in the search for peaceful solutions on the territory of the former SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia].

The representatives of clubs of deputies of the strongest opposition parties in the constituent assembly of the Muslim-Croat federation expressed indignation and protested this decision, the Muslim Sarajevo Radio reported.

The representatives of the Liberal Party, the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats, and the Party of Democratic Action claim a total blockade has emerged in the implementation of the Washington Agreement and accuse the ruling parties—the Croatian Democratic Community and the Party of Democratic Action—for it, the Muslim Sarajevo Radio reports.

Social Democrats, Liberals Criticize UN Inaction

AU3011174494 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 30 Nov 94

[Report by Samir Huseinovic]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] At the Social Democratic Party news conference, journalists were addressed by Nijaz Skenderagic and Gradimir Gojer. They presented the party's views on the current situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

What is happening in the Bihac region is the biggest stain on the world's conscience, which is calmly watching the destruction of the Bosniak people. UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] and its leaders, especially Generals de Lapresle and Rose, appear to be deliberately devising tactics according to which their men are taken captive by the chetniks, in order to justify their inaction in the Bihac region because of alleged fears for these soldiers.

Gojer also said that it is not an army that is fighting the 5th Corps, but bewildered chetnik phalangists who not only aim to capture territories but also perpetrate the genocide of the Bosniak people. Therefore, the Social Democratic Party is appealing to the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina to do their utmost to strengthen the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina as the only component that will secure our future. [passage omitted]

Regarding Butrus-Ghali's visit to Sarajevo, Gojer said that he was not certain of his good intentions and that he did not believe that Butrus-Ghali could understand the real nature of the struggle of the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Nijaz Skenderagic presented the Social Democratic Party's view on Lord Owen. He said that after openly siding with the aggressor, Lord Owen no longer has the authority of a negotiator in settling the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Skenderagic reminded journalists of Owen's direct involvement in supplying the aggressor with fuel from the so-called FRY.

Presenting the views of the Liberal Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the current situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, journalists were addressed by party President Rasim Kadic. He spoke about the orchestrated conquest of Bihac under the auspices of United Nations and England, aimed at dividing Bosnia-Herzegovina and creating a greater Serbia. Kadic also said that our authorities are not able to oppose these efforts diplomatically, and that the defense of Bihac will be a turning point in developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Our political friends, above all, the United States and Germany, have prevented the Republic of Croatia, our only possible ally, from helping Bosnia-Herzegovina militarily. The Liberal Party does not trust Christopher's promise that there will be no changes in the Contact Group's plan, and insists on a detailed analysis of the situation at the next assembly session. According to this party's views, the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina should not be accepted, but in view of limited military potential, one should consider accepting certain concessions while preserving the external borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina and human lives, and secure living space for the Bosniak people.

The Liberal Party briefed the journalists on its participation in the international congress of liberals in Bled [Slovenia], where, among other things, the congress adopted a resolution supporting the just struggle of the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Army, Krajina Serbs Exchange Fire Around Knin

AU0112135194 Paris AFP in English 1321 GMT 1 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Dec 1 (AFP)—The Croatian Army and Croatian Serb forces exchanged mortar and machinegun fire for six hours in one of their worst clashes since a March ceasefire, a UN military spokesman said here Thursday.

The "very serious" gun battle took place Wednesday across front lines in southern Croatia, said UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) spokesman Michael Williams. It was "one of the most serious incidents since the ceasefire was established" on March 29.

The Croatian Army and the secessionist Serbs exchanged mortar, machinegun and light arms fire from around 11:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. (1000 to 1600 GMT), said another UNPROFOR spokesman, Alexander Ivanko. The Croats fired 33 mortar shells into the Croatian Serb's self-declared Republic of Krajina, which covers around a quarter of Croatia.

The battle, around the Croatian Serb stronghold of Knin, was waged across the so-called separation zone between the two sides established under the terms of the UN-mediated ceasefire, Ivanko said. UNPROFOR gave no details of casualties.

News of the battle came shortly after Croatian Serb leader Borislav Mikelic announced in a dispatch monitored in Belgrade that his self-proclaimed administration had approved a draft accord on normalizing economic relations with the Croatian Government.

The accord was due to be submitted Thursday to the Krajina "parliament" for ratification.

B-H Serbs Cross Border, Seize UN Troops

AU0112134394 Paris AFP in English 1318 GMT 1 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Dec 1 (AFP)—Seven Ukrainian peacekeepers stationed in Croatia's Krajina region have been captured by Bosnian Serbs who staged a cross-border attack to seize them, a UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] spokesman announced Thursday.

Alexander Ivanko said the peacekeepers were taken back into Bosnian territory Wednesday and that UNPROFOR was negotiating their release with officials in the Bosnian Serb stronghold of Pale and the Croatian Serb stronghold of Knin.

Government Ready To Resolve Military Situation

LD3011193794 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 30 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ] expects and supports every effective action on the part of the international community aimed at saving Bihac and protecting the UN safe area. The HDZ and the Croatian Government will do everything in their power to help Bihac, HDZ General Secretary Zlatko Canjuga said at a news conference. Sonja Rabuzin-Pavic reports:

[Rabuzin-Pavic] Bihac is a confirmation that the international community is divided and inefficient when it comes to resolving issues of key importance for the future organization of Europe and the world, Zlatko Canjuga said, and added that Bihac is proof that it is [word indistinct] today to discuss the moral principles of the international community's policies. Canjuga went on to say:

[Begin Canjuga recording] The HDZ condemns the continuous Chetnik attacks and shelling against Zupanja and Posavina in the Republic of Croatia and asks the international community and UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] to prevent them. [end recording]

[Rabuzin-Pavic] The international community, by being inefficient, is providing an opportunity to Serbs to make military conquests, Zlatko Canjuga says. This, as well as the statement of the Russian foreign minister that the key to the solution lies in Belgrade, clearly shows that the creation of some sort of a rump Yugoslavia has not been abandoned, the HDZ general secretary said:

[Begin Canjuga recording] The HDZ believes that the key to a solution must be in the implementation in principle of UN decisions and in respecting and protecting newly-created sovereign states in the former Yugoslavia, and not in the hands of the aggressors advocating a Greater Serbia. [end recording]

[Rabuzin-Pavic] Zlatko Canjuga went on to say that the HDZ condemns attempts by quasi-politicians to discredit Croatia's policy vis-a-vis Bihac. Replying to several questions by journalists regarding the forthcoming talks with representatives of local Serbs, Zlatko Canjuga said, among other things, that an agreement can be a step forward, although one agreement on its own will not be sufficient to resolve the situation in Croatia. However, Canjuga said:

[Begin Canjuga recording] The Croatian Government is resolute in the true sense of the word and is ready to militarily protect Croatian borders and resolve the situation in the Republic of Croatia by military means. [end recording]

[Rabuzin-Pavic] HDZ General Secretary Zlatko Canjuga also said that Croatia must know how to protect itself in the turmoil of international relations and that no policy aimed at dividing Croats can be in the interests of the Croatian state.

Susak Says Croatia To Enter War if Bihac Falls

LD3011144294 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1428 GMT 30 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Nov 30 (TANJUG)—Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak has said Croatia will enter the war against Bosnian Serbs if the town of Bihac in northwestern Bosnia falls into Serb hands.

The REUTER news agency quoted Susak as saying in an interview with THE NEW YORK TIMES, 'if it came to a situation where Bihac would fall for whatever reason—maybe the guys (Muslims) inside did not want to fight or (Muslim) military leaders tried to surrender—Croatia would intervene.'

Susak said in the interview published on Wednesday that Croatia had been ready 10 days ago to respond to the Serb moves with a military intervention near Bihac and in Serb Krajina, but that Washington had asked it not to enter the war.

REUTER quoted Susak as saying, 'Looking in retrospect, we are sorry that we did not in a sense because that was the golden opportunity to establish law and order in Krajina.'

The Bosnian Serb army in mid-November crushed a Muslim offensive launched from the United Nations-protected 'safe area' of Bihac, retook all 200 sq km of lost territory and encircled Muslim troops, forcing them to withdraw to the town.

Serbs in Croatia set up their own state, the Republic of Serb Krajina, in 1991, after Croatia launched a war of secession from the former Yugoslavia and removed Serb national rights from the Croatian Constitution.

The territory of Serb Krajina was placed under United Nations protection in spring 1992 but has, nevertheless, been the target of four large-scale Croatian offensives since.

UNPROFOR Concerned With Military Activity

LD3011174694 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1740 GMT 30 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Erdut, Nov. 30 (TANJUG)—The U.N. Protection Force [UNPROFOR] command in the eastern Serb Krajina town of Erdut on Wednesday expressed concern over increased military activity of Croatian and Serb Krajina troops.

An UNPROFOR command communique said both Croatian and Serb Krajina troops were deployed along the confrontation line in eastern Slavonija, south of the town of Osijek, and in 1,000 m-deep area on both sides of the line.

The communique said both sides had taken out part of heavy weapons from depots and deployed it in the exclusion zone, 10 and 20 km from the confrontation line.

The communique said Serb Krajina military police had blocked UNPROFOR personnel at several checkpoints, and said Klisa airfield, 10 km southeast of Osijek, had also been blocked, while U.N. military observers had been prevented from patrolling the exclusion zone.

The Croatian side had denied U.N. military observers access to some localities near or in the immediate area of the confrontation line, such as Ivanovac, Privlaka, Jarmina and Koritna, south of Osijek, the communique said.

The UNPROFOR command said free movement was the major prerequisite for normal activities of U.N. peacekeepers, and said all warring sides had to guarantee free movement.

The UNPROFOR command also demanded that U.N. civilian police be allowed to return to their stations as soon as possible.

Commenting on the UNPROFOR communique, Serb Krajina assistant defense minister Milan Milanovic said Croatia's continued threats were a good enough reason to take cautionary measures.

Milanovic said the measures had to be taken also because of UNPROFOR and NATO bahavior in Bosnia, he said.

Milanovic said Krajina Serbs gave no cause for the withdrawal of U.N. civilian police in eastern Slavonija, and said they were ordered to do so by the UNPROFOR headquarters in Zagreb, a day before Serb Krajina airfield at Udbina was bombed.

NATO warplanes launched an air strike against Udbina airfield on Nov. 21.

Defense Minister Hails Accord With U.S.

LD3011185894 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 30 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] After signing a Croatian-U.S. memorandum on cooperation in defense and military relations with his U.S. counterpart William Perry yesterday, Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak has returned to Zagreb. Here are his brief comments on this document:

[Begin Susak recording] This is a big step for Croatia. Everything outside the framework of the embargo is in the agreement, and everything that is in Croatia's interest—and it will be in the U.S. interest for further cooperation when the embargo is lifted—is also in the agreement, so that in general it satisfies everything that Croatia sought. [end recording]

RSK Approves Economic Relations With Zagreb

LD3011213694 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2046 GMT 30 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Knin, 30 Nov (TANJUG)—At a session this evening, the government of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] unanimously approved the agreement on economic relations with Croatia, on which the final decision will be made by the deputies of the Krajina parliament at a session in Knin tomorrow.

According to RSK Prime Minister Borislav Mikelic, the RSK thus "clearly showed once again that it supported the policy of peace and cooperation with the international community."

The approval of the agreement on economic relations with Croatia which, as Mikelic underlined, is devoid of any political connotations will open the door to negotiations on other issues of interest for Krajina and Croatia.

He added that the acceptance of the agreement on economic relations, referring to the reestablishing of water and electricity supplies and the opening of the highway and the pipeline—on which talks were held for more than three months—is a logical result of the negotiating process and the implementation of the cease-fire agreement which, as he stressed, the Croatian side must fully implement.

Mikelic noted the presence of Croatian forces along the line of separation and the buffer zone in Western Slavonia, exactly where the highway runs.

Croatian Serbs Support Zagreb-Knin Agreement

LD0112120794 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1031 GMT 1 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 1 Dec (TANJUG)—In Belgrade today the Association of Serbs from the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] and Croatia sent a letter to the RSK government and its prime minister, Borislav Mikelic, expressing support for acceptance of the agreement on the RSK's economic relations with Croatia.

"With this act you unambiguously demonstrated that you favor cooperation and peace—which will be very well received by the Serb people and all constructive forces in the international community which resolutely support those who are against war and destruction," the letter says.

The association expressed hope that the RSK assembly will also adopt a decision along the same lines and in this way show its faith in peace and consistent realization of the national interests of the Serb people who, in their struggle, merited recognition and the right to their own state.

Congratulating the RSK government for its decisiveness and courage, the association stresses its full support and promises to do everything to give humanitarian and other assistance to the people of Krajina.

Albanian Prime Minister Makes Official Visit

LD0112103894 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 1 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Albanian Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi, who is leading a government delegation, arrived this morning on a two-day official visit to Croatia. Croatian Prime Minister Nikica Valentic attended the welcoming ceremony at Zagreb's Pleso Airport with state and military honors.

Official talks between the two prime ministers and government delegations are envisaged for today. Interstate treaties are scheduled to be signed tomorrow. [passage omitted]

General on Extent of Cooperation With NATO

AU3011191594 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 29 Nov 94 p 4

[Interview with Major General Imra Agotic, commander of the Croatian Air Force and Air Defense, by Snezana Dukic; place and date not given: "We Are Not Afraid of Serbian Threats To Attack Zagreb"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The military-political situation around Bihac could change the strategic position toward the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. It has become evident that the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] is helpless in the newly evolved situation, and a new, outside factor—NATO—has intervened. We talked to Major General Imra Agotic, commander of the Croatian Air Force and Air Defense about whether NATO would finish the job it has barely started, and why Croatia did not intervene militarily in the new situation. [passage omitted]

[Dukic] Why did the Croatian Army not intervene military in this situation?

[Agotic] It is known that the Croatian Army's state of alert has, to some extent, been upgraded, and it is ready to minimize, that is, eliminate possible provocations by the Serbian side. Therefore, the Croatian Air Force, as part of the Croatian Army, has its specific tasks and is able to carry them out as planned. [passage omitted]

[Dukic] Does the Croatian Air Force perhaps have an agreement with the NATO forces? Are NATO jets using our logistics and the information from our airspace monitoring and guidance system?

[Agotic] No, there was no need for that, NATO carried out its actions on its own. It used the Republic of Croatia airspace as agreed with the Croatian political leadership and has access to unlimited use of Croatian airspace. Croatia was warned every time before the airspace was closed. There were cases when the airspace was closed in the agreed zones—at specific coordinates and altitudes—despite the fact that NATO jets did not act. NATO can only act through Croatia and go on extending aid in halting the aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina and liberating the occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina territories, which, and we are certain of this, contributes to the liberation of occupied Croatian territories. The Croatian leadership recently gave permission for the temporary use of other zones in the Republic of Croatia that more or less coincide with the airspace of occupied Croatian territories!

NATO Marines in the Adriatic

[Dukic] Were there problems with civilian air traffic?

[Agotic] When this zone is closed certain problems do arise because it then must be detoured, which, in turn, slows down air traffic despite the fact that all airports remain open for passenger traffic. This makes air traffic more difficult, and Croatia is less than delighted that is has to cede some of its airspace to NATO for its combat activity. However, we believe that this is unavoidable and that it is Croatia's contribution to the implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions and the liberation of its occupied territories. [passage omitted]

[Dukic] It has been mentioned that Croatia would soon procure Western technology training aircraft. It this true?

[Agotic] We would gladly answer this question positively. We have the intention and need to procure training aircraft. In any case, I believe that they will be of Western technology. I believe that this will happen very soon and that our future pilots will soon train on new aircraft!

[Dukic] Recently there have been rumors that you are to take up a new post. Is the post in question perhaps that of Croatian military attache to NATO—how much truth is there in the rumor?

[Agotic] There have been some ruminations involving a transfer to another post. This is completely normal. I have been at the head of the Croatian Air Force for three years now, but we have not completed our tasks and that is why, I believe, that I will not leave this post for some time. The programs we planned have not yet been fully implemented, so I hope that I will not be leaving this position until the implementation of the planned program is well underway. However, I am ready to go wherever our state leadership believes that I can do more....

Interior Ministry: Citizens To Regulate Status

AU0112090794 Skopje MIC in English 30 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Interior Ministry has informed the people living in the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] who, in line with the law on citizenship of the Republic of Macedonia, have not obtained Macedonian citizenship that they should regulate their status as foreigners.

The citizens of the former republics of the SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] who had not applied for Macedonian citizenship by 10 November 1993 at the latest, starting from 10 January 1994, in accordance with Article 8 of the Law on Movement and Stay of Foreigners, are regarded as foreigners. The persons whose procedure for regulation of citizenship status is still underway, will be regarded as foreigners from the adoption of the final negative decision. Therefore, it is necessary for those persons to report to the regional units of the Interior Ministry, according to place of residence, and apply for an approval to stay in the Republic of Macedonia. Furthermore, they have to return their valid ID cards that they own at the moment, as after receiving approval, they can receive ID cards for foreigners.

It is also necessary to stress that in accordance with the law on movement and stay of foreigners, the failure to report staying in the country represents an offense, with legal consequences.

Production, Investment, Currency Problems

95BA0022A Skopje SVET in Macedonian 15 Oct 94 pp 14-16

[Interview with Dr. Mihail Petkovski, Department of Economics at the Sv. Kiril i Metodij University in Skopje, on *Decline in Production, Investment Initiatives, and the Rate of the Denar*, by Vlado Bojkovski; place and date not given: "The Locomotive Engine Is at Its Home Platform"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Bojkovski] Mr. Petkovski, the stabilization program of the Macedonian Government [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] has been implemented over the past 10 months, and the outlines of the government's economic policy for the forthcoming year have become clear. One of the issues, still being debated in theory and yet to be proven in practice, involves the reasons why production has been declining for the past several consecutive years, and conditions which must be met in order to revive it. Public production declined by 9.5 percent in 1990; it was -10 percent in 1991, -17.7 percent in 1992, and last year it declined by 15 percent; the expected 8 percent decline for the year will probably double.

[Petkovski] The reasons for the continuing decline in production, speaking of the entire period from 1980, may be divided into two basic groups of factors: The first is that of external and extreme circumstances, which we cannot control in pursuing our economic policy. This includes the extreme shocks, an entire series of which affected the Macedonian economy; the latest, naturally, was the total Greek trade embargo against us, which was started last February.

The other group of factors or reasons for decline in production has to do with the slow pace with which the structural reforms are being implemented. Specifically, we know that structural reforms, which include above all privatization and restructuring of banks and enterprises, are processes the purpose of which is to strengthen demand and prevent production from declining and, at critical times, to shift the economy itself to the positive growth area. After their successful reforms, some East European countries have already entered that area, such as Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia.

What we must do now is work with greater energy and decisiveness and with a clear concept in hastening the structural and institutional reforms since a further delay in the declining rate of production would be economically unviable and socially destructive.

[Bojkovski] What are the sectors and the measures to which priority must be given in focusing the attention on achieving faster structural and institutional reforms—reforms we could say that have essentially been determined and initiated?

[Petkovski] Naturally, privatization and the change in ownership rights and a clearer definition are the main factors in the conversion from a socialist to a market economy. Today, according to the new law, privatization must be implemented with all our strength and as rapidly as possible, in order to indicate that the changes can no longer be revocable, that there can be no retreat, and that we are not only marching ahead but also advancing to a market economy, based on all the rules of the game related to developing such an economy. However, the experience of the other East European countries teaches us that privatization is important, and also that particularly vital are the processes of restructuring banks and enterprises and the implementation of institutional reforms in terms of creating a market for capital, money, and manpower. It is quite well-known and clear that a sick financial system and ailing banks with poor balances of payment are a major hindrance in converting to a market economy. Because of this, significant priority must be given to the process of restructuring and privatizing the banking system; an important problem in this case is the need to set a specific amount of funds. However, through our own efforts and with foreign aid, we shall be able to procure such funds and to formulate a clear strategy for bank restructuring. Directly related to this is the restructuring of enterprises, which apply to the banks for loans of dubious value. It is a question of enterprises that also are financially sick, lack liquidity, and find themselves in a difficult situation; this particularly applies to the classical socialist enterprises. Along with this, as I already said, we also must develop the institutional structure of a market economy, such as a gradual development of a capital market, a gradual introduction of a manpower market, and faster restoration of the money market. All such measures, if carried out on a synchronized basis, could strengthen demand in our economy and, along with the necessary stabilization measures, take the Macedonian economy out of a truly difficult recession tunnel.

[Bojkovski] The issue, as a dilemma in theoretical thinking, is the fact that, in addition to declining production and a negative foreign trade balance, the domestic currency continues to strengthen in relationship to the strong global currencies.

[Petkovski] Looking at official statistics leads to a mystery. As you pointed out, looking at extreme estimates, especially in terms of the balance of trade, we see a profound deficit; production is declining while the denar is strengthening compared to the strongest world currencies. Clearly, this is a question of a foreign currency influx which is not recorded in statistics. However, this influences demand and the strengthening of domestic in terms of other foreign currencies. What is dangerous in all this is the question of whether our export enterprises will be profitable and competitive, and at what rate. If they fail, the pressure to devalue the national currency will increase and, some time next year, the excessive growth of the trade deficit will trigger either a devaluation or depreciation of the national currency. At this point, the optimal strategy is that if we cannot increase the competitiveness of our economy through the mechanism of the exchange rate of the denar, to at least roughly balance the dynamics of inflation and the exchange rate. This is because a high real appreciation has not only a short-term effect on the balance of payments but also clearly negative structural results. It stimulates an import development strategy which, in any case, does not suit us and could create the type of structural characteristics which would enable us to earn a sufficient amount of foreign exchange, service our foreign debt, and, in general, let us out of the world markets, turning us into a country which will exclusively depend on foreign financial aid.

[Bojkovski] The basic features of the economic policy of the Macedonian Government for the forthcoming year indicate that, in the future as well, we could expect a strengthening of the rate of domestic currency with an annual inflation of less than 18 percent (for this year the expected inflation is 70 percent) revealing the existence of an even worse credit-monetary policy.

[Petkovski] Naturally, this depends on the structure of the combination of economic policies, as the experts claim. As I pointed out, in answering your preceding question, I believe that we should not allow any further drop in the competitiveness of our economy and, using all available steps and instruments of economic policy, prevent this. Although I say that this is not simple, it seems to me to be achievable. For example, for the next year, if inflation indeed reaches 18 percent, this step, roughly speaking, will depress our currency as well, as a result of which this will not only entail a loss for the exporting enterprises but also for enterprises selling on the domestic market and which are exposed to foreign competition. They also lose a great deal of their competitiveness, and the consequence of this is a further drop in production. Actually, even the latest changes made by the government in the foreign trade system affecting individual items indicate that the pressure exerted by foreign competition is excessive in terms of our producers, so that any further expansion of the real appreciation will indeed have a negative impact on the element of stabilization program which especially concerns me, i.e., production decline. In economics everything is interrelated: The dynamics of the rate of exchange and of production; the dynamics of the budget and of the rate of exchange, so that all of these are components of the economic policy for the next year and must be taken into consideration.

[Bojkovski] For the past few years we have been in a state of profound disinvestment. That is why there has been substantial encouragement and investment steps taken in the area of the infrastructure: Building a gasification system, the Bitola-Skopje pipeline, the Kozjak multiple-stage hydroelectric system, the Kumanovo-Kriva Palanka-Bulgarian-Macedonian border railroad, the modernization of airlines, which includes the recently signed contracts for a loan from the European Bank for the purchasing of equipment for flight control, steps related to the domestic and international mail service connections of the state, steps to modernize the customs service, improvement of the banks, etc. All of this would eventually revive investment activities in the production area and the economy will begin to eliminate the traps and difficulties in which it finds itself.

[Petkovski] In any case, this is good news for the national economy, for it is well-known that investments are the basic dynamic factor for the growth of production of any economy. Prosperous economies involve a high share of investments in public production. Thus, in China they exceed 30 percent and in South Korea even 39 percent of participation in public production. Last year, our investments totaled 14 percent and the latest data indicate a further decline in investments.

In terms of the need to increase production, in practical terms we must take into consideration increasing investment as well. Considering the extensive unknown factors with external and internal features, it is perhaps understandable that private capital is still in favor of waiting. It is reasonable, therefore, that such public investments are the first to appear on the stage. Such is the case in the other East European countries as well. Public investments, welcomed as an initial capsule, as the locomotive engine which drives the train forward, in itself are not sufficient to promote overall investment activities and the so greatly needed production growth. All of this must be followed by the growth of private investment for which, once again, it is necessary to implement investments and structural reforms, which we mentioned and which will increase demand and enhance the motivation of business people to invest.

[Bojkovski] A key aspect of investment is procuring funds. Foreign credits are attractive but less so than those from domestic and personal sources, as well as group or individual foreign investments. Are there conditions for a greater participation of sources of funds in investment activities and particularly attractive legal prerequisites for attracting foreign capital?

[Petkovski] If such a situation develops, there would be an influx of foreign capital. The experience of other countries shows that foreign investors prefer legal and political stability and the existence of skilled manpower compared to tax benefits. We could offer them tax reductions to the zero percent level but if they do not feel secure in terms of the economic and legal results of their investments they are not about to come. Naturally, we must not dare to underestimate external factors which are out of our control. However, this is not a reason for failing to achieve that which we could do ourselves, the more so since we could do something and be very successful and go forward in the implementation of reforms. The East European countries that energetically implemented such reforms, such as Hungary and Czechia, are today even considering how to limit the influx of foreign capital.

In addition to foreign capital, another important factor is domestic savings which currently seem to be totally frozen, for well-known reasons, dominant among which is the unfortunate story of the frozen foreign currency savings. According to official statistics, domestic savings have even declined. Savings in public production in China or South Korea participate in investments up to the 40 percent level. On this basis, aware of the factors governing investments and savings, it becomes clear why production has stopped. We must make a great effort to rehabilitate domestic savings. In this connection, I would mention a few factors. It is necessary to ensure the solution or have a clear concept as to how to resolve the problem of the frozen foreign currency savings, followed by developing investments that would encourage savings, as well as a market for capital, a variety of investment funds, pension agencies, and so on, and develop attractive financial instruments, such as securities and deposits or any other method that would stimulate savings and encourage it, and thus provide growth funds.

All successful economies after World War II, from Japan to Germany, have been based on foreign aid. However, the basic factor which pulled those countries out of economic crisis and degradation was domestic capital, domestic savings, domestic knowledge, and domestic architects of economic reforms.

Professor Views Opening of Albanian University

AU3011193394 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 30 Nov 94 p 4

[Interview with Tome Batkovski, assistant professor at the Faculty of Security, by Zoran Petrov; place and date not given: "The Initiative for Albanian University—Negation of the Constitution"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Public attention has recently been focused on an initiative by a group of Albanian intellectuals to open an Albanian university in Tetovo. It has also prompted various comments. We are discussing this issue with Tome Batkovski, assistant professor at the Faculty of Security in Skopje, one of the most knowlegeable experts on the Albanian question in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia]. Recently, he published a book entitled "The Great Albanian Game in Macedonia." Batkovski's interest is security, political criminology, and various organized forms of criminal activities, so the subject of the discussion is also expanded to cover this aspect.

[Petrov] First, in what field or context would you place the initiative for opening an Albanian university in Tetovo?

[Batkovski] This so-called initiative appears to belong to the educational sector, but I think that it is wrong to view and deal with it only within such a framework. In my opinion, it belongs to the political and security sector. Namely, it must be viewed within the context of continued activities of Albanian nationalism over the last 50 years, oriented to the accomplishment of a "compact Albanian ethnic space in Macedonia," as one of the phases toward an "ethnic Sciptria [Albania]."

An Unprecedented Threat

[Petrov] You say that this is not at all a problem of education. If so, what is its political dimension?

[Batkovski] We must take into the account that the basis for the security of a state is not the quantity and compactness of its armed forces, but its educational system. In my opinion, it means that the illegal activities to open an Albanian university in Tetovo are effectively directed toward the destabilization of the foundations of Macedonia's sovereignty. We must certainly emphasize that this is not just an initiative, but a series of preparations directed toward the formation of illegal forms of authority outside the institutions of the system. It is nothing other than a negation of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of Macedonia.

I repeat, the initiative is not just an initiative, but it is a preparation of illegal activities in the political sense. I think that essentially it is a strategy of a fait accompli policy against the government and, in general, against the legal institutions of the state. As proof of this we can take their irreconcilable stance that they will act outside the institutions regardless of the positions of the government. In my opinion, it is an unprecedented threat of individuals or an organization that have formally declared themselves as belonging to the system. All this becomes even more serious with the support of legal bodies. Such bodies are the assemblies of the Communes of Tetovo, Gostivar, and Debar, which are obliged to act according to the Constitution and the laws of the state. It is a nonsense in any state governed by laws, and if it becomes a real practice, it will mean that it is directly denying its own existence. Indeed, we could find ourselves in a situation where illegal actions become legal, which could cause widespread consequences.

[Petrov] From what was presented to the public at the news conference of the Initiative Committee for the formation of the university and from what its president, Fadil Sulejmani, said, we know that this initiative was launched by Albanian intellectuals at the university level, that three communal assemblies and a number of political parties are giving it support, and that even provisional bodies have been elected. Does this suggest really well made preparations?

[Batkovski] Absolutely. The involvement of the parties of the Albanian minority in Macedonia proves that it is not just a simple initiative, but a series of activities that are not in conformity with the laws, that it is a kind of a logistical support for a political plan. In essence, all this represents a conspicuous example of the nonrecognition of the statehood of the Macedonian nation, and a promotion of another nation's statehood. This is a practical step toward the federalization of Macedonia and its disintegration. In this context, the Albanian language would become a second official state language, and, logically, this initiative to found an Albanian university aims at this. It would mean that a second parallel educational system would be formed. This may be the most important link in the chain for the formation of a para-authority, towards the projected idea of an ethnic Albania.

Creation of Animosity

[Petrov] The insistence on creating an Albanian university is always defended by the thesis that the Albanians in Macedonia are suffering educational terror. What is your comment?

[Batkovski] This is a most significant stance, which actually serves as a starting point for supporting the initiative. It has been said before, but now the idea has been repromoted that the Albanians in Macedonia have been suffering in educational slavery over the past 50 years. This claim is used as one of the constant propaganda points by Albanian nationalists and it is necessary to emphasize that it is essentially not a true thesis. Their basic aim is the homogenization of the Albanians in Macedonia and the creation of a larger rift between them and the Macedonians. Logically, it means division and hatred.

[Petrov] Why is that?

[Batkovski] Because if we say that the Albanians have suffered a kind of a slavery, then the question is—from whom? We know that slavery must be implemented by somebody. I repeat, the global orientation is the creation of animosity against the legal authorities and the Macedonians as the most numerous population in Macedonia.

[Petrov] Is this not exaggerated? Could we say that Macedonia is also responsible for this?

[Batjkovski] No, I would not agree. All the data indicates the reverse. For instance, the secondary, high, and university level schools in Macedonia are open to all citizens that fulfill the prescribed conditions. In the past, there were even some privileges for the national minorities and the 10-percent quota is known. In this way it was possible to enroll members of these groups in schools, even though their knowledge was lesser and it was contrary to the principles of any civic society. Nevertheless, this was a democratic concession and an act of good will on the part of the present authorities aimed at resolving interethnic relations in the state. This policy was promoted a long time ago. In the early post-war years, the government of the then very poor and exhausted Macedonia made enormous efforts for the establishment of a network of classes in the Albanian language. For instance, in 1946-47, 148 elementary schools in Albanian were opened and by 1967 there were 256 such schools. In that period, the density of the educational network in the Albanian language was greater than the general situation in schools in Macedonia. This was noted in an appropriate publication by the republican Department for Statistics. This is why it must be clearly pointed out that the Republic of Macedonia cannot be held to blame by the ethnic Albanian minority.

I think that enormous damage to the stability of the whole state has already been done at the political level, the existing interethnic friction in the western parts of Macedonia will become even more intensive, and relations will further cool down.

[Box, p 4]

Tetovo University To Open on 17 December

The announced university in the Albanian language will be opened in Tetovo on 17 December and lectures are expected to start in January next year. According to statements by Fadil Sulejmani, president of the provisional department of the university, the deadline for an answer to their request to the government to open a university has passed and "there can be no going back."

In the meantime, they will be requesting a meeting with President Kiro Gligorov, but, as Sulejmani said, this will be just an informative discussion in which Sulejmani's "word will be the first and the last." Top government officials in the Republic of Macedonia will also be invited to the opening of the university, which will consist of seven faculties.

Slovenia Becomes NAA Associate Member

95P20199A Ljubljana SLOVENEC in Slovenian 19 Nov 94 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Slovenia - NAA Associate Member"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ljubljana — The permanent committee of the North Atlantic Assembly [NAA], the parliamentary arm of NATO, has accepted Slovenia as an associate member. This was ceremoniously announced at a meeting of the NAA in Washington on 18 November. This decision is an important event for Slovenia because of the well-known difficulties Slovenia has experienced in seeking integration into the EU [European Union] and because the North Atlantic Assembly has accepted, so far, as associate members only those countries that had already concluded an agreement on associate membership with the EU.

Defense Ministry Monitoring Situation in Bihac

AU0112150194 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 30 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Defense Ministry is monitoring the situation in western Bosnia constantly and reporting in a timely fashion to the government offices about worrying consequences that could alter the strategic balance of powers.

Because of the escalation of the situation, Slovenia is also threatened with a fresh wave of refugees, Defense Minister Jelko Kacin stated at the news conference at noon.

The central attention of the conference was devoted to an interpellation in the work of the defense minister. Kacin said that the authors of the interpellation were not the deputies signed underneath it, but Janez Jansa, president of the Social Democratic Party, who had announced the interpellation at the party meeting on 24 November. According to Kacin, the interpellation also has an effect on the electoral campaign, because it mentions some candidates for local elections. [passage omitted]

Federal

Rain Level Forces Cut in Hydroelectric Energy

LD3011192394 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1502 GMT 30 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Kladovo, 30 Nov—Serbia's hydro-electric power plants annual production has but cut in half due to low levels of rain for this time of year, Stanisa Paunovic, the director of power generating and waterways system of Djerdap said today.

Today, Serbia's hydro-electric power plants today delivered only 20 million kilowatt-hours of energy instead of 40, Paunovic said. [passage omitted]

Report Describes 'Heroj' Class Submarine

AU0112104094 Belgrade VOJSKA in Serbo-Croatian 17 Nov 94 p 19

[Bosko Antic report: "'Heroj' Submarine"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Heroj" class submarines are modern torpedo underwater ships with high combat qualities. They were built in Yugoslav shipyards in cooperation with the former Shipbuilding Institute and numerous suppliers from the former Yugoslavia. They were designed by experts employed with the Institute of Military Technology.

Both Yugoslav and foreign equipment were used in the manufacturing process. The latest technological achievements in the field of underwater shipbuilding were applied and high-quality materials used.

This is a single-hull submarine with one drive shaft and appropriately positioned rudder and screw. The arrangement of the buoyancy tanks, the discharge system, and a small reserve buoyancy make rapid vertical movements possible. Good stability and good underwater and surface maneuvering properties make the submarine safe and easy to control.

Optimum dimensions, a cylinder-shaped hull, as well as good hydrodynamic properties enable it to reach maximum underwater speeds for this submarine type.

High-capacity lead accumulator batteries of small dimensions serve as the energy source. Propulsion is diesel-electric. The snorkel makes it possible to charge batteries under water. The machines are installed in the so-called anti-shock arrangement.

The submarine is highly automated, which means that the machines and the mechanism are controlled by only a few people. Special attention is paid to the quality and position of hydroacoustic instruments.

In favorable propulsion conditions under water, this submarine model is noiseless. Apart from that it is safe and it can reach considerable depths, which properties enable it to perform secret military operations. The ability to reach great depths, its significant radius of action, good maneuvering properties, and autonomous operation, as well as the efficiency of its weapons, make this submarine one of the best achievements in this underwater ship class.

[Box, p 19]

Displacement, tons: 614.5 surfaced; 704.6 dived. Dimensions, meters: length 50.38, width 4.00, height 5.68, draft 4.22. Machinery: 2 diesels 400 kw each and electric motors 1.192 kw each. Speed, knots: 9.86 surfaced; 15.30 dived. Economical surface speed 8.94 knots, economical underwater speed 4.22 knots. Weapons: 533-mm torpedo tubes—6. Compliment: 55.

Publications Examine Air Routes From Belgrade

95P20198A

[FBIS Media Note] REPUBLIKA, a Slovene-language daily published in Trieste, announced on 8 November that the Yugoslav airline JAT was set to initiate air service from Belgrade to Trieste on 10 November. After having received permission from the Italian Government, JAT was to commence twice-weekly charter flights (Tuesdays and Thursdays) from Belgrade to Trieste, according to the report.

The 9 November REPUBLIKA expanded on this report, adding that a round-trip business class ticket would cost 760 German marks and a tourist class 500 marks. According to the article, JAT wants to attract passengers from northern Italy, Istria, and Slovenia, particularly many FRY (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) citizens living in Italy, citing as "decisive" a great deal of interest for the flights among Italian businessmen. JAT estimates that the Belgrade-Trieste flights will be 80-percent booked after the first month of operation and is already planning to expand its service to Trieste to four flights a week, in addition to three flights a week to Klagenfurt in southern Austria. Saso Mrvaljevic, chief of JAT's operations for Slovenia, told the paper that passengers from Slovenia would be able to obtain tickets through a Slovene travel agency, since under the sanctions, the Yugoslav airline does not do any business in Slovenia.

The 8 November Ljubljana daily SLOVENEC reported that, contrary to reports in September and October, the Slovenian airline Adria Airways does not plan to fly to Belgrade "for now." Although Adria Airways' commercial director conceded that the Ljubljana-Belgrade air route would be in Adria's business interest, the deal fell through because of political conditions stipulated by JAT. These conditions were detailed in the 8 November issue of the Ljubljana daily DELO: The establishment of diplomatic relations between Slovenia and the FRY and the signing of a bilateral agreement on air traffic.

Montenegro

Trial Run Begins of Third Private Radio Station

LD3011151394 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1305 GMT 30 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Pljevlja [northern Montenegro], 30 Nov (TANJUG)—A trial run began today in Pljevlja of Radio Panorama, the third private radio station in Montenegro.

Citizens of Pljevlja can now listen to two local radio stations. Radio Pljevlja began to broadcast experimentally on 19 November between 1200 and 1400 [1100 and 1300 GMT] on FM and on the medium wave, and Radio Panorama is broadcasting from today from 1100 to 1500 on FM.

Radio Pljevlja is part of the Pljevlja Public Company Information Center, as is "Pljevljanske Novine," and the founder of the Information Center is the municipal assembly.

The owner of Radio Panorama is Hasena Lujinovic.

Kosovo

Serb Police Continue Arrests, Mistreatment

AU3011143994 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1735 GMT 29 Nov 94

[Report by Leke Musolli]

[FBIS Translated Text] Activists of the Independent Trade Union and former workers at the Secretariat of Internal Affairs of Kosova have become Serbian police targets for days.

The Kosova Information Center reports that on 29 November, Enver Krasniqi, former security worker in Kline, was arrested at a house on Saraleve Street in Prishtina, where he was staying as a guest. Reports confirm that in the early hours of 29 November, the house of Bedri Uniku, a former Secretariat of Internal Affairs employee, was raided. After the raid, Bedri Uniku was arrested by the police and sent to the police station in Gjakove. We have no information regarding his release.

Reports from Gjakove inform that following their arrest several days ago, Muhamet Nimani, Xhavit Osmani, Tahir Bexhani, Ahmet Hasi, Bibe Biblekaj, Zenel Rama, Zeke Beka, Xhafer Sahatciu, and Faton Kumnova were sent to Prishtina on 28 November. Meanwhile, Sali Hakaj was released from detention on Sunday, 27 November.

The Information Commission of the Democratic League of Kosova branch in Vushtrri reports that several days ago, the Serbian police arrested Enver Magjuni, former top chief of the police station, and Selam Shala, former commander of the police in Vushtrri.

Meanwhile, a report from Podujeve confirms that on Friday, a Serbian police expedition raided the home of Isak Saliu under the pretext of searching for arms. After the raid, the police apprehended Isak Saliu and his 18-year-old son Muhedin and sent them to the police station in Podujeve, where they were brutally beaten. It is reported that, following police torture, Isak Saliu and his seven-member family felt obliged to abandon their home, leaving all family property at mercy's fate.

Serbs Conduct Albanian Library 'Inquisition'

AU3011144094 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1735 GMT 29 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The Serbian authorities have carried out an inquisition against Albanian books and other publications in over 60 libraries in Kosova. Many libraries have been closed, while over 200,000 library units have been isolated, crippled, or destroyed. This violence also included the Popular and University Libraries in Kosova, founded 50 years ago.

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